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Abstract
Plans by utility standards organizations and privately-owned companies to
transition control and monitoring of the US power grid and other utility infrastructures
from simple, proprietary protocols to open, IP-based architectures and standards will
reduce operating costs and expand customer support options but will also face several
serious obstacles to implementation. First, TCP/IP and the Internet were never designed
for the hard real-time packet delivery required by SCADA systems. Second, the
alarming rise each year in reported corporate downtime, financial loss, and espionage
from insiders and Internet attackers, often using widely available exploits, foreshadows
an increasing vulnerability of utility data and control systems. With the swift move to
embrace IP-based control systems, there is surprisingly little available research regarding
means to ensure continuous, safe, and secure operation of these critical infrastructures in
the face of determined cyber threats.
This thesis investigates network security policies and mechanisms for control
system networks using a mix of TCP and UDP transport protocols over IP. It
recommends flexible, scalable, modular, and cost-effective security solutions that can be
added in strategic locations to protect existing legacy architectures and accommodate
transition to IP standards. User-definable rules and responses enact the unique policies of
organizations that must operate with zero failures in environments with varying levels of
uncertainty and trust.
This thesis proposes and evaluates a comprehensive and collaborative security
concept, defined as a trust system, that is based on a best-of-breed application of
standard IT network security mechanisms and IP protocols. The trust system provides
seamless, automated command and control for suppression of network attacks and other
v

suspicious events. It also supplies access control, format validation, event analysis,
alerting, blocking, and event logging at any network-level and can do so on behalf of any
system that does not have the resources to perform these functions itself.
This thesis simulates layering mechanisms for encryption, authentication, traffic
filtering, content checks, and event correlation over real-time data acquisition, control,
and protection signaling in order to mitigate malicious activities from both internal and
external sources. Latency calculations are used to estimate limits of applicability within
a company and between geographically separated company and area control centers,
scalable to hierarchical regional and national implementations.
A successful solution at any level requires balancing the protection of private
communities of interest while fostering a combination of centralized and distributed
emergency prediction, mitigation, detection, and response. To achieve this, while
meeting strict time constraints, secure and dynamic peer-to-peer mechanisms are assisted
by bandwidth guarantee algorithms in automatically sharing critical status information
within and between organizations to enhance real-time situational awareness and prevent
catastrophic power outages that would otherwise cascade across large control and
reliability boundaries.
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COLLABORATIVE, TRUST-BASED SECURITY MECHANISMS
FOR A NATIONAL UTILITY INTRANET

I. Introduction
1.1

Background
The U.S. utility industry operates and maintains a significant portion of national

critical infrastructure, supplying electrical generation and transmission, nuclear power
production, water and waste management, oil and gas, and other critical services to
consumers; seaports, airports, and other transportation systems; and numerous
manufacturing plants, government offices, and businesses throughout the country.
Systems used to manage these complex networks, often with thousands of
monitored nodes, have to be capable of reliable and accurate hard real-time or near realtime responses to fluctuations and emergency situations. Traditionally, each company
purchased and installed its own proprietary systems and protocols from various vendors
with no overall guiding interoperability standards adhered to by the community
as a whole.
In system design, interoperability and security were often of a lower priority than
efficiency and functionality. Many companies took comfort in the uniqueness and
complexity of their systems as a means of security from would-be attackers. The need
for interoperability was not critical for larger companies that could control the cradle-tograve supply of services, from generation to transmission and distribution, to meet
customer demands for an entire metropolitan area.
In the electrical power industry, deregulation has resulted in fragmenting many of
1

the previously held monopolies so that each privately-owned company specializes in only
one function of the power grid (i.e. generation, transmission, distribution, etc.) with less
wide-area visibility. It has also served to increase competition among these companies
resulting in a greater need for management efficiencies and protection of companysensitive data from unauthorized disclosure to competitors. These new trends point to a
need for greater collaboration and situational awareness while providing strict network
security in an environment prone to variable trust relationships.
1.2

Problem Statement
In recent years, the utility community has drifted away from the proprietary

systems and protocols that once dominated the industry toward adoption of more
open, networked communication standards for control and data acquisition, patterned
after the efficiencies and lower cost of technologies seen in the Internet. The increased
competition has made the lower cost and interoperability of IP-based, plug-and-play,
Commercial-of-the Shelf (COTS) technologies attractive. These signs point to the
eventual development of a Utility-specific Intranet, patterned after, yet unconnected to,
the global Internet.
The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), riding upon the Internet Protocol (IP)
is the most common Internet standard for reliable information transfer with delivery
confirmation. In November 1999, the TCP/IP framework was mandated by the
International Electro-Technical Committee (IEC), a standards organization for the
community, so that every modern computer and operating system integrated into the
SCADA network will have a TCP/IP network stack.
2

Whether the legacy proprietary protocols were any less vulnerable to attack
because of their obscurity is unlikely, however with the shift to IP-standards and common
control system operating systems (e.g. Windows®, Linux®, Solaris®, UNIX®) it is certain
that they are becoming more vulnerable to a wider audience of skilled and amateur
attackers, familiar with the numerous IP-based exploits, techniques, and attack tools
freely downloadable from the Internet [1].
Power engineers wanting to maintain strict processes and speed of operation
claim that the vast majority of common IT security mechanisms will upset the delicate
balance and cannot be applied to SCADA networks. IT personnel familiar with the
security mechanisms used to defend more delay-tolerant office networks see these as the
most secure measures for protecting computer systems against the potential threats from
malicious code and online exploits for which they are all too familiar. Both parties are at
odds as to the role, priority, and best implementation of security countermeasures.
1.3

Research Objectives, Questions, and Hypotheses
The purpose of this thesis research is to investigate the claims from both sides

regarding employment of common, delay-inducing network security mechanisms to realtime SCADA and near real-time wide-area measurement systems (WAMS).
It is the hypothesis of this author that an acceptable, low-cost form of standard IT
security measures may be applied to a Utility Intranet to secure communications from
potential attackers, provide automated responses to identified attacks and suspicious
activity, and increase situational awareness throughout the network within the real-time
reaction timelines for SCADA operations.
3

1.4

Research Focus
The focus of this research has been on security for electrical power grid devices

within a company. The concepts and results, however, are applicable to all levels of the
Utility Intranet from company-level substation automation and control center operations
to area-wide, regional, and even National Interconnection organizations (or any nonutility communications network for that matter).
1.5

Investigative Questions
Research was designed to answer the following questions:
1. What delay will be induced by each security component?
2. What accidental and malicious actions can the security mechanisms identify
and mitigate?
3. Which mechanisms are the most appropriate for each possible operational
configuration and each envisioned attack scenario?

1.6

Methodology
To begin with, it was assumed that future Utility Intranet SCADA networks will

resemble IT network architecture. A collaborative trust system capability has been
derived as a hybrid solution comprised of the most secure IT security mechanisms and
standard IP protocols while focusing on the distinct requirements of the SCADA
community.
To test the hypotheses specified in Section 1.3, a C++ implementation of a
simplistic trust system was created that could evaluate and respond to incoming
messages read in from a scenario file. The delays for processing at the trust system were
4

measured and summed with the delays for sender-to-receiver encryption, transmission,
and propagation, to render the total per-packet and per-scenario latency values.
1.7

Assumptions and Limitations
The delays for router queuing and processing as well as encryption and decryption

were estimated based on measurements presented in the literature. While these
occurrences are responsible for the greatest amount of end-to-end delay, they do not
detract from the trust system functionality and delay, which is in addition to transit delay
that already exists in a SCADA network.
Detailed IEC 61850 message structure was not available for this thesis research.
Message types for scenarios were selected only to illustrate the types of messages that
might be present in a Utility Intranet but do not necessarily duplicate the IEC standards
format. The messages chosen, however, are likely to be larger than SCADA messages
for the same purpose because of full-character representation of some data vice integer
representations and abbreviations likely with real-world optimizations to keep packets as
small as possible. The messages defined for use in this thesis also contain the additional
overhead of TCP, IP, larger IPV6 address, and encryption. The trust system results
accurately represent the delay for trust system evaluation of real-world messages of the
same general size.
1.8

Implications
This thesis research shows that, even with TCP/IP and UDP/IP communications,

Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) encryption, firewall rules, format check, and access
control functions, the recommended security schema can perform within near real-time
5

and at the high end of real-time response time constraints. It is therefore deduced that
with further optimizations, the same schema can be improved to perform satisfactorily in
many real-time scenarios.
1.9

Preview
Chapter 2 describes requirements of real-time SCADA network communications

and the challenges facing those who attempt to secure them. It also presents the results of
investigating on-going research in the field related to SCADA security. Finally it
suggests the ways in which the trust system concept can solve existing security
problems.
Chapter 3 describes the recommended trust system implementation in detail.
Chapter 4 demonstrates functionality of the trust system simulation and presents
several realistic scenarios for attacks against a SCADA network. It also presents the
calculated delay estimates for each scenario.
Chapter 5 concludes this thesis with recommendations for future research in trust
system code optimization, refinement of IEC 61850 message structure, and bandwidth
guarantees.

6

II. Literature Review
2.1.

Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to present relevant background material and

existing research as the foundation for investigative questions, assumptions, and direction
guiding this thesis work.
2.2

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Overview
In North America, the term Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)

is only applied to either a central system that monitors and controls a complete site or a
system spread out over a long distance (i.e. on the order of kilometers or miles) for largescale distributed measurement and control [2]. It is interesting to note that that
throughout the rest of the world, even a single system that performs supervisory control
and data acquisition functions, regardless of its size or geographical distribution, is
referred to as a SCADA system, including those that only monitor without performing
control functions [2].
There is a distinction between supervisory control and real-time (or process)
control. Whereas, the real-time control system within a utility provides automated
control of a process that is external to the SCADA system, the supervisory control
function is implemented by a SCADA system that is overlaid onto the automated realtime control system. SCADA servers provide a human operator with alarms, status,
performance data, and statistics of the real-time process. The SCADA system is typically
not critical to controlling the industrial process in real-time, because the separate (or
integrated) real-time automated control system is designed to respond quickly enough to
7

compensate for process changes within the time-constraints of the process. The SCADA
system, however, allows the operator to poll for information or issue commands in the
event of a failure in the automated process and must still meet stringent time constraints.
SCADA systems are found throughout the public utility industry and are integral
to operation of our national critical infrastructure. SCADA systems are used to monitor
and control geographically separated utility sites such as oil and gas pipelines and
refineries, electrical power generation facilities and transmission grids, air traffic control
towers, railways, maritime ports, water and waste management facilities, chemical
plants, manufacturing facilities, and telephone and cell phone networks, including 911
emergency services [3, 4]. Due the mission critical nature of a large number of SCADA
computer systems, attacks could result, directly or indirectly, in massive financial and
sensitive data losses, destruction of facilities, or loss of life.
Scenarios such as massive power blackouts, oil refinery explosions, or waste
mixed with drinking water due to SCADA system compromise, failure, or degradation
have the potential to inflict significant damage to human life and critical infrastructure at
local, regional, or national levels. If synchronized with a physical attack or the aftermath
of a natural disaster, cyber attacks on SCADA systems could greatly escalate fatalities in
a region already rendered unable to coordinate a timely response or ill-prepared to offer
necessary shelter, clean water, and contamination control, perfect methods for inciting
terror once again in America.
One can imagine the disastrous, synergistic effect of an explosion in a nuclear
facility releasing nuclear contamination in the vicinity of a large population area
immediately following a winter storm or summer hurricane that limits traversal of major
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roadways and at the same time that the city’s water system has been contaminated with
sewage or bacteria and its electricity blacked out for well over a week. The combination
of prolonged extreme (either sub-freezing or above 100 degree) temperatures, disease,
and radioactivity would account for numerous deaths. The effects of Hurricane Katrina
alone, in 2005, resulted in well over 1400 confirmed deaths, this amidst early warning
and active emergency response efforts [5].
Meticulously planned and well-executed cyber attacks, whether conducted solely
by remote network access or in conjunction with a malicious insider, is not an impossible
scenario. What if similar actions were coordinated by terrorist agents to attack multiple
cities within a region simultaneously?
2.3

The Threat to Utility Operations
2.3.1

Threat Sources.

Potential sources for cyber attacks and operational disruptions (whether accidental
or intentional) on SCADA and other utility resources are listed in Table 1.

Table 1. Sources and Motivations for Utility Disruptions and Attack [6]
Source
Industrial sabotage
or theft
Concentrated physical
and cyber attack
Vendor compromise
Technical design error
or environmental
influence
Natural disasters
Operator error

Reason
Financial advantage in insider trading or competing vendor partnerships
Destruction, terror, or activism
Easier to target the supplier than the defended infrastructure itself [7]
Hardware or code; network design, installation and configuration; or
interferences from other technologies in the environment
Earthquakes, tornadoes, volcanoes, fire, thunderstorms, and snow storms
Misjudgment, misconfiguration, or failure to remember operational details,
resulting in dangerous and costly results
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2.3.2 Specific Threats.
Theoretical scenarios abound; however, many businesses and engineers are
incredulous or simply lack the resources or technical expertise to plan and maintain
security upgrades that might eat into company profits or potentially affect performance.
There is also an “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” mentality that can still be found regarding
modifying or rethinking control system operations and cyber security implementations.
Table 2 summarizes the potential threats to utilities from the sources listed in Table 1.
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Table 2. Summary of Threats from Potential Sources of Attack or Disruption [1]
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Improper application of software patches
Plant shutdown for maintenance and start-up after
maintenance (many harmful events occur as a result of
plant maintenance shutdown and start-up)
Access lock-out (locked accounts, admin usernames and
passwords changed)
Removal or misconfiguration of connectivity paths
Physical destruction of systems, resources, or
infrastructure
Downloading malicious code (i.e. autonomous worms
randomly searching for propagation paths, viruses,
Trojan horses, etc.)
Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed-denial-ofservice (DDoS) attacks, such as those that overwhelm
network bandwidth
Control message spoofing
Data acquisition message spoofing so everything looks
normal to prevent response or bad to prompt dangerous
responses
Password or message sniffing
Installation of backdoors to the network
Unauthorized data or code access, use, theft,
modification,
re-routing, and/or deletion
Unauthorized access to or modification of audit logs,
firewall logs, and IDSs signatures/alerts
GPS timeserver corruption
Electromagnetic interference (EMI) and radio frequency
interference (RFI)
Noise on power lines
Interdependence with other networks and support
elements
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Table 3 details potential avenues of attack or disruption in today’s utility networks that
require either elimination or defenses. It also lists the specific trust system functions
that can be applied as a defense-in-depth strategy along these pathways.

Table 3. Potential Attack Routes Requiring Elimination or Defenses [1]
Attack Routes
Internet connections
Business or enterprise network connections
IT/Vendor connections to SCADA framework[6]
Connections to other networks
Compromised VPNs
Back-door connections through dial-up modems
Unsecured wireless connections discovered by wardriving laptop users
Malformed IP packets, in which packet header
information conflicts with actual packet data
IP fragmentation attacks, where a small fragment is
transmitted that forces some of the TCP header field
into a second fragment
Vulnerabilities in SNMP, which is used to gather
network information and provide notification of
network events
Open computer ports, such as UDP and TCP ports
that are unprotected or left open unnecessarily
Weak authentication protocols in SCADA elements
Maintenance hooks or trap doors, which are means to
circumvent security controls during SCADA system
development, testing, and maintenance
E-mail transactions on control network
Buffer overflow attacks on SCADA control servers,
which are accessed by PLCs and SCADA HMIs
Leased, private telephone lines
GPS conditioned timeserver
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Trust System Mitigating Functions
Firewall rules
Firewall rules, network Access Control Matrix
(ACM)
Firewall rules, network ACM
Firewall rules, network ACM
Network logon enforcement, nodal and networklevel ACMs, Suspicious Event Handler
Nodal and network-level ACMs, source tracking
ACM, source tracking, encryption and
authentication enforcement, network logon
enforcement
Packet format analysis, Suspicious Event
Handler
Packet format analysis, Suspicious Event
Handler
Packet format analysis, Suspicious Event
Handler
Firewall rules
Encryption and authentication enforcement
Nodal and network-level ACMs

Traffic prioritization, antivirus scans, DoS
detection and blocking, firewall rules
Packet format analysis, Suspicious Event
Handler
Nodal ACM
Firewall rules, packet format analysis, trust
systems’ collaboration synchronized off of
network-level trust system internal clock as
back-up time-stamping source

2.3.3

Open Source Intelligence.

Even for legacy control systems with proprietary hardware and software, the
knowledge needed to cause a widespread power blackout is readily available on the
Internet, where SCADA vendor websites post manuals, downloadable software, and
source code for major applications [8]. Vendor sites often list well-known customers
with detailed case studies of how these customers have implemented their systems and
which products they have. In fact, it has been found that “over 90% of major SCADA
and automation vendors have all of their technical manuals and specifications available
on-line to the general public” [8].
Many corporate websites list their training materials and operating manuals,
presentations about vulnerabilities and what they think hackers could do, firewall
policies, network diagrams, spreadsheets listing accounts and DNS or IP addresses,
backup and sample configuration files for the control systems, protocol documentation,
as well as documentation of simple penetration testing techniques, examples, and hacker
scripts [8].
2.3.4

Real-world Incidents.

There have been several well-known, real-world incidents affecting SCADA
systems, and very likely many others never publicized, that clearly illustrate the
vulnerability of our critical infrastructure [7].
1. During the Cold War, the US provided Trojan firmware to the Soviet Union,
causing a pipeline to explode in one of the world’s largest non-nuclear explosions [7].
SCADA software, hardware, or firmware can be maliciously produced and sold to US
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companies by foreign or domestic entities with the intent to destroy the power supply to a
region.
2. In 1992, a former Chevron employee disabled its emergency alert system in 22
states, which wasn’t discovered until an emergency happened that needed alerting [7].
3. In 1997, a teenager broke into the NYNEX telephone network and cut off
Massachusetts’ Worcester Airport for six hours, affecting air and ground communications
[7].
4. In 2000, former employee Vitek Boden, exploited a wireless link to the
SCADA system for the Queensland, Australia, Maroochy Shire sewage control system,
releasing a million liters of sewage into the coastal waterways over a period of four
months [7].
5. Also in 2000, the Russian government announced that hackers, acting together
with a company insider, succeeded in bypassing Gazprom security measures and gained
control of the system regulating gas flows for the world’s largest natural gas pipeline
network [7].
6. Some computers and manuals seized from Al Qaeda terrorist safe houses in
Afghanistan contained SCADA information regarding dams and related structures, but no
implementation plan [7]. Terrorists have been searching for critical infrastructure targetsof-opportunity for many years.
7. In 2001, hackers broke into CAL-ISO, California’s primary electric power grid
operator, and weren’t discovered for 17 days [3:75].
8. In 2003, the Ohio Davis-Besse nuclear power plant safety monitoring system
was offline for five hours due to the Slammer Worm [7].
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9. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina disrupted a few refineries in the southern coast of
the US, affecting gasoline prices world-wide [7]. Shutdown by cyber attack has the
potential to affect supplies of gasoline, electricity, or water and corresponding global
stock prices.
2.4

Changes in the SCADA Environment
SCADA systems evolved from proprietary hardware and software platforms used

in the 1960s to acquire data from and control real-time systems. The networks and
protocols used in SCADA systems were also proprietary and customized to meet the
specific needs of the industrial world [1].
There was no Internet or World Wide Web (WWW) at the time, and the SCADA
systems were self-contained, so they were generally considered safe against malicious
intrusions from the outside, but have always been vulnerable to threats from the inside.
Even when the Internet emerged and SCADA systems began to incorporate standard
hardware and software platforms that had known vulnerabilities, the mentality of most
SCADA operators and managers remained the same. The SCADA community believed
that external hackers were not interested in their applications and probably did not know
much about the existence and configuration of SCADA systems. Even in the 1980s and
early 1990s, most documented SCADA security incidents were either initiated by
disgruntled employees or were the result of accidents. SCADA systems were not even
considered IT systems, and were assumed to be relatively less vulnerable to IT-type cyber
attacks. Even to this day, many SCADA systems are perceived as either nearly
invulnerable to cyber attacks or uninteresting to potential hackers [1].
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Within the last few years, several changes have begun to impact SCADA system
operation, design, communications, and security—increasing the risks, vulnerabilities,
and the complexity of defining network security measures for this unique environment.
The restructuring of the utility industry has increased competition while driving
the need for more efficient operations and better coordination among utility companies.
Two major elements are involved. The first element of restructuring is regulatory. Using
the electric power industry as an example, power grids, historically, were centrally
controlled and operated. Changes in the regulatory structure now encourage independent
ownership of generators and favor the emergence of competitive mechanisms by which
organizations can enter into bilateral or multilateral power generation contracts. The
second element in restructuring is a consequence of the first, involving large-scale
operation of the grid. In the past, this was a centralized task. In the restructured climate, a
number of competing power producers must coordinate their actions through a set of
independent service operators (ISO). The process of restructuring has occurred
incrementally. In its earliest stages, large monopoly-style utilities that might have owned
beginning-to-end power production and delivery processes were broken into smaller
companies with typically specialized roles in only generation, transmission, or
distribution. At the same time, there has been a slow but steady growth in the numbers of
long-distance contracts.
Stress on the electric power grid continues to rise in the current deregulated
environment as the demand for power grows with increasing population and infusion of
technology into businesses and homes. With increasing demands world-wide for electric
power, the grid is being operated closer and closer to its limits. Despite this reality, the
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generation and transmission capacity of the grid has not been widely upgraded to
accommodate greater output and flows. Deregulation has served to exacerbate this
situation.
The deregulated utilities have been forced to split into separate companies, each
devoted to different aspects of the power grid, in place of the vertically integrated
structure that existed in the past. Generation, distribution, and transmission systems all
have separate owners under this new arrangement. The transmission system, in
particular, is typically owned and controlled now by the ISO in each region of the grid.
This operating arrangement is problematic in the sense that none of these entities has an
incentive to upgrade the transmission infrastructure. Ostensibly, this is the responsibility
of the ISO, but they lack an economic incentive for adding new transmission lines in the
same way that a generation company has a clear motive to add new power plants to the
grid.
The new structure of the power grid has led to increased competition between
utilities that might have cooperated with one another in the past. This complicates the
proper detection and response to faults that occur in the electric power grid since
information that might have been shared in the past is seen as proprietary for economic
reasons [9].
There is also an emerging trend in many organizations comprising SCADA and
conventional IT systems toward consolidating overlapping activities. For example,
control engineering might be absorbed or closely integrated with the corporate IT
department. In addition, integrating SCADA data collection and monitoring with
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corporate financial and customer data provides management with an increased ability to
run the organization more efficiently and effectively [1].
This drive for efficiency and cost savings has led SCADA system and architecture
designers to begin patterning utility communications after the rapid changes occurring in
the larger Information Technology (IT) and networking industry by becoming more open
and at the same time more interconnected. For economic and efficiency reasons, the
primitive legacy systems are being upgraded using Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS)
hardware and software, and are being migrated from isolated in-plant networks using
proprietary hardware and software to standard data formats and network protocols,
particularly Transport Control Protocol (TCP) for end-to-end control. This trend is
motivated by cost savings achieved by consolidating disparate platforms, networks,
software, and maintenance tools [10]. The downside of this transition has been to expose
SCADA operating systems to the same vulnerabilities and threats that plague Windows
and Linux-based PCs and their associated networks connected to the Internet.
2.5

A Future Utility Intranet
Most researchers anticipate that an Internet-like Utility Intranet (also referred to

as a Utilities Network or Superstructure), dedicated to the power grid and mostly isolated
from the public Internet, will emerge in the coming decade, with TCP likely to be the
primary transport protocol [10]. Another reason SCADA is likely to migrate to a Utility
Intranet is due to the higher polling rates that would be possible with the increased
bandwidth available in the new communications infrastructure [9]. Given the stricter
response thresholds of SCADA systems, this presents an extreme challenge in providing
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for their security in an environment where connections to the Internet (whether known or
not) are almost certain to exist, providing a tempting avenue for attempted cyber attacks.
The move to a universal protocol among all utilities is slow at best but will
probably be dominated by the use of Ethernet as a common carrier for data because of the
ease of use and low cost of Ethernet LAN systems. Many newly developed SCADA
applications and many future variants will use various protocols but ride over IP [11].
The power industry is turning towards next-generation communications systems
in order to meet the increased demands that are being placed on the electric power grid.
These standards point toward the future adoption of a private Utility Intranet based on
Internet technology to improve the efficiency and reliability of the power grid. The
Utility Intranet is likely to begin as an effort to improve upon the monitoring, protection,
and control of individual utilities and, with communication standards, will lead to the
interconnection of the utilities’ data networks in the same way that the electric power grid
has become integrated over time. The introduction of a Utility Intranet has many
potential benefits such as increased information sharing, greater protection and control of
the grid, and the enhanced ability to share power in complex situations such as bilateral
load following. However, great care must be taken to ensure that network capacities,
communication protocols, security, and quality of service (QoS) requirements are
appropriately managed to ensure that the Utility Intranet will be able to meet the demands
that are placed on it by increasing consumption rates [9].
Traditionally, SCADA systems and corporate IT systems have focused on very
different information assurance priorities. Whereas IT system priorities are
confidentiality, authentication, integrity, availability, and non-repudiation, SCADA
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systems emphasize reliability, real-time response, tolerance of emergency situations,
personnel safety, product quality, and plant safety, usually to the exclusion of any
security mechanism that might hinder these.
Now, with the compatibility and overlap of the two networks, both SCADA and
corporate IT will have to develop complementary security models. Current issues such
as dial-in modems connected to one system compromising the other, the possibility of
unprotected, rogue corporate Internet connections rexposing the SCADA network, the
real-time deterministic requirements of SCADA systems, and 24/7 operations require
deconfliction of the disparate cultures of SCADA and IT [1]. A good example of this
sort of problem is the routinely scheduled downtime for IT organizations to upgrade,
patch vulnerabilities, perform backups, and so on [1].

Such downtime cannot be

tolerated for most SCADA systems [1].
Throughout this transition to a Utility Intranet, SCADA system networks must be
well defended yet maintain the same level of service required by their customers [3].
Blindly layering standard IT security mechanisms on top of SCADA networks will not
work without accounting for their unique requirements and time constraints; therefore, it
is important to first understand current and future SCADA architectures and operational
philosophies.
2.6

Substation Integration and Automation
The electrical power substation integration and automation system is the

combination of equipment and communications infrastructure by which raw data
measurements and system health status updates are processed and transmitted from
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remote substation equipment to SCADA systems and historical databases for human
interaction. It is also the means by which commands or polls for information are
communicated in the reverse direction.
Substation integration involves integrating protection, control, and data
acquisition functions into a minimal number of platforms to reduce capital and operating
costs, reduce panel and control room space, and eliminate redundant equipment and
databases [7].
Substation automation (SA) involves the deployment of substation and feeder
operating functions and applications ranging from SCADA and alarm processing to
integrated volt/Var control in order to optimize the management of capital assets and
enhance operation and maintenance efficiencies with minimal human intervention [7].
Substation integration and automation can be broken down into five levels. The
lowest level is the power system equipment, such as transformers and circuit breakers.
The middle three levels are Intelligent Electronic Device (IED) implementation, IED
integration, and substation automation applications. The focus today is on the integration
of the IEDs. Once this is done, the focus will shift to what automation applications should
run at the substation level [7].
The highest level of substation integration and automation is the utility enterprise.
There are three primary functional data paths from the substation to the utility enterprise:
1. Operational data to the SCADA system
2. Non-operational data to the data warehouse
3. Remote access to the IED
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2.7

Operational Data to the SCADA System
2.7.1 SCADA System Components.
Historically substation field devices had no standardized way to present

information to an operator. They were distributed across a plant, making it difficult to
gather data from all of them manually, therefore, the purpose of the SCADA system was
to gather information from the field devices and other controllers, then present it to the
human operator in easy to understand graphics.
The most common substation automation data path is conveying this operational
data from the substation to the utility’s SCADA system every 2 to 4 s. Operational data
(also called SCADA data) includes instantaneous values of power system analog and
status points such as volts, amps, MW, MVAR, circuit breaker status, and switch
position. This data is time critical for the utility’s dispatchers to monitor and control the
power system (e.g., opening circuit breakers, changing tap settings, equipment failure
indication, etc.). The operational data path to the SCADA system uses the
communication protocol presently supported by the SCADA system [7]. The SCADA
system itself has the following four components:
1. Multiple field devices (i.e. power equipment, IEDs, RTUs, and PLCs)
2. Substation data concentrator
3. SCADA master station, HMI, and databases
4. Communications infrastructure
The first two components are within the substations themselves. The third
component interfaces to the company control center, engineering center, and corporate
22

offices. The communications infrastructure is the interconnecting transport mechanism
that ties the SCADA system together
2.7.2 Traditional Field Devices.
The bulk of supervisory control and data acquisition is performed automatically at
the substation level [2]. For years, Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and Remote
Terminal Units (RTUs) carried the load.
The first PLCs used simple software to duplicate the functionality of a rack of
interconnected relays [12]. In the last few years higher end models have been
supplemented with analog inputs and outputs (I/O). The low end PLCs are not even
addressable (i.e. they cannot be used as a slave to another device or as a component in a
control system) [12].
PLCs scan their I/O by electrically reading each I/O point. In a system with lots of
I/O points it can take some time to completely scan all the points. PLCs can be used as
stand-alone devices but they are difficult to configure, requiring ladder logic
programming [12]. When a substation contains lots of I/O that must be monitored or
controlled, PLCs are not the best choice, because they are not usable as the master
controller in a control system, neither are they appropriate for use as protocol converters
or for controlling other IEDs [12].
RTUs are more sophisticated than PLCs and have the intelligence needed to
control a process (or multiple processes) without intervention from a more intelligent
controller or master [12]. RTUs offer interrupt driven digital inputs, time stamped
sequence of events, data logging, intelligent communications, multitasking sequential
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control, process identification control, alarm logging, modular construction, and easier
programming than PLCs [12]. Additionally, an RTU can serve both as the master
controller or a slave controller--in fact, it can be used as both a slave and master
simultaneously in a “vertically deployed control system” [12]. An RTU can be used in
conjunction with IEDs as a protocol converter or controller for the IEDs [12].
Because of today’s advancements in microprocessor technology, a single IED is
capable of performing numerous protection, control, auto-reclose, self-monitoring, and
communication functions that used to require separate RTU and PLC devices [13].
2.7.3 Intelligent Electronic Device (IED) Implementation and Integration.
IEDs are a key component of substation integration and automation technology.
An IED is any device that incorporates one or more processors with the capability to
receive or send data/control from or to an external source (e.g., electronic multifunction
meters, digital relays, controllers, and regulators). Their primary function is to process
the incoming analog signals, convert the values directly to a digital form, and forward the
information via their communications link to a substation automation (SA) controller
(also known as a data concentrator). IED technologies help utilities improve reliability,
gain operational efficiencies, and enable asset management programs including predictive
maintenance, life extensions and improved planning. IEDs can also issue control
commands, such as tripping circuit breakers to maintain a steady state if they sense
anomalies or dangerous changes in voltage, current, or frequency. Many IEDs are now
capable of peer-to-peer communications for high-speed protection functions in which any
node can initiate sessions and is able to poll or answer polls from other devices [7:7-6].
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Nearly all electric utilities are implementing IEDs in their substations. New
substations will typically have many IEDs for different functions, and the vast majority of
operational data for the SCADA system will come from these IEDs, with a smaller
amount of direct (i.e. hardwired) input acquired by PLCs.
Typically, there are no conventional RTUs in new substations. Instead, the RTU
functionality is addressed with a mix of IEDs and PLCs using digital communications.
Older substations, that still have a conventional RTU installed, can integrate the RTU
with IEDs, integrate the RTU as just another IED, or retire the RTU altogether and use a
combination of IEDs and PLCs as with new substations [7].
IEDs being implemented in substations today contain valuable information, both
operational and non-operational, needed by many user groups within the utility. Each
device has some internal memory to store data such as analog values, status changes,
sequence of events, and power quality, usually in a first-in, first-out (FIFO) queue, and is
integrated with digital two-way communications [7].
2.7.4

Substation Data Concentrator.

The data concentrator polls each IED or PLC for updates according to the utility’s
SCADA data collection rates (e.g. status points every 2 sec, tie line and generator analogs
every 2 sec, and remaining analog values every 2 to 10 sec). Current systems must
perform protocol translation, converting all of the IED protocols from the various IED
suppliers. Some experts believe that, “even with the protocol standardization efforts
going on in the industry, there will always be legacy protocols that will require protocol
translation” [7:7-5].
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The substation controller collates the data received from the IEDs, performs logic
calculations, time synchronization, filtering, and pre-processing or reformatting of the
substation data to meet presentation requirements of the master control station, operator
workstation clients, or other intended data receivers [14]. The substation controller will
usually have a PC-based substation host processor, or substation HMI, that supports an
archival relational database, GUI, and Windows® Office-like applications. It stores all
analog and status information available for the substation that is required for both
operational and non-operational purposes (e.g. fault-event logs, oscillography, etc.).
The substation host processor and substation controller are optional--either, none,
or both may be present [14]. A substation controller may be PC-based (in which case the
substation controller itself would be the host processor). It could also be a PLC, data
concentrator, or hybrid combination of any of these options [14].
In a truly flat architecture, where substation-level data collation and re-formatting
functions are not required, the IEDs may communicate directly with the remote SCADA
operator clients. The remote clients can then conduct the same data selection tasks by
polling, requesting, or browsing only the specific data required from a particular IED
[14].
Small, secondary substations may have only a data concentrator with no host
processor for user interface or historical data collection. In this case, IED data is sent to a
larger primary substation, which has a complete substation integration and automation
system, to combine the information and interface with the SCADA system.
It is expected that future technological improvements in substation devices will
continue to increase the decentralized gathering/processing of data and alarm
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handling/filtering at the field device (rather than the master control station), direct IED
communications with multiple master stations and databases (reducing the need for data
concentrators), and peer-to-peer status sensing/reaction by neighboring field devices.
2.7.5

SCADA Master Control Station and Human Machine Interface.

The data concentrator forwards all data required for operational purposes to the
SCADA system. The operational data is then compiled and formatted in such a way that
a control room operator can make appropriate supervisory decisions that may be required
to adjust or over-ride normal PLC or IED controls.
A Human-Machine Interface (HMI) computer presents the process data to a
human operator and is the standardized means through which the human operator
monitors, controls, and interacts with the industrial process and its multiple remote
substation field devices. A typical SCADA operator screen shot is depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Example SCADA HMI Control Screen [15]
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A master control station (or simply master station) is compromised of the
supervisory servers and software responsible for communicating with the field devices in
substations and then to the HMI software running on client workstations in the control
center. In smaller SCADA systems, the master control station can be composed of a
single PC. In larger SCADA systems, the master control station may include multiple
servers, distributed software applications, and geographically separated disaster recovery
sites. Today, most major operating systems (e.g. Windows®, Linux®, Solaris®, UNIX®,
etc.) are used for both master control station servers and HMI workstations [2].
SCADA host control functions are almost always restricted to basic site over-ride
or supervisory-level capability. For example, an IED may govern the generation rate of a
generator in a power plant, but the SCADA system may allow an operator to change the
control set point for the current and effective load on the generator, and will allow any
alarm conditions such as extreme frequency or voltage fluctuations to be recorded and
displayed. While the feedback control loop is closed through the IED, the SCADA
system monitors the overall performance of that loop.
Use of newer IEDs and intelligent PLCs, capable of autonomously executing
simple logic processes, is increasing [2]. Instead of relying on operator intervention, or
master control station automation, IEDs may now be required to operate almost entirely
on their own to react to emergencies and perform safety-related tasks [2].
2.7.6 SCADA Databases.
SCADA systems typically implement a distributed operational database,
commonly referred to as a tag database, which contains data elements called tags (or
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points) [2]. A point represents a single input or output value monitored or controlled by
the SCADA system [2]. Point values are normally stored as value-timestamp
combinations (i.e. the value and the timestamp when the value was recorded or
calculated) [2]. A series of value-timestamp combinations is the history of that point [2].
It's also common to store additional metadata with tags such as path-to-field-device and
register, design time comments, and alarm information [2]. Data may also be correlated
by a Historian, often built on a COTS database management system, to allow historical
trending and other analytical work [2].
2.7.7

Communications Infrastructure and Transmission Media.

A system to meet hard real-time or near real-time detection, decision, and reaction
times is strongly dependent on a robust, reliable communications architecture. The
internal substation integration and automation infrastructure and the connections between
utility organizations will become increasingly critical data highways for situational
awareness and response, requiring attention to security, reliability, and, most of all, low
latency. Specific intra-company design criteria include high bandwidth, low bit error
rate, multi-point access, and some degree of redundancy [16].
Electrical utilities have employed a wide range of transmission means to meet
short and long-range communication needs, driven more by cost-efficiency than security.
SCADA systems traditionally relied upon radio or direct serial and modem connections
for communications with substations. Now there is a growing trend in the use of spreadspectrum satellite and inherently non-secure wireless technologies such as Wi-Fi/WiMAX, General Packet Radio Service, Enhanced Data rates for Global Evolution, CDMA
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Data Service, and home-grown 900MHz radio solutions. Power line carrier, microwave,
and fiber optics systems are the most popular technologies for wide area protection [16].
Optical fiber is an ideal solution for Utility Intranet communications. Thousands
of miles of optical fiber have already been installed as part of the power line facilities
[16]. Since optical fiber is immune to electromagnetic and radio frequency interference
and crosstalk present in power plants, substations, and powerline transmission paths,
fiber-based LANs reduce error rates from a few errors per minute (with copper) to only a
few errors per month, even at data rates above one gigabit per second (Gbps) [17].
Optical fiber's low attenuation and high bandwidth also provide the ability to transmit
signals over long distances.
Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM) systems present a new alternative for
optical fiber network connectivity with much greater advantages in cost, flexibility, and
scalability. Since light waves of different lengths do not interfere with one another,
multiple wavelength signals can be transmitted through the same optical fiber without
error [17]. By allowing multiple high-speed communications applications to share the
same fiber simultaneously, WDM opens the door to optical fiber's tremendous bandwidth
capability allowing transmission and propagation speeds of more than one Terabit per
second [17]. WDM systems create completely independent, fully transparent paths over
each fiber[17]. This allows the combination of multiple application protocols over the
same fiber without any issues of latency, speed, proprietorship, or software setup [17]. A
multi-channel WDM link behaves as multiple virtual fiber pairs, letting utilities mix and
reconfigure protocols as needed [17].
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2.8

Non-Operational Data to the Corporate Data Warehouse
The most challenging data path is conveying the non-operational data to the

utility’s data warehouse. The non-operational data path to the data warehouse conveys
the IED non-operational data from the substation automation system to the data
warehouse, either being pulled by a data warehouse application from the SA system or
being pushed from the SA system to the data warehouse based on an event trigger or
time. Non-operational data consists of files and waveforms such as event summaries,
oscillographic event reports, or sequential events records, in addition to SCADA-like
points (e.g., status and analog points) that have a logical state or a numerical value. This
non-operational data is not needed by the SCADA dispatchers to monitor and control the
power system [7].
The trend in IP-capable utility operations is for the data concentrator to send both
operational and non-operational data through a firewall, separating the operational and
corporate LANS, to the corporate Intranet, to be maintained in a corporate data
warehouse for common, client-server or mainframe access by various company user
groups such as operations, planning, engineering, SCADA, protection, distribution
automation, metering, substation maintenance, and IT personnel. This setup provides
multi-user simultaneous access, throughout the organization, for up-to-date information.
2.9

Remote IED Access
The remote access path to the substation traditionally uses either a dial-in

telephone connection or a network connection. There are interfaces to substation IEDs to
acquire data, determine the operating status of each IED, support all communication
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protocols used by the IEDs, and support standard protocols being developed. There may
be an interface to the Energy Management System (EMS) that allows system operators to
monitor and control each substation and the EMS to receive data from the substation
integration and automation system at different periodicities. There may be an interface to
the Distribution Management System (DMS) with the same capabilities as the EMS
interface [7].
2.10

Time Constraints
Timeliness of message delivery is critical to the electrical grid. Traditional short

circuit protection systems measure local signals and respond in 4-40ms to disturbances in
the local area. For the purposes of this paper, 4ms is considered as a benchmark for
worst-case response time requirements in local protection.
Wide Area Protection and Control (WAPaC) systems gather information from
multiple locations on the system and issue wide area controls as necessary to respond to
disturbances in a somewhat longer time frame. Depending upon the distance from the
origin of the disturbance and type of disturbance, there may be a time lag on the order of
seconds before the disturbance reaches systems that are hundreds of miles away. If highspeed communication channels are available for signaling, it would be possible to get an
early warning of an impending disturbance in time to set some supervisory control
strategies in place. Today’s wide area communication topologies, are capable of
delivering messages from one area of a power system to multiple nodes on the system in
as little as 6 ms. Assuming a decision calculation time of 50 ms, a disturbance on a
system could be detected and a corrective response delivered in less than 200 ms [16].
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Even assuming as much as 200 milliseconds delay in transmission and processing,
enough early warning would be available in most cases so that supervisory control of
critical functions could be implemented. If, in addition, the nature of the disturbance was
known, each key control and protection system could be switched to a defensive posture
appropriate for the particular problem [16]. Table 4 summarizes typical time constraint
thresholds that must be met for SCADA and utility protection responses.

Table 4. Time Constraints for Electric Utility Operations
Systems
Substation IEDs;
Primary short
circuit protection
and control

Situation
Routine power equipment signal
measurement
Local-area disturbance [6]

Backup
protection and
control;
Wide-area
protection and
control
(WAPaC)

Transient voltage instability

SCADA

Frequency instability, must
respond faster than generator
governors to trip generators
instantaneously
Dynamic instability
Poorly damped or un-damped
oscillations
Voltage instability
Thermal overload
Emergency event notification
Routine transactions
Routine HMI status polling from
substation field devices
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Response Time
Every 2-4ms
< 4ms from event detection to sending
notification [14]
4 - 40 ms automatic response time
Often < 180 ms to convey 14+ trip signals to
disconnect generators at the top generating
station [16]
Could require < 300ms response time (by load
shedding) for high rates of frequency decay;
requires detection within 100ms to allow
operator response in 150 to 300ms [16]
A few seconds
Several seconds
Up to a few minutes
Several minutes for severe overloads, rarely less
than a few seconds for minor occurrences [16]
< 6 ms
< 540 ms [3]
Every 2 secs

2.11

SCADA Protocols and Standards
2.11.1 Legacy Proprietary Protocols.
SCADA protocols have always been designed to be very compact and efficient,

however, RTUs and other automatic controller devices were being developed before the
advent of industry-wide standards for interoperability. As a result, manufacturers
invented a multitude of SCADA and control system protocols. Especially among the
larger vendors, there was the incentive to create their own proprietary protocol to "lock
in" their customer base. It wasn’t until the late 1990’s that manufacturers began to shift
toward more open communications like Modicon MODBUS over RS-485. By 2000 most
vendors offered completely open interfacing such as Modicon MODBUS over TCP/IP.
2.11.2 Transition to Open Protocols.
The development of Distributed Network Protocol (DNP) 3 was a comprehensive
effort to achieve open, standards-based interoperability between substation computers,
RTUs, IEDs, and master stations (except inter-master-station communications) for the
electric utility industry. It is still used within US utilities such as water companies and
electricity suppliers for the exchange of data and control instructions between master
control stations and substation controllers [1].
In the early 1990s, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) decided that an
effort was needed to define a more robust standard than DNP3 to serve the SCADA
needs of the electric utilities. The result was the Utility Communications Architecture
(UCA).
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In 1999, UCA 2.0 migrated to International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)
Standard IEC 61850 for Substation Automation. Both are networkable and objectoriented, which makes it possible for a device to describe its attributes when asked [18].
This capability allows self-discovery and pick-list configuration of SCADA systems [18].
IEC 61850 is part of the Common Information Model (CIM) developed by IEC Technical
Committee (TC) 57 that also includes the utility communications standards listed in
Table 5 and visually depicted in Figure 2 [1].

Table 5. Sample of Standards Comprising the Common Information Model
IEC Standard
IEC 61970
IEC 61968
IEC 61334
IEC 60870-5
IEC 60870-5-103
IEC 60870-6
IEC 60870-6-101/104
IEC 60870-6-TASE.2
IEC 61850
IEC 60834

Title
Power Systems and Programming Interfaces for Integrating Utility
Applications
Distribution Equipment and Processes
Distribution Automation Using Distribution Line Carrier Systems
Distribution
Telecontrol Equipment and Systems: Transmission Protocols - Companion
Standard for the Informative Interface of Protection Equipment
Transmission
Telecontrol Protocols Compatible with ISO and ITU-T Recommendations
Inter-Control Center Communications Protocol (ICCP)
Communication Networks and Systems in Substations
Performance and Testing of Teleprotection Equipment of Power Systems
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Figure 2. TC57 Standards Used in Substation and Control Center Communications [19]

2.11.3 IEC 61850, Communication Networks and Systems in Substations.
The IEC 61850 standard defines common data formats and communication
methodologies to allow devices to communicate across IP-based networks [9]. IEC
61850 is a layered architecture that separates the functionality required for electric utility
applications from the lower-level networking tasks [1].
IEC 61850 defines a total of 13 different Logical Groupings of data that could
originate in the substation (see Figure 3) [14].
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Figure 3. IEC 61850 Logical Node Groups and Group Designators [14]

Each of the Logical Groups are further subdivided into Logical Nodes (86 total),
each composed of data that represent some application-specific meaning and intended to
provide separate sub-categories of data [14]. Figure 4 provides an example of Logical
Node Groups.

Figure 4. IEC 61850 Logical Nodes [14]
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Logical Nodes are comprised of Data Classes (355 total), which are divided
among seven categories as detailed in Figure 5 [14].

Figure 5. IEC 61850 Data Class Categories [14]

The container is the Physical Device (network address), and contains one or more
Logical Devices. Each Logical Device contains one or more Logical Nodes. Each
Logical Node then contains a pre-defined set of Data Classes, each of which contains
data [14]. Figure 6, depicts the multiple functions supported by IED-1.

Figure 6. Example of Browsing IED-1’s Functions [14]
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Because IEC 61850 supports self-description, an operator can see what data a
device has by communicating with it and browsing its contents. Control center personnel,
via the HMI, browse the devices directly and subscribe to the data they require – there is
no need for an intermediate cross-reference of data. Figure 7 depicts the ability to drill
down through folders on the IED for data values.

Figure 7. Example of Browsing IED-1 for Data [14]

2.11.4 GOOSE and GSSE.
Generic Object Orientated System-wide (Substation in some literature) Events
(GOOSE) and Generic Sub-Station Event (GSSE) define a high-speed, Ethernet-based,
object-model protocol to be used for high-speed multi-device communications between
protection devices. The GOOSE and GSSE services are used for fast multicast
communication between a publisher and one or more subscribers. The abstract services
are used for such operations such as protection event notification. Upon detecting an
event, the IED(s) use a multi-cast transmission to notify those devices that have
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registered to receive the data [6]. Collisions are quite possible in an Ethernet network in
this scenario, so the GOOSE messages are re-transmitted multiple times by each IED
[14]. “IEC 61850 supports both client-server and peer-to-peer communications. “It is the
peer-to-peer communications ability that is used to exchange GOOSE messages between
IEDs” [14]. GOOSE requires peer-to-peer communications between relays, quite
possibly from different vendors. Configuring the requisite publisher/subscriber model
could be a very daunting task, especially when each vendor will have their own
proprietary configuration program [14]. Because of this, IED vendors are required to
provide a descriptor file for their IEDs in Extensible Markup Language (XML) format.
The eventual goal is for the devices to transmit their configuration in XML upon request.
The use of XML and the substation configuration language defined by IEC 61850 will
provide visibility into the data available from any vendor [14].
There is still great room for improvement. IED suppliers acknowledge that their
expertise is in the IED itself – not in two-way communications capability, the
communications protocol, or added IED functionality from a remote user. Though the
industry has made some effort to add communications capability to the IEDs, each IED
supplier has been concerned that any increased functionality would compromise
performance and drive the IED cost so high that no utility would buy it. Therefore, the
industry has vowed make competitive cost and high performance as priorities over
network security enhancements as standardization is incorporated into the IED [18].
Figure 8 illustrates GOOSE, GSSE and other substation-level communications
that will ride over Ethernet and Internet Protocol.
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Figure 8. Ethernet as the Foundation for All Future Substation Communications [19]
2.11.5 Problems with TCP/IP for Time-constrained Traffic.
TCP as a transport protocol has several undesirable properties that make its
deployment problematic in situations and applications that have time dependencies.
TCP’s tightly integrated congestion control mechanism, designed to work well
when transmitting large quantities of data, can interfere with time-critical transmissions.
TCP slow-start and congestion control will induce instability during periods of peak
message traffic, such as emergency situations, precisely when guaranteed delivery of
urgent information is required [10]. Unless a nonstandard TCP implementation is selected
or bandwidth guarantees are provided, standard TCP functionality will be intolerable for
real-time traffic [10].
TCP is a primarily point-to-point protocol that is inefficient in many types of
monitoring applications where the same message needs to be shared with multiple other
nodes [10].
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The large overhead associated with TCP headers and the three packet handshake,
required to establish a connection, creates significant delay. The congestion in the
network will increase by several magnitudes as the number of simultaneously
communicating sensor nodes increases over time along with the resulting number of
systems monitoring them. If the network grows large enough, this could become a
significant cost [10].
TCP lacks any provision for priorities. Messages are delivered in a strict first-infirst-out (FIFO) order without exception. A Utility Intranet will support many
applications and message types, some having lower priority, and many shipping very
large files. Because TCP lacks any notion of priority, low priority file transfers compete
for the same resources as do high-priority, urgent notifications. If several TCP
connections are all transmitting relatively unimportant non-operational information
across a section of the network and a new TCP connection is initiated with extremely
important emergency information, the most important connection will only receive its
“fair share” of the connection rather than the high priority that it deserves.
TCP’s behavior results in a network with very high utilization rates that are
shared in what can loosely be described as a fair manner between TCP connections that
are making use of it. This high utilization makes it difficult to initiate a new TCP
connection or to ramp up an existing connection if new time-critical information becomes
available when network utilization is high. The lengthy connection re-establishment and
re-send times could result in time-critical data finally arriving stale to its intended
destination.
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The greedy bandwidth consumption approach underlying TCP ensures that when
this happens, routers will become overloaded, a common occurrence in the modern
Internet, resulting in further incoming packets being dropped until space in the router’s
incoming queue is cleared [10]. The back-off and slow-start that this priority connection
will undergo attempting to establish a connection under congested conditions will also
add significant delay [9].
2.11.6 UDP/IP Research Approaches.
Some messages forwarded within a Utility Intranet are not strictly real-time.
Monitoring and assessing the impact of an evolving power shortage or some other slower
contingency involves tracking data that escalates over periods measured in minutes. Still
other forms of data such as power generation statistics and consumer usage data can
change over hours or days [10].
In the case of non-real-time but still time-dependent communications, in the range
of minutes, one solution is to investigate new or real-time protocols, middleware
mechanisms, or a better use of existing transport protocols to seek to overcome these
problems. Hopkinson, et al., have proposed the use of what are termed epidemic
communication schemes, built upon UDP, for coordinated, wide-area SCADA protection
using primary and backup wide-area agents [20]. Their assumption was that delays due
to TCP/IP delivery guarantees and packet overhead would be intolerable. With less
overhead than the same message employing TCP headers, no connection establishment or
teardown, and no slow start and congestion avoidance, UDP messaging alleviates much
of the overall traffic congestion on the same network for non-real-time (i.e. one minute or
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greater) updates [10]. The point-to-multipoint efficiency of UDP also lends itself to
decentralized peer-to-peer communications [20].
In the new protection system they propose, software agents would be embedded
in each of the conventional protection components (i.e. an IED) to construct component
information into informational messages or commands to trip breakers. Each agent
would proactively search for relevant information about known primary and remote
faults, then relay misoperations (e.g. breaker failures) and fault responses by
communicating peer-to-peer with any other available agents at the same substation or at
remote substations or control centers. In all test cases, the agent sharing and group
awareness approach allowed the same information to be learned much faster and more
reliably than standalone alternatives. Agent interactions could compensate for problems
with better performance, even in the face of system malfunctions, increased traffic
loading, and decreasing bandwidth, than in traditional TCP schemes or point-to-point
legacy protocols [20].
In their simulations, three types of agents were envisioned and implemented:
primary agents, backup agents, and load agents. Primary agents were responsible for the
first zone protection, 100% of the transmission line, and backup agents for the third zone
protection (i.e. the first zone plus all the transmission lines connected to the remote end
of the first zone). Load agents were only responsible for sending their current state,
usually their current phasors, to the backup agents. An agent, at initialization, could either
receive a list of the agents in its own protection zone with which it could communicate
or, otherwise, learn this information through a network topology discovery algorithm
[20].
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An IED, for example, could be loaded with software agents that perform control
and/or protection functions. Agents embedded within an IED perceive their environment
through local sensors and act upon it through the IED's actuators. Sensor inputs might
include local measurements of the current, voltage, and breaker status. Actuator outputs
might include breaker trip signals, adjusting transformer tap settings, and switching
signals in capacitor banks. Agents might even interface with systems such as SCADA
master stations.
Primary and backup agents followed a differential philosophy to detect a fault. At
every time-step, they read their local current phasors and sent this information to their
agent counterparts. Once an agent received the phasors from its protection zone’s remote
end, or ends, it calculated the differential current and decided whether a fault occurred or
not. After detecting a fault, the agents took action based on preset rules [20].
One drawback to the software agent scheme proposed is that, while newer,
processor-based IEDs might have sufficient embedded memory, disk, and computational
capacity to be loaded with and effectively use these agents, most older systems have such
limited resources that they could not.
An interim solution to be used with slower legacy systems might be a separate
low-cost, computer or other PC-based box attached at key points in the infrastructure to
gather these inputs and perform calculations on behalf of the protection components
themselves. This box could then issue messages directly to other equivalent boxes that
would translate them into simplistic, understandable instructions to protection
components or directly to the protection components themselves that supported this
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scheme. The latency for computational analysis, message formulation, and transmission
must then be figured into estimated response times.
A similar software agent concept is central to the trust system security
functionality proposed and evaluated in Chapters III and IV of this thesis.
2.11.7 TCP/IP Research Approaches.
The greatest difficulty with applying common network protocols for SCADA
communications is meeting the strict time constraints. In SCADA systems, “the shortest
deadlines are seen in relay control algorithms for equipment protection systems, which
must react to events within fractions of a second. For near real-time response (i.e. less
than one second) delivery guarantees are attractive. Since UDP does not provide this
guarantee, TCP/IP alternatives can be investigated.
A Virginia Tech research team has proposed a scheme that they have called PSTCP/IP because it is a fully TCP/IP-compatible power system communication network
[21]. The PS-TCP/IP concept envisioned a utility TCP-IP network (separated either
physically from the Internet, or possibly behind a NAT proxy and firewall for security)
with IP addresses assigned to each power system device and an undefined but assumed
method for management of traffic flows to lessen congestion. The team made two
fundamental assumptions. First, they assumed that “only utility applications will be
running on the PS-TCP/IP, so network traffic planning and congestion control can be
well managed and the response time can be guaranteed” [21]. Second, they assumed that,
“since it is a private network, the security issue can be well managed” [21]. The paper’s
caveat is that “utility companies can build PS-TCP/IP together with their original
Intranet; however, a "firewall" must be installed to ensure the security of utility
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communications” [21]. In reality, the security situation may be more complex than that
and must be evaluated organization by organization. Many companies have begun to mix
e-mail and office automation traffic on the same network, making it more difficult to
identify malicious packets in a mix of thousands of web interactions and e-mails.
For the purpose of this thesis, it was necessary to make similar assumptions and
recommendations for the most ideal security posture necessary for basic analysis before
progressing to a more complex state, namely bandwidth guarantees and a Utility Intranet
primarily separate from the Internet. In a similar manner, IP addresses were assigned to
each system in the simulation network but did not follow the team’s recommended
address assignment schema and were chosen as larger IPV6, versus IPV4, addresses.
2.12

Current State of SCADA System Protection
The old paradigm was to install a system, let it run unattended, and replace it in

about five years or more. For newer PC-based systems, utility companies have to wrestle
to cope with more dynamic operating procedures and financial planning (i.e. install a
system, patch it at least every week, perform backups and virus scans, upgrade or replace
incremental capabilities each year, and train personnel on the changes) without impacting
24/7 operations and quarterly profits [7].
On the positive side, the SCADA constituency is becoming increasingly aware of
their systems’ vulnerabilities and is taking action through increased emphasis on
information systems security peculiar to the needs of SCADA users. In addition,
standards organizations concerned with data acquisition and control are developing
guidelines and standards for the security of SCADA systems. National laboratories have
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established SCADA test beds to evaluate the most effective security measures.
Organizations such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) have
initiated programs focusing on SCADA security [1]. The negative side is that these
standards, guidelines, and security measures have not been universally applied to critical
infrastructure applications because of lack of funds, management apathy, other issues
perceived as higher priority, and lack of guidance in some sectors [1].
Conventional IT cyber security approaches generally focus on standalone
products (i.e. firewalls, IDSs, router ACLs, etc.) that are associated with individual
devices on a network. This point-oriented security approach is vulnerable to attacks that
circumvent the one particular security control. In addition, other parts of the network
might be unaware that an attack is occurring. Security researchers have noted that what
is needed is a coordinated security paradigm that takes advantage of the capabilities of
devices such as routers and switches that are cognizant of network activities on a larger
scale. What is necessary is to develop an adaptive network and application-aware
solutions that address security as a collaboration of defense mechanisms operating as a
defense system to identify threats and respond accordingly [1].
The future power grid will begin to support higher levels of integration and
federated systems services [22]. The trust system concept was intended to support the
goals for current and future SCADA systems, as listed in Tables 6 and 7.
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Table 6. Requirements for Current SCADA Systems
Requirement
Quality of Service
(QoS)
High Availability

Security

Legacy device interface

Self-describing
Automated

Description
SCADA systems are deterministic. QoS, precise interrupt timing, reliability,
and low latency are more critical than throughput [6].
Real-time SCADA systems cannot afford delays that may be caused by
information security software and that interfere with critical control decisions
affecting personnel safety, product quality, and operating costs.
Security in the utility community has a very unique meaning which is quite
different to that used in IT networking. NERC Form 715 defines [1] security
as “a system’s capability to withstand system disturbances arising from faults
and unscheduled removal of bulk power supply elements without further loss
of facilities or cascading outages.” If the NERC definitions of adequacy and
security were modified to apply to SCADA systems in general, they might
read as follows: Security: A system’s capability to withstand system
disturbances arising from faults or unauthorized internal or external actions
without further loss of facilities, compromise of human safety, and loss of
production [1].
Most plant components in existence today have minimal computing
resources. They do not usually have excess memory capacity that can
accommodate relatively large programs associated with security monitoring
activities [1].
Available data is discoverable
Advancements in systems are requiring fewer operators and more automated
SCADA control. As the master station software is more and more capable of
analyzing data, it has to present less to the operator [6].

Table 7. Goals for Future SCADA Systems [22]
Goal
Self-healing/adaptive
Dynamic
Optimized
Predictive rather than
reactive
Distributed
assets/information
Integrated
More secure

Description
Correct problems before they become emergencies
Interactive with consumers and markets
Make the best use of resources and equipment
Prevent emergencies ahead of time rather than solve them after they
occur
Share resources across geographical and organizational boundaries
Merge all critical information
Protected from threats from all hazards
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2.13

Specific Challenges to SCADA Security and Recommended Solutions
2.13.1 Per-User Authentication and Access Control.
2.13.1.1 SCADA Security Issues.
In the SCADA environment, a control operator might need to enter a password to

gain access to a device in an emergency. If the operator types in the password incorrectly
a few times, a conventional IT security paradigm, which presumes an intruder trying to
guess the password, will lock out the operator. Locking out the operator is not a good
thing in real-time control environments [7].
Many systems require no authentication at all. When accounts do exist, username
and password information is almost always sent in the clear in both human-to-machine
and machine-to-machine applications [7]. In practice, SCADA systems or consoles tend
to be configured with the same username and password or with standard defaults like
console, administrator, or anonymous.
RTU test sets, used to issue commands to an RTU, are commonly available on the
market. The systems don’t authenticate and have little to no data validity checking.
2.13.1.2 Recommendations from Literature
For operators on local control devices, passwords might be eliminated or made
extremely simple [1]. In situations where the passwords might be subject to interception
when transmitted over networks, encryption should be considered to protect the password
from compromise.
Access controls should be implemented for all SCADA systems. Role-based
access controls might be used at the supervisory level of SCADA operations [1].
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In addition, access might also be restricted based on two-factor authentication and digital
certificates or challenge-response tokens [1]. Options include biometrics, smart card
identification, and other authentication technologies.
Procedures should be implemented to monitor access controls for authorized
access, un-authorized access, and unsuccessful un-authorized access attempts.
2.13.1.3 Objections and Questions from Utilities.
Currently, biometrics are not completely reliable. Depending on the characteristic
being examined, there might be a high number of false rejections or false acceptances.
There are also issues possible with throughput, human factors, or system compromises.
Given the real-time nature of SCADA operations, how would password policies
be applied to prevent lockout in emergency situations? In addition, how would rights be
managed for each person that may need to perform multiple, changing roles?
It is costly to keep access control lists (ACLs) of who should connect to whom
up-to-date as the network evolves over time. It may not be practical to reconfigure all
monitoring systems rapidly when a problem arises unless there are automated
communications to push updates to each affected node in the network [10].
2.13.1.4 Trust System Solutions.
The trust system interacts with an existing authentication mechanism such as a
logon server to enforce multi-level, role-based access based on the success or failure of
credentials provided by the one that is logging in. For this thesis, the most restrictive
policy was assumed and is suggested, requiring initial logon of every new user as well as
every system that is coming back online. By tracking the time, conditions, and status of
all logons and monitoring, correlating, and even blocking suspicious logon activity
51

(tracked by username, IP address, credentials, and distance), the trust system provides
comprehensive logon state and security situational awareness.
The trust system also relaxes standards in situations where it has a greater level
of trust that the user (or system) is who they say they are, based on the quantity and
reliability of the credentials provided to logon and the source of the logon. It differs from
most IT security schemas by providing more chances to a user who, after one or two tries,
is highly close to being correct, but appears to have simply forgotten or mistyped a few
characters of their password. It also simplifies access in emergency situations by
assuming that any logon is a priority, to speed this process, and by implementing a onetime network logon which is good for any system or data in the local network enclave to
which the individual is entitled, based on their assigned role, instead of separate logons
for different systems or higher-level roles when the user is still at the same computer.
The pre-defined user role and the access level, calculated from the credentials provided,
are used to allow and disallow access to systems, folders, files, and data elements for
each user. In the event of lost, misplaced or forgotten credentials, the trust system can
allow an elevation request from the user to another user with the same logged-on access
level desired by the requestor. In this way, assuming proper (preferably visual)
verification occurs, they can be approved temporary access at the higher access level
required to perform their job. This might be the case if, for instance, they accidentally
left their smart card at home or experience biometric read errors and cannot otherwise
gain root (or other level) access with only a username and password. Use of this feature,
of course, should be the exception and not the norm.
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The trust system can perform data and validity checking on incoming commands
and messages on behalf of field equipment (i.e. from an RTU, PLC, or IED test set or
admin laptop); however, access control at the SCADA field equipment, first, and then
authentication at the network logon server (i.e. a network-level logon) is preferred before
any further communication is allowed with the SCADA node. This can be facilitated by
the trust system. Authentication by any device connected to the IED requires an IP port
on the SCADA field device for connection and an IP-enabled test set or laptop
(preferably using encryption) capable of supplying authentication credentials.
Distribution of trust agents throughout the network allows a much more
decentralized and efficient implementation of this authentication scheme and all other
trust system functions.
2.13.2 Prevention of Data Interception or Alteration.
2.13.2.1 SCADA Security Issues.
Traditional RTUs, PLCs, and IEDs are designed for efficiency to prioritize task
execution using microprocessors with limited memory and computational capacity,
stringent real-time constraints, low bandwidth links, and minimal attention to security
policies [18]. They typically send information without transmission security and many
use wireless connections susceptible to interception [1].
Packet-based SCADA protocols usually provide message integrity checking at the
data link layer to find errors caused by electrical noise and other transmission errors [18].
Since these checks do not include encryption technology, to protect against malicious
interference with data flow, and their algorithms are well-documented and publicly
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available, they only provide protection against inadvertent packet corruption caused by
hardware or data channel failures [18].
2.13.2.2 Recommendations from Literature.
Digital certificates and cryptographic keys should be used and managed for
encryption and digital signatures relating to SCADA system elements [1].
Transmission errors are best detected and handled close to the source or physical
medium (i.e. at the data link layer) while protection from network content alteration is
best achieved as close to the application layer as possible (i.e. the network layer or above)
[18].
When packets are routed through a corporate LAN or Utility Intranet, message IP
addresses must be visible for each router and switch along the way to read and select the
appropriate path to route it to its destination. Traditional security solutions implemented
at the network layer or above are usually proprietary VPN schemes or standards-based
(e.g. IPsec) protection schemes” [18]. For these public-key cryptosystems, key
management, including certification that the public key actually belongs to the person
named, is an important issue that has to be handled by the organization. More
importantly, they can require relatively long processing times that may be incompatible
with the real-time requirements of SCADA control systems [1].
As a result, symmetric-key cryptosystems, which can perform much faster, may
be more suitable for use in the SCADA environment, however, key management
becomes much more difficult. Although, symmetric-key cryptography has not yet been
widely applied to SCADA systems, it is applicable to data transmitted over a longdistance SCADA network and could be added to protect its most critical portions [1].
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2.13.2.3 Objections and Questions from Utilities.
Older systems can’t support the computational burden of block encryption [18].
Encryption, configuration control, and other strong security measures usually
reduce the ease of management of SCADA systems. Complexity is the bane of efficient
SCADA operations.
IP already adds nearly 30% more overhead to SCADA communications,
encryption will add too much latency.
The TCP security model, SSL, permits a client of a server to authenticate a server
and then encrypt sensitive data such as a credit card number, but that capability does not
account for the varying levels of trust and other issues that arise between mutually
suspicious operators [10].
2.13.2.4 Trust System Solutions.
Research for this thesis, indicates that IPsec public key encryption can be used in
some cases for non-real-time communications and has the potential, with faster
processing, to reduce latency to the point where it could be applied to real-time
communications.
For legacy systems and applications that do not, or cannot, provide encryption at
the IP-level or above, the trust system in gateway-configuration, with IPsec tunnel
mode, can act as an encryption gateway. This can occur by encrypting the unencrypted
incoming packets, adding an IP header with destination address of the next trust system
along the way to the destination, and forwarding it. When the packet is received by the
trust system closest to the destination, it strips the address, decrypts the packet revealing
the destination address, and forwards it, unencrypted, to the destination.
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For systems that can be loaded with software trust system agents, the agent
middleware can interact to package the data with IPsec encryption at the host before it is
passed on to the physical/data link layer for transmission.
IPsec delay is highly processor-dependent. Until technological improvements are
made in the SCADA hardware installed in utility networks to allow fast enough
processing and less queuing delay, stand-alone symmetric key hardware can be added to
the network to encrypt packets after they leave the source, switch, and possibly the first
router, at the physical layer, and decrypt the packet before passing it to the destination
router, switch, and recipient. In that case, the basic IP-to-IP firewall rules checks of the
trust system could still be performed on a packet in transit and fixed-length messagetypes could be deduced. However, unless the trust system itself were implementing the
symmetric key encryption, the trust system’s format module and some access control
matrix checks would be negated because it could not see the encrypted data inside the
packets, including the message type. Once the data was decrypted, though, full trust
system checks could be performed at the host level, catching at delivery instead of
stopping malicious activity closer to the source.
2.13.3 System Hardening.
2.13.3.1 SCADA Security Issues.
Once SCADA systems are installed in an operational production network, they
are rarely, if ever, patched. SCADA system device banners are rarely disabled, giving
out device and software names, versions, and manufacturers (important sources for
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manuals of technical and operational information that could be used to attack and
compromise them).
2.13.3.2 Recommendations from Literature.
Unused physical ports, banners, and network services should be disabled and patches
should be kept up to date [23]. Operating system and application patches should be
applied as they are made available, always testing for negative impacts on system
functionality first [23].
2.13.3.3 Objections and Questions from Utilities.
The Microsoft Service Pack 2 fix for the Blaster worm turned off anonymous
logons by default for the DCOM service, requiring authentication. The OPC standard for
data transfer runs without authentication. Blindly implementing SP2 would have broken
SCADA systems running OPC that was not designed for logons [7]. This illustrates the
complexity of transitioning to COTS products where one-size-fits-all vendor patches may
not always work for unique, partially legacy-based, and time-critical control
configurations.
2.13.3.4 Trust System Solutions.
While it is assumed that unused ports are disabled by default by SCADA
administrators, to supplement interface-level defenses, the trust system software agent
on a system, acting as middleware between the transport and physical/data-link layers,
can perform interface-level access control via its ACM for useable ports that are
configured ON (or OFF) yet for which connection and access should be restricted only to
specific IP addresses and authorized user/role combinations.
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A developmental testbed must be established (either within each company or at
area or regional level for economy) to duplicate utility systems down to the company
substation level for the purposes of testing COTS patches, software, and upgrades prior to
deploying them to the production network. This could also be a role for the NSTB in
conjunction with a regional or national utility control center.
Most utilities employ redundant servers for reliability. After testing and approval
have occurred on developmental duplicates of operational configurations, patches should
be loaded onto an offline production system within the company that will be employing
the patch and functionality verified prior to rotating the offline system back into
operation. This procedure can also be used to regularly exercise the company’s backup
systems and restoral procedures or to run antivirus scans.
Oversight and accountability for testing, approval, assigning suspense dates, and
tracking compliance for patches must be established at regional and national levels to
ensure continuity of security posture across the entire Utility Intranet.
Throughout changes from primary to backup, the trust system must have all
systems configured in its ACM. Trust system ACMs require each network node to log
on and off of the network as they connect, shutdown, or are disconnected. The trust
systems then update one another as they learn that one system has gone offline and
another is online, to maintain situational awareness and accurately deconflict suspicious
events.
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2.13.4 Secure Software Engineering.
2.13.4.1 SCADA Security Issues.
Security is often an afterthought or not even considered in SCADA operating
system design and implementation, hence secure coding practices are not required. They
usually have no input validation, non-secure programming syntax and commands, and are
vulnerable to buffer overflow, memory dump, etc.
Manufacturers haven’t been forced to improve SCADA security and there is little
incentive for vendors or developers to do so on their own [18]. Telecommunications
equipment and services sold to utilities is “big business, averaging 3.5 million dollars
annually and rising, according to UTC Research” [22]. It’s hard for manufacturers to
financially justify investing extra manpower and dollars to develop, implement, and
maintain additional security features and practices that don’t make them any more
competitive or increase profits over their peers who don’t.
2.13.4.2 Recommendations from Literature.
Development of an open, yet secure real-time operating system is encouraged,
along with a review of existing SCADA protocols and IEC standards for security.
Federal and state governments should provide sufficient incentives to encourage
private sector investment and development in SCADA security.
2.13.4.3 Potential Solutions.
Requirements documents for new systems, protocols, standards, and software
should explicitly state security capabilities required and secure coding practices expected
to prevent such avoidable security mistakes prior to new software development and
marketing.
59

The trust system can only question or stop potentially malicious commands and
input in packets created by deployed code or intended to exploit known vulnerabilities in
deployed code. Any source code purchased or downloaded for utility systems should be
scanned for examples of non-secure code and associated vulnerabilities in order to
determine specific signatures for the trust system or other intrusion detection systems to
look for. This is not easy and there are few, if any, automated tools for this purpose,
however, it is reasonable to assume that such a tool could be developed to search for
instances of potentially bad practices to narrow the examination in source code.
Economy would be achieved by performing this function once per application at a
national or regional level, even after deployment, and going back to vendors to re-code
specific sections more securely.
An advocate on behalf of utility companies could be established at the national
interconnect level to perform vulnerability scans, penetration tests, and code reviews in
conjunction with fly-off tests of vendor solutions. The same entity should also
consolidate community requirements and hold vendors accountable for developing
solutions that meet not only time, safety, and reliability, but security specifications as
well, in their designs.
2.13.5 Non-secure, Backdoor Connections.
2.13.5.1 SCADA Security Issues.
SCADA administrators and industrial automation analysts are often deceived into
thinking that because their industrial networks are on separate systems from the corporate
network, which is often connected to the Internet, they are safe from outside attacks.
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Security is most easily compromised at the SCADA host (master station and
HMI) or control room level. If the SCADA computers are logging data out to some
back-office data repository like SQL server, Oracle, or PI Historian, then the SCADA
computers must be on the same network as they are or have a path to access them. This
means there is a path to the SCADA systems and eventually to the remote substation field
equipment through the corporate network. Often these connections are left open 24x7 to
allow full-time logging, which provides an always available path through the network for
someone to attack [8].
A data concentrator or substation host processor at a substation mediates all
communications to and from IEDs by forwarding the message to the appropriate IED and
routing the response back to the original caller.
Modems are commonly imbedded in substation end device equipment such as
IEDs, PLCs, and RTUs to allow vendors to poll them over dial-in phone lines to support
the product or as an easy way to retrieve non-real-time data from them. These modems
will often have default usernames and passwords that aren’t changed or backdoor
usernames and passwords that can’t be easily changed by the customer. Some will accept
calls from any source that knows their number.
Though there is no access control, monitoring, or authentication employed on
these connections by the utilities themselves, company employees often have a false
sense of security because they assume these end devices are protected by the noncorporate vendor network connections [1].
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Unsecured remote desktop applications like X-Terminal, PC Anywhere, and
Exceed are frequently used for remote visibility and administration within utilities and
over the Internet from home or vendor offices [18].
Many IEDs are IP-enabled with much of the data to and from them traversing
non-secure wireless networks [18].
2.13.5.2 Recommendations from Literature.
It is best to not to allow any communications to the substation from outside the
secure utility network [18].
For existing dial-up lines either require strong user authentication, encrypt
communications, or eliminate them altogether [18]. Dial-back modems should, at a
minimum, implement separate lines for incoming and outgoing call back. This helps
protect the integrity of the phone switch [18].
Eliminate all connections to the Internet from the SCADA network. Do not
enable Web-mail for remote e-mail access. Instead, maintain accounts and servers for
outside communications on a physically separate office LAN that does not connect to the
SCADA network. Also, implement a secure VPN solution for any remote desktop access
from either network.
For corporate connections to the SCADA network, consider web-based thin client
solutions that enable plant, management, production, and maintenance personnel to view
read-only, real-time process graphics from a remote location [11]. A user can use a
standard web browser and Utility Intranet connection to see animated displays of
manufacturing activity, thus allowing a more informed decision-making process [11]. At
the same time, thin clients can protect data by not allowing users to change values.
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The US military has gone to great efforts to ensure that its classified networks are
in no way connected to the Internet or to its unclassified systems. Classified digital
information is encrypted to the highest level in-transit and hard drives are locked in safes
with two-person integrity checks on the lock when not in use or attended. Buildings
where classified information is processed implement strict physical access control and
require positive identification and need to know for entrance. They also use metal
sheets or mesh in the walls and are designed without windows to prevent unencrypted
electromagnetic emanations from computer workstations and screens from being
detectable or visible from outside the building. Operational security is strictly enforced
and trained at least annually so employees recognize sensitive information and even sets
of data that, by themselves are unclassified, but when linked together, can give
indications of classified operations or intentions.
Though it is not necessary to employ the exact same measures as for national
security secrets, critical infrastructures must be seriously evaluated and approached with
the same well-planned, deliberate, security-conscious mindset.
2.13.5.3 Trust System Solutions.
One main function of the trust system is to implement a firewall. Whether
loaded onto its own server (as a hardware firewall) or as a software agent running on a
SCADA node (as a software firewall) the trust system filters out unauthorized packets,
adding security to any incoming connections to which it is attached based on a whitelist
of known to-be-authorized traffic by source and destination addresses, port, protocol, and
message type. This is in contrast to more typical and more error-prone blacklist rules,
which attempt to account for every type of traffic that would not be authorized.
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This is easier to do with a controlled network where only a finite number of
message types, protocols, and source-destination IP address pairs is possible. Accurately
defining authorized traffic for web searches, e-mail, and other unpredictable common
office exchanges that occur with numerous Internet servers, clients, and applications is
nearly impossible as most Internet-connected business networks can attest from seeing
their share of viruses, compromises, and zero-day exploits.
Keeping e-mails and coordination between utility organizations on a separate
network may be more of a hassle (potentially two separate client computers—one
connected to the SCADA Utility Intranet and the other to the Internet for WWW
searches, coordination with vendors, etc.) but is the most secure configuration for the
operational network. On a Utility Intranet, separate from the Internet, a global address list
and DNS servers can be maintained within areas and regions to feed legitimate e-mail
addresses and IP lookup information for utility-specific clients and e-mail servers.
Unless this separate Utility Intranet is compromised by an insider (maliciously or through
infected disks or thumb drives) the only outside avenue of attack would be through a
rogue connection to the Internet, a wireless access point, or dial-in through the telephone
network.
2.13.6 Systems In Need of Maintenance.
2.13.6.1 SCADA Security Challenges.
Many critical infrastructure systems have a history of deferred maintenance that
has to be addressed before implementing a security system.
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2.13.6.2 Trust System Solutions.
Implementing trust systems in gateway configuration such that they only interact
with each other, or with nodes that can support trust system agents, adds security to a
network that is seamless to any nodes that cannot yet be loaded with a trust system agent
themselves.
2.13.7 Timely Detection and Elimination of Malicious Code.
2.13.7.1 SCADA Security Challenges.
SCADA systems do not use antivirus software.
2.13.7.2 Recommendations from Literature.
Antivirus software should be implemented wherever possible [24], [25].
2.13.7.3 Objections and Questions from Utilities.
The computational overhead associated with running antivirus software, updating
virus signature databases, and quarantining or deleting malicious code require computing
cycles that might seriously affect the real-time performance of SCADA system
components. Automatically updating virus databases from Internet antivirus sites
exposes SCADA systems to more viruses and attacks.
2.13.7.4 Trust System Solutions.
As a rule of thumb in SCADA systems, scans (antivirus or otherwise) should be
conducted on systems rotated temporarily offline and only returned to service when
discovered discrepancies are remediated, for minimal impact to operations. Regularly
rotating a system offline (replaced by its backup) for scans is also a way to exercise
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backup contingency plans ensuring hot spares will always be functional in an emergency
situation.
The trust system can be loaded with or call antivirus software to run virus scans
on e-mails and their attachments traversing the company’s piece of the Utility Intranet.
Antivirus updates can be downloaded to media manually from the Internet on a
separate network. After scanning the media, it can be hand carried for loading onto the
Utility Intranet and distribution. Another solution might be to work with antivirus
vendors to mail or ship disks regularly with the latest updates. It is also important to fully
test any update on developmental (or test) SCADA systems before loading onto the
utility production network, to ensure patches and antivirus detection/cleanup actions will
not accidentally break SCADA applications.
2.13.8 Resource Exhaustion Attacks.
2.13.8.1 SCADA Security Issues.
A denial-of-service (DoS) attack is an attempt to either temporarily or indefinitely
disable a network system or resource or simply it make it unavailable to legitimate users.
Methods of attack can include flooding a link to prevent legitimate network traffic,
preventing a particular individual from accessing a service, or disrupting service to a
specific system or person. A DoS attack is the greatest problem during times of peak
loading like an emergency[18].
A DoS can disrupt a server by sending more requests than it can handle, thereby
preventing access to a service; consume computational resources, such as bandwidth,
disk space, or CPU time; disrupt configuration information, such as routing information;
or disrupt physical network components.,
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A DoS attack may include execution of malware intended to max out the CPU's

usage, trigger errors in the microcode of the machine, trigger errors in the sequencing of
instructions, to force the computer into an unstable state or lock-up, exploit errors in the
operating system to cause resource starvation and/or thrashing, or crash the operating
system itself.
2.13.8.2 Recommendations from Literature.
First, there are fewer avenues of attack from the outside on networks that are
physically isolated from the Internet [18]. Perimeter defenses with appropriately
configured alternate routes can provide some defense (i.e. relief) in the face of DoS
attacks, presuming that the alternate links do not become saturated [3].
“Defense on telephone system requires managing QoS by giving preferential dial
tone to critical users while denying peak-load service to ordinary users” [18].
Filtering is often ineffective, as the route to the filter will normally be swamped
so only a trickle of traffic will survive. However, by using an extremely resilient stateful
packet filter that will inexpensively drop any unwanted packets, surviving a DDoS attack
becomes much easier. When such a high performance packet-filtering server is attached
to an ultra high bandwidth connection, communication with the outside world will be
unimpaired so long as not all of the available bandwidth is saturated, and performance
behind the packet filter will remain normal as long as the packet filter drops all DDoS
packets.
Having a separate, emergency block of IP addresses for critical servers, with a
separate route can be invaluable. A separate route can also be cost effective because it
can be used for load balancing or sharing under normal circumstances and switched to
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emergency mode in the event of an attack. WAN-link failover will work as long as both
links have DoS/DDoS prevention mechanisms.
SYN cookies modify the TCP protocol handling of the server by delaying
allocation of resources until the client address has been verified. This seems to be the
most powerful defense against SYN attacks. SYN floods can also be prevented using
delayed binding or TCP splicing [26].
Content-based DoS can be prevented using deep packet inspection. Attacks
originating from dark addresses or going to dark addresses can be prevented using bogon
(bogus IP) filtering.
Automatic rate filtering can work as long as rate-thresholds are set correctly and
granularly. Routers have some manually-set rate-limiting and ACL capability. Most
routers can be easily overwhelmed under DoS attack. If rules are added to take flow
statistics out of the router during the DoS attacks, they further slow down and complicate
the matter.
Application front end hardware is intelligent hardware placed on the network
before traffic reaches the servers [26]. It can be used on networks in conjunction with
routers and switches. Application front end hardware analyzes data packets as they enter
the system, and then identifies them as priority, regular, or dangerous [26].
Intrusion-prevention systems are effective if the attacks have signatures
associated with them. However, the trend among the attacks is to have legitimate content
but bad intent. IPSs which work on content recognition cannot block behavior based
DoS attacks. An Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) based IPS can detect
and block denial of service attacks because they have the processing power and the
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granularity to analyze the attacks and act like a circuit breaker in an automated way. A
rate-based IPS (RBIPS) must analyze traffic granularly and continuously monitor the
traffic pattern to determine if there is a traffic anomaly [26].
2.13.8.3 Trust System Solutions.
A trust system at the network perimeter can enforce encryption and
authentication policies for packets entering the network, requiring a malicious DoS
packet to have the proper key in order to stand any chance of entering the protected
enclave. The packet must also meet the trust system firewall rules for source IP
address, destination IP address, destination port, and authorized message type
combinations. In the case of an encrypted DoS (less likely from an outside source than a
misconfigured or malfunctioning system) the packet would enter the network but
repeated identical or similar packets in a very short period of time would be detected as a
potential DoS suspicious event and blocked very shortly after beginning. To prevent
resource exhaustion of the trust system itself, the trust system is capable of
communicating further down the line to query other trust systems to identify the path the
packet has traveled and notify them to discover and block similar activity closer to the
source.
2.13.9 Cyber Intrusion Detection.
2.13.9.1 SCADA Security Challenges.
Lack of network security countermeasures in many utility networks makes it
nearly impossible to detect cyber intrusions. Current substations generally do not have
firewalls or intrusion detection systems (IDS) installed, so it is not possible for those
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companies to know if, when, and by whom they are being targeted [18]. Those that do
have some IDS capabilities often do not update or monitor them regularly. They also
rarely have the expertise to use them effectively unless they hire security specialists.
Because of the varying ages and sophistication of some SCADA system
components, many do not even have logging capabilities. Available audit trails are
usually not turned on because of the drain on processor performance and limited memory.
In general, substation automation systems that do have logging enabled don’t log who is
attempting to obtain access to them [18]. With no logs or audit trails, activities of
malicious insiders are effectively untraceable and there is no easy way to define security
policies and traffic filtering for what is usual or unusual activity in the SCADA network
[18]. In many cases if an incident occurred there would be no way to tell if it were
malicious or accidental [7].
There are few SCADA-aware firewalls and, though the National SCADA Testbed
at Idaho National Lab is working to develop intrusion detection capabilities for existing
control systems, it is not the SCADA system developers’ priority [18].
2.13.9.2 Recommendations from Literature.
Utility organizations should implement network rings (or layers) of defense, also
known as defense-in-depth [8].
To start with, there should be perimeter monitoring on remote, unattended
SCADA system elements [1].
Firewalls can be used to screen message traffic between a corporate IT network
and a SCADA network on the Utility Intranet. This configuration can protect SCADA
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systems from penetrations that have occurred on the corporate side. Some issues that
have to be considered when applying firewalls to SCADA systems are the delays
introduced into data transmissions, the skill and overhead required to set up and manage
firewalls, and the lack of firewalls designed to interface with some popular SCADA
protocols [1]. While most firewalls do not support SCADA protocols, this situation is
being researched by a number of organizations and some SCADA-aware firewalls are
under development [1].
Perimeter defenses should employ two layers of firewalls that will conduct
stateful data inspection. One firewall would be installed between the Utility Intranet
wide-area-network (WAN) side and your corporate LAN and a second strong firewall
would wall off the organization’s SCADA networking systems from both the internal
corporate network, with its preponderance of non-real-time e-mail, web, and office
automation traffic, and the mixed content traversing the external Intranet between utility
organizations. This would provide at least two layers of firewalls between the SCADA
networking systems and the external Utility Intranet [8]. Only trusted connections will be
allowed to link into the SCADA system behind the outer firewall in the outer trusted
zone, but will also have to pass the scrutiny of the inner firewall policy sets as an added
layer of protection from compromise [3]. Firewalls must be SCADA-aware to recognize
and protect critical traffic to and from SCADA supervisory control elements [1].
The perimeter router can compliment these defensive systems by implementing
strict access control lists to deny all access and only allow access by exception rules (i.e.
a whitelist of authorized traffic).
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The SCADA network must also employ tightly managed subnetting to ensure an
exclusively private network, which will effectively hide the SCADA system from outside
entities and the utility’s public network in general [3]. If IPsec is used, care must be
taken to deconflict incompatibilities with Network Address Translation.
The network connections and any DMZ should be equipped with several types of
intrusion detection systems. Network IDS devices should monitor the traffic on the
network links and in the DMZ. Host-based IDSs should ensure that key files on critical
systems and DMZ servers are not manipulated [3].
After-the-fact analysis of audit trails is a useful means to detect past events. To
aid response measures, it is best to record as much of the communications traffic, as
possible, however disk storage is very expensive and often cost prohibitive. Monitoring,
on the other hand, implies real-time capture of data as a system is operating. Both
techniques are successfully employed in IT systems and will yield similar benefits in
SCADA networks [1]. For the logging of data on every packet, or even just the
suspicious ones, to be practical, low-cost, high capacity storage and an IDS that can
distinguish legitimate SCADA messages from unauthorized and malicious counterfeits
[18].
2.13.9.3 Objections and Questions from Utilities.
IDSs, firewalls, and antivirus software might slow down certain SCADA
operations. Their benefits to SCADA need to be proven to outweigh the potential
negative affects on efficiency, safety, and ROI of operations [1].
Oftentimes, SCADA systems go down due to other internal software tools or
employees that accidentally gain access into the SCADA network. Any time a system
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goes down, even for maintenance, there’s no certainty it will come back online smoothly.
Adding more complex software to interact with these finicky systems could prove more
disastrous.
At this time, IDSs are not available for some SCADA protocols [1].
2.13.9.4 Trust System Solutions.
The trust system performs firewall and IDS functions at any level of the network,
even on individual systems (i.e. host-level).
Simulations have shown that trust system firewall rules and format module
delays are sufficiently small enough to be a relative non-factor even for near real-time
(less than one second delivery time) communications.
The trust system logs suspicious event details. Because it can unpackage and
inspect each packet that crosses its path, the trust system can easily log all packets
(suspicious or not) on behalf of any system that cannot implement logging or audit trails
itself (assuming sufficient storage is available), significantly improving historical
reconstruction of network events, including low-and-slow attacks that escalate over days,
weeks, or months.
2.13.10 Insider Threat.
2.13.10.1 Objections and Questions from Utilities.
Privacy rights issues inhibit screening and profiling of some individuals.
2.13.10.2 Trust System Solutions.
Regardless of company hiring policies, as long as employees are required to
acknowledge and authorize “consent to monitor”, the trust system can track and log all
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actions, suspicious or not, that cross its path and attribute them to an authenticated
username and source system. If an individual’s action are authorized by the trust system
but later determined to be malicious, historical records will allow the piecing together of
the individual’s time-stamped actions.
Consent to monitor should be outlined and signed off by each employee in
contracts at the time of hiring and can also be setup as a reminder (and to cover any noncompany vendors, etc. that be on the network) by displaying a logon banner with the
legal phrasing to which the user must click an agreement button in order to connect. The
same banner would also allow the documentation of actions for legal prosecution should
an attacker attempt to conduct malicious actions.
The trust system logs are much more complete when a trust system agent is
loaded onto each SCADA node vice two trust systems in tunnel mode, which might only
see the traffic between them and not node-to-node traffic at the edges (e.g. between two
nodes on the same switch).
2.13.11 Limited physical security.
2.13.11.1 SCADA Security Challenges.
Whether due to budget restraints or to low priority, many substations and other
remote sites are left with inadequate or lackadaisical physical security procedures,
assuming that no one would really be that interested in SCADA equipment [1]. Unlocked and un-guarded facilities can allow an attacker to simply scale a fence to enter an
equipment room and plug in to access the SCADA network.
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2.13.11.2 Recommendations from Literature.
Fences, locks, motion-detectors, and security cameras can provide greater
physical security for facilities and remote substation yards. Tamper-resistant or tamperproof enclosures for SCADA system components are a good second line of defense to
prevent unwanted meddling, compromise, or damage [1]. The use of authenticated entry
and metal detectors is highly recommended for control centers and substations. In
addition, emergency action plans should be updated with procedures for dealing with
armed entry attempts and those procedures regularly exercised.
2.13.11.3 Objections and Questions from Utilities.
No one would really be interested in SCADA equipment and most of our
substation yards have fences around them. Even if someone could get in, they wouldn’t
even know what to do with the equipment or have passwords to logon.
2.13.11.4 Trust System Solutions.
The trust system ACM module’s logon credentials check can require smart card,
voice recognition, biometric, or other physical credentials for logon authentication before
granting network access, supplementing enforcement of physical security for network
actions.
The trust system can also notice and alert on the loss of an expected message
from a specific node or connectivity loss that might have resulted from disconnection or
damage to network components, aiding rapid recognition and recovery.
It is difficult to defend even the most conscientiously monitored IP networks with
highly trained analysts, especially when the ability to dictate and monitor every crucial
update and configuration of installations throughout the US is not available and
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determined attackers are constantly crafting and testing new ways to steal information or
disrupt operations. Even with its best efforts, a large, highly targeted company can
expect multiple system compromises each year, and those are just the ones they catch.
The US military has gone to great efforts to ensure that its classified networks are
in no way connected to the Internet or to its unclassified systems. Classified digital
information is encrypted to the highest level in-transit and hard drives are locked in safes
with two-person integrity checks on the lock when not in use or attended. Buildings
where classified information is processed implement strict physical access control and
require positive identification and need to know for entrance. They also use metal
sheets or mesh in the walls and are designed without windows to prevent unencrypted
electromagnetic emanations from computer workstations and screens from being
detectable or visible from outside the building. Operational security guidelines are strictly
enforced and refreshed at least annually so employees can recognize sensitive
information and sets of data, that by themselves are unclassified, but when linked
together, can give indications of classified operations or intentions.
Though it is not necessary to employ the exact same measures as for national
security secrets, critical infrastructure operations and sensitive information must be
seriously evaluated and approached with the same well-planned, deliberate, securityconscious mindset.
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2.13.12 Proactive Vulnerability Assessment.
2.13.12.1 SCADA Security Issues.
Few, if any, proactive deception measures, vulnerability discovery, or
fingerprinting of attackers, attack techniques, and zero-day exploits is conducted by
companies.
2.13.12.2 Recommendations from Literature.
Regular vulnerability scans and analysis should be conducted and best practices
from the SCADA Honeynet Project should be implemented on the Utility Intranet [1].
2.13.12.3 Trust System Solutions.
As a rule of thumb in SCADA systems, scans (vulnerability or otherwise) should
be conducted on systems rotated temporarily offline. Scanned system may be returned to
service when discovered discrepancies are remediated.
Vulnerability scanning would be a separate function from the trust system, but
the schedule for legitimate scans that traverse the network must be updated in trust
system rules so they are not assumed malicious and blocked.
The results of vulnerability scans should be used to improve the security posture
of the scanned systems and to identify temporary security holes in the network that may
require new trust system rules or signatures until a more permanent patch or upgrade to
remove the vulnerability can be implemented.
The trust system could also be loaded with and run vulnerability scanner
software, in limited instances, to gather additional information for its analysis of a
suspicious event. Examples might be a port scan to a single port to determine its open or
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closed status or to send a test message that should be blocked and result in the return of a
RST/ACK, in order to verify proper functionality of a trust agent’s defenses.
2.13.13 Lack of Centralized System Administration.
2.13.13.1 SCADA Security Issues.
Most utility companies have no single entity responsible for network
administration. Users are usually their own system administrators (with root-level
access) often with no reason to have those privileges [18].
2.13.13.2 Recommendations from Literature.
The principle of least privilege “should be applied in granting system access
permissions to users and applications and in allowing access to files” [23].
Assign specific, certified individuals with roles and responsibilities as operations
network administrators to monitor, modify, and maintain overall SCADA system and
network health. They should work hand-in-hand with administrators of corporate LAN
systems, perimeter IT devices, and security administrators if they are not the same
individuals.
Restrict root-level access only to administrators and engineers that need higher
level privileges (e.g. root) to perform their jobs. Normal IT practice is for administrators
to logon as a regular user when they aren’t performing immediate administrative
functions. When administrative actions requiring root-level access are required, they
should then either elevate their privilege with another password or logon with a different
username and password to the specific system they need to access. Use of the root-level
privilege should be reserved only for specific functions that require that privilege and
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only for as long as that higher privilege is necessary, then the individual should logoff as
root or return to a lower-level privilege.
2.13.13.3 Objections and Questions from Utilities.
Which of the 300 corporate personnel can monitor, control, and be certified on the
more than 10,000 devices in the network, especially if an operator is the only one
working on an evening shift and an emergency occurs—it’s just easier for everyone to
have the same rights and to be their own administrators.
2.13.13.4 Trust System Solutions.
The trust system does not provide administration but automatically enforces a
well-planned access control policy. It tracks access attempts, generating detailed records
of actions that occurred on the network which support network management and reduce
the burden on human administrators, allowing companies to do more with less.
An alert correlator would bring synergy and speed as well as comprehensive
situational awareness, management, and control to network security, administration, and
operations personnel in response to all types of alerts, through its filterable, combined
displays.
Unique specialties in SCADA, IT, and security administration within and
organization, working together, creates a resident body of expertise, confidence, and trust
that can proactively and continuously assess and improve the overall security posture of
systems and network design. This capability is crucial to defining efficient security
policies, rules, and signatures as well as effectively detecting and responding to network
security incidents.
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2.13.14

Integration of Security into Network Design and Planning.

2.13.14.1 SCADA Security Issues.
SCADA networks were designed for efficiency and simplicity without initial
consideration for security. Security, if given any real concern at all, was often a lowpriority afterthought.
2.13.14.2 Recommendations from Literature.
Employ a demilitarized zone (DMZ). Access to SCADA data summations from
substations and sensors, if made publicly available to the Utility Intranet, should be
redundantly ported to special web-enabled database servers, which live exclusively in the
DMZ. Additionally, the remote sensors and substations should remain isolated. DMZ
servers merely reflect the collected data concatenated and stored in core database servers
and should be alternately available via application servers in the heart of the next
generation security enclave to decision makers in the central SCADA control center, so
no critical system resources will be lost [3].
SCADA networks should be segmented off into their own IP segment and use
proper subnet masking techniques to protect the Industrial Automation environment from
other network traffic like file and print commands. [8].
A company’s SCADA and internal intranet IP addressing schemes should be
separated from the company’s public (to the Utility Intranet) network and from each
other if possible.
If trusted connections link into the SCADA system behind the outer firewall in
the outer trusted zone, they must still have to pass the scrutiny of the inner firewall policy
sets as an added layer of protection from compromise. [3]
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Additionally, the SCADA network must employ tightly managed sub-netting to
ensure an exclusively private network, which will effectively hide the SCADA system
from outside entities in the Utility Intranet and the utility’s public network in general [3].
Use smart switches instead of hubs.
“Data mining out at the edges leaves administrators with the power to configure a
security policy appropriate to their installation; deciding what data to share with others
and what forms of authorization will be required before access is permitted. For example,
a policy might dictate that normally, Node A limits itself to reporting voltage data and the
phase- angle of the power phasor, measured locally, but when the ISO announces a
“contingency,” Node A may be willing to report far more detailed data. Node A would
require a configuration certificate authorizing contingency-mode reporting, and could log
this information for subsequent audit” [10].
Do not allow wireless connections if at all possible. Those that remain should
require authentication and strong encryption added (not inherent WEP, which is easily
cracked).
In addition to technical and administrative security controls, various physical
security measures can be applied to protect SCADA systems. Backup, duplicate,
geographically separated control centers can provide redundancy and, therefore,
protection against human attacks and natural disasters. On a smaller scale, a hot backup
standby SCADA system at the supervisory control center provides a means to continue
operating if the primary system is disabled. As an additional security layer, the SCADA
control center could be located in a remote area in an unmarked, inconspicuous building
[1].
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2.13.14.3 Trust System Solutions.
The trust system enforces access restrictions between IP addresses that should not
be allowed to communicate with one another via specific message types and interfaces.
Because the trust system analyzes and reassembles packets, it can, where necessary,
replace IP addresses and provide network address translation for the purposes of hiding
or making routable, IP addresses of nodes behind it.
2.13.15 Security Policies and Procedures.
2.13.15.1 SCADA Security Challenges.
Policies and procedures constitute the foundation of security policy
infrastructures. Implementing effective policies and procedures can reduce liabilities and
ensure subsequent prosecution of violations. Unfortunately, developing, documenting,
and enforcing effective security policies are some of the most difficult measures to
manage. Only a conscious, ongoing, proactive network security program can have
realistic success over the long term [8]. Most utility companies lack effective,
enforceable security policies and procedures.
2.13.15.2 Recommendations from Literature.
Utility organizations at all levels of the Utility Intranet, from the smallest SCADA
office to regional and area control centers, should implement comprehensive, flexible,
and testable security policies for each environment and for their interactions with other
entities (i.e. between SCADA and corporate, inter-company, company to area control
center, etc.). These policies should not be drafted in a vacuum, but instead with input
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from all stakeholders (e.g. operators, engineers, IT, and management). Finally, plan and
implement security policy management and assign responsibility and oversight.
It is important for SCADA operators, engineers, and administrators to work with
IT departments to develop well thought out system operation and contingency plans in
the event of problems, including the gamut of potential network security incidents [16].
Over the years, information system security professionals have developed a number of
generally accepted best practices to protect networks and computing infrastructures from
malicious attacks. They are an excellent starting point, however, these practices cannot
be applied directly to SCADA systems without accounting for the different requirements
of SCADA as compared to IT systems.
2.13.15.3 Trust System Solutions.
The trust system enforces the security policy with which it is configured. It also
learns and proactively implements blocks or suggests new firewall rules, to security
analysts, for suspicious activity not originally anticipated.
Security logs generated by the trust system document suspicious events and trust
system response details for after action review, analysis of security policy for updates,
and trust system configuration changes.
2.13.16 Cybersecurity Priorities.
2.13.16.1 SCADA Security Issues.
Cybersecurity is a low priority to most utility owners because of long-held
misconceptions of invulnerability. First, there is industry denial about how much they
are actually connected to the Internet. There is an increasing trend in connections from
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the corporate network to the SCADA network for activity and performance reports. The
same corporate offices are connected to the Internet for e-mail and web access. Remote
login over the Internet and telephone lines for monitoring and administration of SCADA
systems has also been growing in popularity for years. In the very beginning, control
systems were less visible than IT systems and many were not even connected to external
networks. Their components required detailed technological knowledge to implement
and operate, so the myth of security-through-obscurity had some basis in fact, but that is
not so anymore.
Fear of economic impact has resulted in isolationism (i.e. reluctance to ask for
help or report network security incidents). A press release out of Washington, dated
April 7, 2002, stated that, according to an FBI survey, most large corporations and
government agencies have been attacked by computer hackers, but more often and more
frequently they do not inform authorities of the breaches. The survey found about 90%
of respondents detected computer security breaches within the previous year but only
34% reported those attacks to authorities. Many respondents cited fear of bad publicity
about computer security. There is much more illegal and unauthorized activity going on
in cyberspace than corporations admit to their clients, stockholders, and business partners
or report to law enforcement [8].
2.13.16.2 Recommendations from Literature.
Education of decision makers in the industry is key to dispelling the myths.
Vulnerability assessments have already demonstrated unauthorized access to SCADA
and Distributed Control Systems. Examples from contracted penetration testing, using no
zero day exploits, indicate the level of naivety among SCADA users. A common
84

misperception among SCADA operators and managers is that “the threat is low because
outsiders know nothing about our systems”. “They were appalled to then learn that teams
were able to, in a matter of minutes, gain access to the SCADA control network through
unsecured Wi-Fi access from the neighborhood, unknown and unprotected dialup lines,
and the Internet. Although organizations were adamant about the fact that their
operations network was not connected to the Internet, the teams more often than not
identified an interconnection between the production and office network, with no airgap,
and the office network then connected to the Internet. The teams discovered network
diagrams that in many cases didn’t match reality and laptops, not tracked or accounted
for, allowed to connect to the production network from the outside (spreading viruses and
worms) [7].
A combination of scheduled vulnerability assessments to include remote and
internal scans (even lab results can suffice), human engineering analysis (i.e. looking for
written-down passwords, accessible network equipment, phishing techniques, etc.), and
operational security assessments (i.e. searching for and piecing together sensitive
information from public websites and records), can prove just how vulnerable a particular
network or system is and can demonstrate the negative operational impact that could be
created by an attacker.
2.13.16.3 Objections and Questions from Utilities.
A well known CIO stated in the 2002 issue of CIO magazine that “most public
utilities rely on a highly customized SCADA system. No two are the same, so hacking
them requires specific knowledge,” referring to the company’s unique design and access
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to that customized software [1]. He also stated that “cyber terrorism may not be nearly as
worrisome as some would make it. That’s because it’s utterly defensible” [1].
2.13.16.4 Trust System Solutions.
Even with technical training, regular application of the latest patches, security
software and hardware, and dedicated specialists for round-the-clock monitoring, even
the most heavily defended IT networks see their share of system compromises throughout
the year from Internet connections.
The trust system records suspicious event details useful for IT and security
personnel to prove to management the types and quantities of attacks attempted against
the network when suggesting investment in security purchases.
Unnecessary ports, obviously, should be closed. As another line of defense,
though, the trust system protects the unprotected (i.e. systems that for one reason or
another have open ports which for which there should be no communication). In this
case, the trust system blocks incoming packets destined for that port and IP address
combination.
Institution of a national utility certification program that ranks companies and
areas on their production, training, efficiency, environmental impact, rates, customer
satisfaction, and security performance would increase healthy competition for customers
now able to pick and choose their energy sources.
A certification program, coupled with external vulnerability assessments and
mandatory incident reporting, would reward companies with good management, policy,
and security measures, encouraging network security investment.
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It would soon become apparent that the number of attacks on a company is
irrelevant as compared to the ability to quickly and consistently detect and prevent
breaches, which are the hallmarks of a security conscious organization.
The trust system makes it easy to gather and analyze attack data for reporting and
proving successful mitigation by a company, allowing it better protect its operations
while gaining a higher security certification than its peers, and potentially higher profits
due to consumer confidence.
2.13.17 Economics and Return on Investment.
2.13.17.1 SCADA Security Issues.
Deregulation has resulted in a greater focus on efficiency and return on
investment (ROI) rather than on security. Industry consolidation, increased competition,
and low profit margins in some sectors have reduced investment in technology and
production upgrades. Utilities are now operating closer and closer to their limits as they
attempt to keep up with growing energy demands. The minimal reserve capacity, such as
in the electric utility industry, has resulted in systems that are less resilient to accidents
and attacks.
Obviously, corporate management officers are truly concerned about the safety
of their country and the nation’s critical infrastructure, but, when they have to make
budgetary and commitment decisions for their own organizations, these security concerns
can be easily superseded by multiple economic, cultural, and financial issues. Budget
meetings revolve around maximizing profits while juggling other pressing investments
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required to out-perform lower cost competition, fund deferred maintenance, and achieve
harmony between conflicting institutional cultures and priorities [1].
Most senior managers of utility companies view security costs as a competitive
economic issue. They do not see a market incentive for spending large amounts of
capital on information security technology. Just as some companies assert that
regulations requiring expenditures for pollution controls negatively impact their bottom
line, many claim that the costs of SCADA security will put them at a competitive
disadvantage with companies that do not implement similar measures. In addition, many
managers do not see investments in their individual organizations having much effect on
the overall public welfare.
Few senior managers think of securing SCADA systems as more than just
purchasing and installing hardware and software. More importantly, an organization has
to invest in hiring qualified personnel, instituting an on-going training program so
individuals remain current in a highly dynamic field, developing and managing flexible
security policies, daily monitoring network traffic, and continuously assessing and
improving security measures. Without those who can properly operate and maintain
security systems, and provide the human operational understanding and on-the-fly
decision-making for which no machine can adequately substitute, security hardware and
software, by itself does them little good.
2.13.17.2 Recommendations from Literature.
To level the playing field, the government must develop and enforce standards for
securing SCADA systems that apply to all organizations in an industry so that all the
participants bear the costs equally [1].
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2.13.17.3 Objections and Questions from Utilities.
A utility consists of dozens to hundreds of substations, each with many IEDS,
enterprise-wide upgrades, re-programming, or replacement for IEDs and legacy systems
is too costly [18].
2.13.17.4 Trust System Solutions.
The trust system concept recognizes the needs and financial resources of various
organizations can be quite different. It focuses on minimizing cost and maximizing
flexibility in implementation.
As a caveat, the trust system does require a particular amount of hard disk
storage for its applications and performs better, especially when conducting more security
functions, with faster processors and larger/faster memory, so there are some limits to the
modular add-on capability without also upgrading memory, hard disk, and processing
capacity.
Simulations for this thesis were conducted on a personal computer (PC) to
evaluate performance by the most simple, cost-effect COTS hardware solution, however,
the trust system would be an open software solution that can be added to any user
hardware (better hardware just performs better) and interact with any existing operating
system or protocol. All trust system modules are software programs that work either
together or alone, so a company that does not need all of the trust system functions can
simply pick-and-choose and purchase only what they need. The idea is that is the
company already has a good firewall or IDS that they could interact with the trust
system (or vice versa) to keep up to date on their discoveries and actions. In this way,
the trust system is more of a security manager.
89

The same is true for a company that needs to invest in one or two modules now
and add additional functionality later. Trust system software would be easily
upgradeable by simply installing additional, add-on software modules or upgrades to
existing modules.
While the trust system provides a security framework, companies themselves
implement their own security policies and can enable, add, or tweak security thresholds
and rules unique to their organization.
Until a company is able to transition fully to processor-based, IP-enabled master
stations and field equipment that can implement distributed trust system agents on all
critical nodes, the trust system, loaded onto separate security boxes in the network (i.e.
systems, such as a trust PC, server, or router) provides security functionality on behalf
of the limited-capacity legacy systems that send traffic across its path.
Server memory and SCSI drives are recommended for extended operation, even
in workstations and HMIs. When defining hardware purchase requirements,
organizations should plan for excess memory and disk space upfront or ensure servers
and workstations have plenty of expansion capacity to accommodate future performance
enhancing memory, disk, and processor upgrades as technology improves and costs
decrease.
2.13.18 Information Security Expertise and Responsibility.
2.13.18.1 SCADA Security Issues.
SCADA maintenance and administration are fractured with no single cyber
security overseer [18]. SCADA and distributed control systems have traditionally been
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the exclusive domain of electrical engineers. With the transition to standard hardware
and software platforms, Internet protocols, and connections to corporate enterprise
networks, IT personnel are becoming more involved with SCADA systems. Thus, there
are conflicting cultures and priorities and differing stances on implementing IDSs,
firewalls, authentication, and encryption [1].
Operators, power engineers, and management often try to guard their operational
systems from IT personnel, who are the smartest on network security, because of
assumptions they can’t or won’t understand operational impacts or that they will disrupt
working operational capabilities for unnecessary security restrictions [18].
Unfortunately, SCADA security discussions typically devolve to “SCADA
personnel largely working in a vacuum and telling the IT security community that they
don’t understand SCADA protocols” [18].
Great research is being done on both sides (i.e. IT security engineers and SCADA
engineers), but the SCADA security torch continues to be carried by a handful of people
focused only on the control system environment.
2.13.18.2 Recommendations from Literature.
IT personnel must understand operations and the impact of security mechanisms
to the degree that they can make them transparent to the operators and power engineers.
It is important that the IT security community is involved. It doesn’t take much work for
them to extend their existing body of knowledge in order to take some of the increasing
burden off of power engineers and operators.
It is important for both sides to understand that SCADA network security
discussions are the same as any other security discussion (i.e. operating systems, services,
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web-based, XML, SNMP, TCP/IP, UDP/IP, etc.) but with different message formats and
very strict time constraints. While the overall concepts are the same, it is important to
understand that the applications and priorities are going to be slightly different in
SCADA security versus IT security.
2.13.18.3 Objections and Questions from Utilities.
Power engineering is already a relatively small subset of electrical engineering
and power engineers who are interested in, let alone like, understand, or are enthralled by
information technology are even harder to come buy [18].
IT personnel don’t understand SCADA systems, protocols, and operational
requirements and may degrade or cause downtime in the 24/7 operations with their
restrictive policies and security measures.
2.13.18.4 Potential Solutions.
It is recommended that each organization assign an Information Systems Security
Officer (ISSO) to maintain and monitor all security policies for control, office, and
engineering networks.
Assign a small, qualified security team (reporting to the ISSO) with
administration privileges over security systems to objectively evaluate security posture
and effectiveness; update security systems, signatures, and rules; and analyze suspicious
network events, logs, and security alerts.
Power engineers must know enough about information technology and
information security to be effective in adhering to security policies and assisting in
defining workable system security requirements, solutions, and operating procedures.
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Instead of arguing over who is more qualified to offer architecture
recommendations and protocol design changes, all parties (i.e. SCADA, IT, and network
security) must recognize that they each bring important skillsets and insight to the table.
They must form a team that gains familiarity with each other’s requirements and works
together to define, implement, and maintain a workable security policy.
2.13.19 Security Training.
2.13.19.1 SCADA Security Challenges.
Companies have little or no investment in security training.
2.13.19.2 Recommendations from Literature.
Management should ensure design of a specific, documented and testable security
training plan for each user role and require initial training and qualification, quarterly
updates, and annual refreshers. Integrate security scenarios and responses into regular
exercises. A certification program should be established for security analysts and all
who will perform administrative functions affecting network performance, security, and
safety.
2.13.19.3 Objections and Questions from Utilities.
Financial constraints leave little money for expensive information security
courses.
2.13.19.4 Trust System Solutions.
Organizations should develop, by experience, in-house experts (or area/regional
support teams) that will continuously document lessons learned, best practices, and
provide tech support and training for the benefit of all employees.
93

Detailed traffic captures and suspicious event parameters, logged by the trust
system, are no-cost, and can be used to train employees to recognize regular traffic
patterns, signatures and history of the most common and most dangerous suspicious
events, and proper trust system responses. A spare trust system can be used offline
connected to a single laptop (attacker) as a training simulator or test platform by which
the laptop can launch attacks or requests to see how the trust system will respond, as
configured by the company’s security policy. This simulator configuration provides an
interactive learning and testing environment.
2.14

Chapter Summary
Overall, the majority of the SCADA community has been quick to embrace the

transition to IP-based standards. In some cases it has already begun to adopt the IT
business practices of non-SCADA corporations, such as connecting the corporate
management LAN to the operational (i.e. production) network for updates and improved
communications. We have also seen the continuation of remote connections for
administrators and operators, now over Internet and telephone connections, for business
efficiency. In all of these endeavors, it appears that security has taken more or less a
back seat to functionality in SCADA design, instead of being considered in parallel at the
outset. As a result, it has been temporarily ignored or passively entertained but mainly
left to vendors and research labs to figure out and recommend as an after-the-fact
configuration, if necessary, while IP-standards documentation, testing, and deployment is
already underway without clearly defined security standards, policies, strategies, and
technical support at all levels of the community.
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It is difficult to defend even the most conscientiously monitored IP networks with
highly trained analysts, especially when the ability to dictate and monitor every crucial
update and configuration of installations throughout the US is not available and
determined attackers are constantly crafting and testing new ways to steal information or
disrupt operations. Even with its best efforts, a large, highly targeted company can
expect multiple system compromises each year, and those are just the ones they catch.
As a move toward an interconnected Utility Intranet is realized, a US-wide operational
utility network, with some potential overseas offices, will only be as secure as the least
secure organization within it. Since these companies are currently privately owned with
little hierarchical oversight or technical support, the chances for non-secure practices and
backdoors from Internet and telephone connections by even a single company to allow
viruses, worms, DoS, Trojans, sniffers, and rootkits to filter into the network and wait for
the next opportunity to infect and disrupt SCADA operations is only a matter of time and
nearly impossible to prevent.
Although non-SCADA Internet-connected corporations and home computers are
low hanging fruit for amateur script kiddies who have a plethora of online tactics,
techniques, and procedures for manipulating cyberspace, others desire more of a
challenge or are simply greedy enough to look for alternative targets of opportunity in
order to improve there situation in life. They are undaunted to make the extra effort to
understand utility SCADA and emergency management technologies and dream of ways
to defeat them. Then there are those terrorist-sponsored individuals, groups, and
organizations who simply live to control through fear, death, propaganda, and anarchy or
nation-state military or paramilitary units that work to maintain a technological advantage
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and have been gathering and testing every bit of communications network intelligence
they can find, steal, or buy in preparation for the chance to take down or disrupt an
American utility when it is advantageous to their cause.
As computer processors have increased in speed, we have begun to quickly
exceed the ability to humanly react fast enough to escalating, well-planned network
attacks and must rely more and more on automated security technologies to detect and
respond accurately in order to prevent damage, disruption, or loss and buy time for the
decisions and actions that only humans can make to maintain continuity of operations.
This will require ever-increasing technological capabilities and refreshes, regular system
updates and security checks, active security monitoring of network traffic, and regular
training to detect and respond to network reconnaissance and attacks before or at least as
they happen, and recover in the event of successful attacks.
Operators and administrators will have to know their own systems and their
vulnerabilities as well as the impact of network transport and security systems in the
same network. IT administrators will have to understand the specific security measures
that apply to SCADA networks versus more delay-tolerant office LANs, and security
analysts will have to be employed and trained to provide low-level expertise and
integration of security mechanisms that complement and don’t hinder their company’s
operations. Communication and between all of these roles is critical. Above all of these
cultural changes, will be a pervasive and necessary lack of trust, because any IP packet
that attempts to enter the network or is received by one of its systems could be from a
compromised system elsewhere in the network.
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Fortunately, the cost for increased commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies
remains the same or decreases over time making it possible for companies to
continuously improve their network functionality, efficiency, and security. Yet,
technology means nothing if the humans, especially at the lowest level, are not well
trained to select, install, configure, maintain, analyze, and improve it, since they are the
one’s who best know their own operations and are responsible each and every day to
supply the basic needs of millions of American citizens.
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III. Methodology
3.1

Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it will explain the concept and real-

world applications of a trust system, as an integrated suite of flexible and configurable
trust-based security mechanisms with pick-and-choose, add-on security capabilities for
existing and future IP-based SCADA, real-time control, and Emergency Management
networks. Second, this chapter will explain the models and scenarios developed to
simulate communications that would be present in a collaborative control network relying
upon non-real-time transport protocols such as UDP and TCP. The purpose of the
simulations was to implement the proposed functionality of these delay-inducing security
mechanisms and to estimate the impact of the induced delay on utility control
communications. The goal of the experiments was to evaluate the hypothesis that
stringent security mechanisms can be implemented in SCADA environments, using a mix
of non-real-time protocols for communication and wide-area information sharing, while
meeting strict real-time thresholds for emergency response.
3.2

The Trust System Concept
3.2.1

What the Trust System Is.

The concept of a trust system is to provide a non-proprietary system, system of
systems, or software agents that plug into an existing network, somewhat transparently,
to perform the functions of correlating data and identifying risk levels for corresponding
events and status updates that point to negative impacts on utility services. The trust
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system, at its core, is a software agent performing active security analysis and response.
In a network where nodes have sufficient unused hard drive capacity, memory, and
processing power, the agent would be loaded directly onto the node and provide an active
interface between incoming messages and the node’s code, data, and applications, similar
to other software firewalls. It could also be set to monitor outgoing messages
3.2.2 What the Trust System Does.
The trust system intercepts status messages or commands from network nodes
destined for the master control station or other nodes in the network. For companies with
some legacy nodes, this would require protocol gateway plug-ins for the trust system to
interpret and analyze packets delivered in different protocols and formats.
The trust system validates input and identifies security risks or bad data,
initiating appropriate alerts and response actions. It then assigns data types to each of the
good data elements in each message. Next, it determines if the recipient is authorized to
read all of the data types in the message, particularly when a recipient is external to the
company (i.e. not a company employee or source IP address outside the company
network). If not, it sanitizes the parts of the message that are not allowed to be passed to
the recipient before forwarding it or simply deletes the message altogether. Finally, good
data elements (i.e. those that appear legitimate because they pass all checks for corruption
and valid data ranges/values) are transferred to database systems for company Intranet
display and to archiving systems for historical and trend analysis. The archived data is
then viewable and accessible only to those with the appropriate credentials, need to
know, and rights to access those data elements.
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Trust systems monitor communications within the company’s SCADA network
and between the company’s SCADA network and other organizational enclaves in the
Utility Intranet. The same concept can be applied to monitoring the company’s office
LAN, DMZ, and Internet VPN connections, which should not be connected to the
SCADA network, if at all possible.
System status updates are communicated between SCADA and emergency
management systems in a series of messages with potentially tens, hundreds, or
thousands of data elements per message. Not all of the data will be needed by every
system or by every user that views the correlated status summaries. Some data may be
strictly for historical analysis or accountability reasons in the event of a resource,
security, or safety incident. Other data may relate to operational or financial performance
and be considered company-sensitive and limited in release.
Because of the wide range of users and systems involved in interconnected utility
operations that need to share data in an effort to increase situational awareness and
prevent emergency situations, there is also a need to restrict what data is readable,
depending on the need-to-know of a user and the sender’s trust that the recipient is who
they say they are and is not going to share the data with someone who does not have the
need to know. Hence the reason for assigning data types (e.g. operational, financial,
network, etc.) and releasability caveats (i.e. company-sensitive, company-restricted, no
vendors, no competitors, etc.) to all data elements (e.g. values, variables, entries, files,
folders, etc.) in the network. The data type and caveat must match the role and access
operations (i.e. rights, such as read, write, copy, etc.) assigned to a specific user, in order
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for that user to perform that specific access operation on that specific data element. This
is defined and enforced in the trust system Access Control Matrix (ACM).
3.2.3

Flexibility in Implementation of the Trust System

In today’s heterogeneous utility networks, where most legacy nodes are unable to
provide the resources needed by a loaded agent, the trust system is a flexible solution that
can be implemented in multiple different ways, depending on the company’s current
architecture and needs, without jeopardizing existing control functions.
For legacy networks, the trust system can be implemented as a trust box (i.e. a
server in front of a group of unprotected nodes that screens incoming packets and
generates security alerts to a security server and security analyst workstations). The trust
box would also act as an encryption gateway, maintaining secure tunnels with the trust
box in front of the master control station server and other servers with which the nodes it
protects must communicate. This thesis investigates the functionality of a standard PC
(desktop) hosting the trust system software. Consider, instead, if one or two distributed,
high-speed cluster servers with processing speeds close to 200 gigaflops per second were
assigned to the task. At the time of this writing, priced between $20,000 and $50,000
[27], a cluster server is not extravagantly expensive compared to the threat of lost
revenue and respect that might result from a security incident in the operational control
network.
For the sake of flexibility and cost savings to utility companies, these various
trust system functions would be implemented as separate software plug-in capabilities
that could each be purchased separately, to perform as standalone capabilities, or installed
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with other trust system modules for more robust capabilities. The loose coupling of
pick-and-choose options for the plug-in trust system modules (i.e. simple software
installs) makes it financially palpable, scalable, and easily upgradeable over time
The trust system can also be implemented as a system of systems. Every
function of the proposed trust system may not be needed by every organization. If a
company already has a good firewall and intrusion detection systems, it would not
necessarily need to purchase these plug-in capabilities for their trust system. In this
case, the trust system can theoretically interact with the data provided by these existing
network devices and complement them by providing its own unique capabilities in a
synchronized conglomerate of distributed systems. Key to the effectiveness of such a
scheme would be an alert correlator to deconflict duplications of both data and alert
traffic and to interpret and consolidate the protocols and information before presenting an
integrated picture to a security analyst, network administrator, or engineer’s screen.
Since every utility and utility company’s network will be different, each
individual company must perform its own individual network needs assessment and
simulation to determine security and financial feasibility and identify weak points and
points of failure in its own network design. It is then up to that company to implement
the best network design with the level of redundancy and defense-in-depth that is
economically feasible and corresponds to due diligence in protecting national
infrastructure and utility services. The trust system’s cost-effective, modular acquisition
and employment options are well-suited for meeting a wide range of implementation
requirements. A logo for the functions supported by the trust system is depicted in
Figure 9.
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Figure 9. Trust System Logo with Capabilities Summary

3.2.4

Passive vs. Active Mode Implementations.

Trust systems may be implemented in an active (or router) mode, where the
trust system is implemented on a hardware device inline with all communications
between the SCADA master control station and the nodes it controls and between the
company’s SCADA network and its outgoing connection to the rest of the Utility Intranet
as depicted in Figure 10. This device may be a specialized trust box or a trust-enabled
router which is also responsible for network routing of all packets on the link. In this
implementation, it may itself stop or correct malformed or malicious packets that it
inspects. The advantage is the ability to block malicious traffic immediately as it’s
detected. A block is constituted by a DENY entry being added to the firewall rules (for a
specific IP address, interface, protocol, port, and/or message type combination) or a
lowered trust level and/or access level (for a specific user or system). The disadvantage is
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that the hardware device is a potential single-point of failure on that link. If the entire
hardware device fails, the link is down; however, alternate or redundant routes can
alleviate this problem, as in any IP network. The simulations and experiments for this
thesis assume a trust system in active mode to demonstrate its blocking functionality.

Figure 10. Trust System Modes and Configuration Options.
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In passive mode, a trust device is connected to a hub or switch on the link
between the SCADA master control station and the nodes it controls and between the
company’s SCADA network and its outgoing connection to the rest of the Utility Intranet
as depicted in Figure 10. In this case, the trust system simply sniffs packets as they pass
by, saves a copy to analyze, and alerts if a security or trust rule has been broken or has
the potential of being broken. The advantage to this mode is that the trust device is not
in-line with the communications, so a failed trust system does not block the
communications link. The disadvantage is that the trust device cannot stop, only report,
malicious packets it sees and it will do so after the packet has passed the trust system
and is likely to already be delivered to the intended recipient.
A way to implement blocking with a passive mode trust system is for the trust
system to interact with a separate firewall or router ACL to block further packets by
source_IP, interface, transport protocol, and message type combinations but there will
still be some delay and a chance that one malicious packet will be delivered to its
destination before other similar packets are blocked. This is also known as half-active
mode.
In the case where some nodes cannot be loaded with nodal trust agents or afford
the clock cycles required for encryption, the trust system may be implemented in either
passive or active gateway mode as depicted in Figure 10. In this implementation, trust
system boxes or routers provide firewall and other security features for the nodes behind
them. They also create an encryption gateway between themselves to protect
communications between trust systems. This mode can also be referred to as tunnel
mode, since IPsec would be implemented in IPsec tunnel mode.
105

Figure 11 depicts peer-to-peer and master-slave configurations of trust systems.

Figure 11. Trust System Configurations

3.3

Real-world Applications for the Trust System
3.3.1

Inter-Company and Inter-Area Protection.

While not the norm in present day SCADA architectures, the concept of a Utility
Intranet can make possible unprecedented situational awareness between utility
companies, control and engineering centers, and neighboring utility control areas.
Sharing of automatic status updates will enable near-real-time situational awareness for
trusted ISOs, control authorities, or reliability coordinators who can, in turn, direct
actions to prevent catastrophic overloads or underloads and ensure equity of resources
within their areas of responsibility and oversight.
The trust system, when placed at strategic locations such as connections between
adjacent utility companies, outgoing connections from utility companies to area control
and engineering centers, tie lines between control and transmission areas, specifically
between control centers and between engineering centers, and between reliability
coordinators in different ISOs provides low-cost network security to traditional SCADA
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networks with their mix of legacy, proprietary systems and protocols and newer
standards-based solutions. Appendix A illustrates the proposed hierarchical structure of
information sharing, support, and command and control. Obviously, an understanding of
appropriate and inappropriate information flows (e.g. who, what, when, where, and how)
is critical to network security planning and design in general but more so in the design
and configuration.
Just as status updates in electric power utilities are sent from field equipment via
IEDs, RTUs, or PLCs and on to SCADA master control stations every few seconds, or
even milliseconds, either the same updates, a subset of those updates (i.e. only significant
changes from the previous update), or a summary report can be easily forwarded on to
connected control area authorities and adjacent electric utility companies on the Utility
Intranet. When substation automation applications do not support this forwarding, the
trust system can be configured to initiate this on their behalf whenever it sees a
qualifying message cross its path.
Situational updates shared between adjacent utility companies will facilitate
automatic recognition of changing conditions that might affect their levels of generation
or transmission. Neighboring companies that receive reliable status updates will have
earliest warning of creeping load changes versus current power generation levels. Early
warning and impact realization will prompt timely decisions on the right combination of
load shedding and adjusted generation rates necessary to absorb or make up for the rapid
changes in power flows from adjacent companies. This will aid private companies in
preserving service to their own customers while preventing potential blackouts and
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alleviating the associated financial costs and loss of public trust that can result from
outages.
Monitoring systems in neighboring Utility Company Operations Centers can then
automatically update their operational picture with a wider perspective of power
capabilities and emergencies in the immediate area while area controllers, ISOs, and
reliability coordinators would have a complete picture of currently segmented utility
operations owned by private companies. Control Areas can forward area-wide status
updates and emergency notifications to a Regional Utility Operations Center and to their
adjacent Area Operations Centers for improved regional situational awareness.
Appendix B depicts the cross-flow of information within and between various Utility
Intranet enclaves.
The trust system can facilitate this message forwarding right now between utility
company networks and control areas for which numerous existing SCADA applications
do not cooperate in this manner. When the trust system inspects and then reassembles a
packet, it can check its own ACM for the list of recipients external to the company
network who are authorized to receive that message type, translate the message into a
new packet with the proper format understandable by those receivers, and then forward
the original message internally, as normal, and the new message to those external
destination IP addresses.
In the event a neighbor noticed a spike or increasingly dangerous situation, in
what amounts to a macroscopic version of the local neighbor_trip, backup_trip, and
intertrip messages that are proposed to occur through embedded software agents within a
single company, a similar trip message might be generated from an adjacent neighbor
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company to ensure the owning company is aware of the impending emergency and can
approve or disapprove the requested action, even if its own systems are malfunctioning.
The Northeast Blackout of August 14, 2003, the largest in North American
history, illustrated this very scenario. Due primarily to malfunction, accidental
shutdown, and internal miscommunication, systems failed to report problems to the
control center within one company, which later denied any need for concern when it
received phone calls from a neighbor company warning they had indications of abnormal
readings along their shared borders of the transmission grid [28].
The controllers continued to operate, blind to the actual situation, for hours before
the cumulative affect (there were also power lines that had sagged in the heat to where
they contacted overgrown trees) created a system-wide point-of-no-return. A series of
cascading transmission line outages traveled through Ohio, around the Great Lakes in
Michigan, through Canada, and into New York State in only ten seconds [9]. Once it
began, the blackout that cascaded from Cleveland to the Northeastern United States took
just seven minutes total [9]. Nearly 10 million people in the province of Ontario (onethird of the Canadian population) were without power and 40 million people in eight U.S.
states (one-seventh of U.S. population U.S.). The financial losses due to the outage were
estimated at $6 billion [29]. In a highly reliable and secure environment, trip messages
from one company to another, especially from a trusted partner that has the interests of
both companies at heart, might be trusted to automatically trip breakers in another
company. This would require a complete culture change from the way electric utilities
are currently operated. Today such company to company initiated actions would likely
be rejected for fear of false trips due to technological or human errors, outside
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hackers/crackers/attackers, or corporate sabotage/espionage. This is where the trust
system will assist in validating traffic and providing assurance to utility managers.
Those companies hesitant to allow automatic actions to their systems by neighbor
companies would be more amenable to the option to approve or deny the trip requests
first or to allow neutral ISOs and reliability coordinators the ability to send commands to
company SCADA systems or breakers in reaction to a growing power outage seen within
their control area. It is also conceivable that the control area authorities that recognize
such a situation could contact the company to direct actions and, if granted proper
permissions, initiate breaker trips remotely when the required reaction time does not
allow for coordination. Either way, shared electronic status readings are more credible
than just word of mouth, and a master control station receiving conflicting reports from
its own substations and its neighbor’s control center could alarm to warn the operator and
would have prevented the 2003 blackout.
In the future, such security mechanisms as those investigated in the trust system
simulations, when layered over ever-increasing bandwidth and connectivity between
utility organizations, would enable the creation and operation of Regional Utility
Operations (or Control and Security) Centers to ensure integrity and fair use of the power
grid and a utility-specific capability for network security response, technical assistance,
and law enforcement liaison for companies within its regional span of control.
3.3.2

Internal Traffic Protection.

Internal to a utility company, the trust system provides firewall functionality
between SCADA nodes and between the SCADA network and any connected office
110

environments, restricting traffic only to authorized protocols and message types, while
compensating for bandwidth congestion and enforcing prioritization of packets. It can
ensure the fastest reliable delivery of important real-time and emergency traffic,
unhindered by delay-tolerant background traffic such as routine e-mails and Intranet web
browsing that might be present simultaneously.
The trust system envisioned will not only enable the sharing of automatic power
flow status and corrections but would guard security enclaves and commercial
communities of interest, protecting company-sensitive data from access by or accidental
transmission to competitors, vendors, and other entities accessing the Utility Intranet that
do not necessarily have the need-to-know, based on their duty position, or role.
3.3.3

Preventing Single Points of Failure.

The goal of the trust system is to be completely transparent to the controlled
utility process and robust in the face of adversity. The trust system is meant to be
layered over the existing process and communications scheme through adding, in a sense,
optional, independent security-layers to the network stack. Even if the entire trust
system was disabled, it should be completely decoupled from the industrial process such
that nothing in industrial operations would break or slow down.
If a single trust system agent at a node (i.e. a nodal trust system) which inspects
messages attempting to access enter through a device interface (at the physical and
network layers) and monitors access operations attempts (e.g. read, write, copy, etc.) at
the application level, should it fail, should not prevent functionality of the node in
sending and receiving communications. The industrial operations would perform as
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always without skipping a beat, except the layered on security measures would no longer
be in effect. Review of the trust system generated security logs would indicate a gap in
the regular entries expected (i.e. at a point in time where it is known that regular traffic
was flowing across the link and trust system analysis detail should be present). This
absence of log entries for a significant period would be sufficient to quickly verify that
the trust system is not functioning.
The best implementation of the trust system within an organization is in a
distributed manner with a network-level trust system (NTS) as an overseer. Each
distributed trust system would be independent, but keep the NTS up to date so that it can
maintain the big picture for the sake of correlating related events in multiple parts of the
network. In the face of lost communications with the NTS, a trust system agent loaded
on a node, referred to as a nodal trust system, could operate on its own to protect its
node and keep its neighbor nodal trust systems up to date, collaborating to ensure
security in their interactive node-to-node communications. The NTS might either have
another trust system in the network pre-defined as an alternate, should it fail, or in the
case of a leaderless situation, nodal trust systems might hold an election to designate a
new NTS with the greatest resources available (above a minimum requirement) for that
function.
3.4

Trust System Concepts and Terminology
3.4.1

Roles and Categories.

There are many different types of users requiring access to various SCADA and
IT system data within the interconnected Utility Intranet. Example user roles, for the
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purposes of this paper, are listed in Table 8. Several different roles may belong to the
same category of users (e.g. for those within the same organization) that requires
distinction as a group for the purposes of releasability.

Table 8. Example Roles for Various Utility Intranet Users
Category
IED_vendor

my_company

trusted_power_grid_organizations

adjacent_competitor_company

Trust
Level
-2
-1
-1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-1
0
-2

Role
vendor_sales_rep
vendor_programmer
vendor_engineer
SCADA_operator
SCADA_administrator
power_systems_engineer
SCADA_maintenance
IT_administrator
network_security_analyst
company_ISSO
management
planner
dispatcher_in_training
my_master_station
area_controller
area_engineer
area_ISSO
independent_system_operator
reliability_coordinator
regional_transmission_operator
interconnection_controller
adjacent1_master_station
adjacent1_trust_system
adjacent1_email_server
adjacent1_SCADA_operator
adjacent2_master_station
adjacent2_email_server
adjacent2_SCADA_operator

A role could be arbitrarily defined to describe any group of individuals. For this
thesis, the role has been specifically defined as a job position. This role-based access
may vary over time for a particular individual, depending on the individual’s assigned
tasks, the data and tools they need to know and use, and the level of trust the company
has in their experience, performance, and current level of training.
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3.4.2

Data Elements and Rights.

Each user role is associated with a set of rights (i.e. permissions) for access
operations (e.g. view, read, write, copy, delete, move, execute, etc.) on specific elements
of data and code available on the various systems in the network. Potential data types
that can be found on a Utility Intranet might include those listed in Table 9.

Table 9. Example Data Types
Abbreviation
OC
DC
DD
OD
SD
ND
NC
ED
OA
LG
IW
IC
XW
XC
SE
CT

Data Type
Operations-specific (SCADA) Code
Development Code
Developmental and Test Data
Operations Data
SCADA-specific Data
Network Data (IT)
Network Code and Configurations (IT)
Emergency Management Data
Office Automation and Common Drives
Logs
Internal (Intranet) Web Pages
Internal (Intranet) Web Code
External (Internet) Web Pages
External (Internet) Web Code
Security Data and Security Code
Coding Tools

Potential data access operations by Utility Intranet users might include those
listed in Table 10.

Table 10. Example Access Operations
Abbreviation
r
c
w
a
p
m
d
s
x

Access Operation
read/view/open
copy
write
append
paste
move/cut
delete
save
execute
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3.4.3

Access Levels.

An access level determines what data a user or device should be allowed to
receive, see, and interact with. More specifically, an individual’s access level is
dependent upon two factors: an individual’s role and the Access Credentials Control
Number (ACCN), an integer (0-4), calculated from the number and reliability of
successful logon credentials presented for logon to the network.
While very minute internal failures, outages, or limitations that have no effect on
other companies or services provided to customers do not need to be known by
competitors, when an event (or factors) are detected that could contribute to a widespread
(outside of the company) emergency, some of these data elements, previously kept
internal to the company, may need to be communicated. In this event, either the access
level of the user or device to be informed must temporarily increase or the access level of
the data element must temporarily be decreased to make more “company sensitive”
information available or releasable. This also means there must be a mechanism to track
access level state changes and a method to revert to the original level once the emergency
situation is resolved. The easiest way to deal with this is at the trust system when
assigning access caveats to data elements. Normally, some data elements might have
company-sensitive or company-restricted caveats assigned. Data given a restricted caveat
can never be sent to an external agency that is not authorized to see this caveat (financial
reports might be an example). Sensitive data (caveat = sensitive) may not be released, in
general, to external organizations, except in certain circumstances. If, for instance, all of
the following conditions are met: emergency = true & external_impact = possible &
caveat = sensitive, then the data is releasable to a particular list of authorized IP
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addresses. There is no need for raising or lowering access levels of users or access
caveats for data because once data is released it is then known and present outside the
company network and cannot be taken back. Another tag for released = true could also
be set with a release date traceable to the release list so it is always known to whom and
when sensitive information elements were released. If not released, then released = false
and it is understood that this information has never (deliberately and electronically) been
made available to anyone outside the organization without the need to know.
Access levels and access caveats are not the same as security classifications or
security clearances assigned to government data and personnel, respectively. Data of
varying security classifications (e.g. Confidential, Secret, Top Secret) traditionally has
not been maintained on the same physical network or connected networks and must
maintain physical separation. Although this has been the procedure to date, in the future,
technology may provide strict logical separation control, for data of different
classifications on the same storage media, that prevents any chance of remanence, bleedover, tapping, theft or inadvertent access by anyone not holding the appropriate security
clearance for the data they attempt to view or access. Research in this area is not the
purpose of this thesis.
Data, folders, and files could have an associated data type as well as a release
restriction, or access caveat, such as “company sensitive” applied to them. In this case,
authorized access to both parameters and the proper read and execute rights would be
required to view and use the folder, file, or data.
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3.4.4

Trust Levels.

In addition to access levels, there are trust levels for both users and systems.
Trust levels designated for the purposes of this thesis are depicted in Table 11.

Table 11. Example Trust Levels
Trust
Level
-0

Degree
Full trust (i.e. High)

-1
-2
-3

Cautious trust (i.e. Med)
Suspicious (i.e. Low)
Untrusted (i.e. None)

Example
Control Area (CA) employee, Reliability Coordinator (RC), or
Independent Systems Operator (ISO)
Employee of a partner company
Employee of a partially-trusted competitor company
Employee of an untrusted competitor company or other untrusted
source

The trust level is an integer to be subtracted from (or a negative integer that is
added to) the ACCN (a positive integer from 0 to 4) of a user or system. A trust level of 0
is good and a trust level of -1 to -3 means something has occurred to cause the trust
system to begin regarding further traffic from a particular source with greater suspicion.
A lowered trust level decreases the ACCN, and, therefore, the access level of the user or
system.
If the trust system detects false or corrupted data from a node (e.g. a malformed
or spoofed packet, DoS attack, or corrupted data), it must decide if it should initiate a
maintenance trouble ticket or security alert, lower the trust level for that system, initiate a
switchover to a redundant backup system (if available), or change its priorities for
primary and backup sources of information for particular data elements that were
originally supplied by that system?
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3.4.5

Multi-level Access.

The assignment of access levels and rights over data elements can prevent
unauthorized disclosure of sensitive data or even the existence of such data for multiple
users at different access levels.
Each individual’s account is tied to specific rights (i.e. permissions) over specific
types of data by its assigned role (and category, if applicable). One right would be for
reading operational status message data elements. Another might be for executing a
diagnostic program. This applies not only to a utility company’s employees and systems
but to partners and competitors, which would normally have no authority to initiate
actions on that company’s systems. User and system roles prevent a user from viewing
data, files, folders, or systems in the network for which they are not authorized. Those
they can read, are prevented from modification if the user or system does not have
authorization according to the ACM.
Permissions for writing and executing code or initiating actions on or by the
utility company’s systems (tripping a breaker, increasing/decreasing generation or load,
shutting down, switching over from primary to backup, etc.) require specific access
levels. Rights (i.e. permissions) not only apply to accessing data elements in messages
and in folders but also to accessing systems and sections of code (used by the system),
etc.
3.5

Trust System Modules Overview
Appendix C illustrates the primary functions of the trust system in a flowchart of

operations. White blocks indicate functions simulated to illustrate the trust system
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capabilities. Gray objects indicate servers that are important to the SCADA network and
comprehensive security monitoring that are assumed, but not simulated, in experiments
for this thesis. Gray diagonally shaded blocks indicate trust system functions not
necessary to be simulated in the research for this thesis yet important to the overall trust
system capability.
3.6

Firewall Rules Module
3.6.1

Firewall Rules Check.

The trust system is configured with signatures for authorized communications
traffic, similar to a firewall whitelist. This is the opposite approach to blacklist firewall
rules, which specify unauthorized traffic. The trust system firewall rules filter incoming
packets on the combination of source and destination IP pairs, message type allowed,
protocol, source and destination ports, and trust system interface receiving the packet.
In the firewall rules depicted in Table 12, only port 500 (IPsec) is allowed, to ensure all
communications are encrypted.
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Table 12. Firewall Rules and Outbound Routing Table Excerpt

3.6.2

Encryption Check.

All messages sent and received between systems on the SCADA network should
use encryption, such as network-layer (i.e. layer 3 of the OSI model) IPsec, if it does not
prevent delivery within time-constrained thresholds. The SCADA network nodes
simulated this thesis were assumed to communicate only over a single encrypted source
and destination port (port 500 for IPsec) for inbound and outbound messages.
Incoming messages are decrypted by the trust system with its private key and the
sender’s public key. If a message was both sent and received on port 500 and
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successfully decrypted, the message passed the firewall rules encryption check. If,
however, the message was received unencrypted, the firewall rules encryption check
failed immediately. If the message was encrypted, but the trust system did not have the
proper key to decrypt the message, the firewall rules encryption check also failed,
because either the sender or the trust system had the wrong key.
3.6.3

Firewall Rules Scorekeeper.

If a message does not pass the firewall rules, the passed and failed parameters,
known as labels, are updated in the firewall rules scorekeeper (FWR-SK) with the label
name, value, and score (0=passed or 1=failed). At this point, if one of the firewall rules
labels failed, the packet has failed the firewall rules check and the packet may be
discarded and ignored; however, for the purposes of search into maximum delay, the
trust system is allowed to fully analyzed every packet, forwarding it through all trust
system checks (i.e. firewall rules, format, and ACM checks) before documenting all
passed and failed parameters and discarding bad packets. Therefore, the updated firewall
rules scorekeeper is forwarded to the next trust system module, the format module.
3.7

Format Module
3.7.1

Input Validation and Format Checks.

If a message passes the firewall rules check within the firewall rules module, the
firewall rules scorekeeper is forwarded to the format module component of the trust
system for format and input validation. The trust system differs from a standard firewall
(which usually looks only at lower-level IP addresses, ports, and protocols) in that it also
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inspects a message’s packet and header sizes and contents as well as its application data.
Data that does not meet expected types, values, or ranges is recognized by the trust
system as a suspicious event and rejected.
By checking packets against expected size, field content, or data ranges, the trust
system identifies corrupted or malicious packets. It may then auto-correct (if the proper
value is known), discard, or discard and poll the sender for a resend. Such efforts can
help to prevent database contamination and improper or erroneous actions by the
intended recipient. The trust system uses the following rules to analyze packets in the
scenarios designed to support this thesis:
1. Compare message payload length to the expected length for that message type
2. Compare content and values to expected values or range for that message type
3. Compare message source_IP to logged_on_IP of that system_name
4. Compare message source_IP to logged_on_IP of that username (if message was
user initiated and not strictly system-to-system)
If there is an expected value for overall packet length for the message type, this is
checked first. If no overall length is set for that particular message type, or if the overall
length is correct, the trust system separates the packet into its individual components by
reading and assigning each header and data value to label variables, specific to that
message type. The variables are then compared to the expected values for that specific
message type. If values are within expected ranges, or exactly match the expected value
or list of values, the label passes the format check.
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3.7.2

Format Scorekeeper.

Similar to the firewall rules check, a format scorekeeper (FOR_SK) keeps track of
which labels passed or failed and is forwarded with the FWR-SK to the next trust system
module, the Access Control Matrix (ACM).
By forwarding along all scorekeepers from the previous checks (IP addresses,
ports, protocols, etc. in the case of the firewall rules check and header and payload values
in the case of the format check) to the next module (in this case the ACM), that next
module has documentation of the previously evaluated parameter names and values that it
might need for its own checks and also, when it comes time to create a log entry of the
results or to re-assemble the original packet for forwarding onto the destination, all of the
data and header information is maintained
3.7.3

Data Tagging.

Before the FOR-SK is forwarded to the ACM, each label is tagged with a
particular data element type and caveat. This tag is used by the ACM for access control
and can also be used for data archiving in a historical database or on a server, so that later
access by users and systems can be checked against a trust system ACM (either at the
network level or on the database/server itself) for authorization. The data element type
tag (i.e. OD, ND, OC, etc.) and other metadata parameters (such as creation date, original
name, author, and data types/caveats; copies made by date and username, changed name
and/or type/caveat; etc.) can also be carried along with the data (or file) when it is copied,
pasted, modified, and attached to e-mails. This metadata can allow the trust system to
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evaluate access authorization for attachments in e-mails or access from the LAN, even as
an original document is renamed or modified over time.
3.8

Access Control Matrix (ACM) – Logon Security.
3.8.1

Initial Network Logon Control.

The trust system Access Control Matrix (ACM) maintains the current name
(username or systemName), role, and access level entries for all authorized network users
and systems that it, or the nodes it protects, may need to interact with on the network.
While the values for these entries are pre-configured and usually do not change very
often, the logon ACCN, effective ACCN, and logon IP are initialized at zero until a user
(or system) logs on to the network. After an approved logon, the IP address from which
the logon occurred is entered (i.e. the logon IP) and the calculated values for logon
ACCN and effective ACCN are updated in the ACM.
When the user (or system) logs off, the values are reset to zero again. In this way,
the trust system always knows the users (and systems) that are logged on and from
which location (the logon IP), at any given time. The trust level is normally zero (i.e. -0)
at initial logon, and is only changed by the trust system if it detects behavior that lowers
its trust in the user (or system).
It is recommended that communications between the logon server and network
trust system be via a dedicated (i.e. directly connected) and encrypted connection. The
purpose of a dedicated connection is to prevent spoofed network logon_evaluated
messages being sent to the network trust system. In this way, for the trust system to
receive spoofed credential analysis, either the logon server must receive a spoofed
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logon_request message, authenticate the false credentials and forward the results to the
trust system or the logon server must be compromised in order to send incorrect
messages to the trust system.
No group accounts should be allowed, instead all users should be required to
logon and authenticate individually with username and logon credentials to gain access to
network resources.
When a user (or system) attempts to logon to the network, a logon_request
message, containing the user-supplied logon credentials (e.g. password, smart card, PIN,
biometrics, etc.), is sent to the network logon server. The logon server evaluates the
credentials and informs the network trust system of which credentials passed or failed,
in a logon_evaluated message.
For a logon server capable of hosting a nodal trust system agent, the trust
system functionality could be performed on the logon server itself and the network trust
system informed, after-the-fact, of the results.
The trust system uses the analysis of successful and failed credentials, provided
by the logon server, in the logon_evaluated message, to calculate a logon ACCN, using
the criteria outlined in Table 13. The greater the number of credentials provided and the
greater the reliability of those credentials, the greater the logon ACCN (LACCN). For
full administrator (i.e. root-level) access, at least two credentials with a total effective
ACCN (EACCN) of at least 4 must be provided. This is to lower the possibility of simple
password cracking attempts on accounts gaining high-level privileges.
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Table 13. Example Logon ACCNs Assigned Based on Supplied Credentials
Credentials
Authorized username, incorrect
password
Authorized username, correct password

Logon
ACCN
0
1

Authorized smart card, incorrect PIN

2

Authorized smart card, correct PIN
or
Authenticated biometrics
Any combination of the above
successful credentials for which the sum
of the individual logon ACCNs is > 4

3

4

Summary of Access Granted
No Access
Basic access, unless elevated by another logged-on
user (same role) with a higher access level
(effective ACCN of 2, 3, or 4)
Basic access, unless elevated by another logged-on
user (same role) with a higher access level
(effective ACCN of 3 or 4)
Intermediate access, unless elevated by another
logged-on user (same role) with a higher access
level (effective ACCN of 4)
Full (root) access

After calculating the logon ACCN, the trust system then adds the current trust
level for the user (or system) to the logon ACCN to give the effective ACCN. The trust
level is a negative integer indicating the level of trust that has been lost, normally -0. If
the effective ACCN is zero, the logon is denied. If the effective ACCN is not zero, the
trust system checks its Access Control Matrix (ACM) to determine the role assigned for
that username. This is essentially role-based access. The trust system also determines
the authorized combination of access operations on data types, based on the effective
ACCN for that role.
As an example, if user John R. Smith attempts to logon with the correct username,
jrsmith, and with the following credentials: the correct password, smart card with PIN,
and one biometric credential (i.e. fingerprint, eye scan, voice recognition, etc.) his
assigned logon ACCN would be calculated from Table 13 using 1+3+4=7. According to
Table 13, he needs an effective ACCN of 4 to achieve root level access if the ACM affords
that to his role. The trust system checks the ACM to find that the username jrsmith is
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assigned the role of SCADA_engineer and a trust level of 0. It then calculates the
effective ACCN (effective ACCN = logon ACCN + trust level = 4+0 = 4).
The minimum amount of successful credentials supplied (i.e. only username and
password) provides only the lowest level of access, equivalent to a basic_office_user for
the purposes of this paper. It is assumed that this might be a secretary or other office
worker that has access to office automation tools and inter-office communications but no
need-to-know regarding operational data or code.
3.8.2

Work Schedule Restricted Access.

The trust system can also check each logon attempt for certain positions against a
work schedule of authorized users. This way it could detect unusual activity such as an
employee coming in after hours or when they are not scheduled to work, in order to
attempt something malicious. If no malicious actions were performed (e.g. someone
came in on a weekend to catch up on some office work) the log entry could be verified
and ignored/annotated/deleted. This type of check would also alert for malicious logon
attempts by an outside attacker that has compromised a username and password and after
hours, on weekends, or during the shift the person with that username is not scheduled to
work attempts to use the stolen/cracked username and password to gain access to the
network. This would be easily detected by matching the logon attempt against the
facility’s physical entry records.
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3.8.3

Simultaneous Logon Control.

If a user, already logged on at one IP address, attempted to logon from a second
IP address, the trust system would check its simultaneous_logon_limit parameter to
ensure that the maximum number of simultaneous logons for a single user would not be
violated before issuing a logon_approved message. It would also verify that it was
reasonable for the user to be logging on from the source IP by comparing the
time_from_last_activity = current_time – time_of_last_activity for the IP address of the
original logon to the time required to travel between the physical locations of the two
logon IP addresses, to ensure it is reasonable for the user to have traveled to the new
location to logon. A query message would also be sent to the screen of the computer at
which the user first logged on, displaying a message requesting that they approve or deny
the simultaneous logon. In this manner, if the simultaneous logon was spoofed, and the
original user was at their workstation, they could click to DENY the logon. If the
response was APPROVE ,or if no response was received within 15 seconds and the trust
system had no other reason to believe the simultaneous logon was not legitimate or
reasonable, the logon would be approved and a second entry with the same username, but
different logon IP and ACCN values, would be entered into the ACM. If at any time the
DENY query_response was received, or activity was observed from the keyboard or
mouse of the original IP address, it would indicate a suspicious event. The trust system
also maintains a record, while a user is logged on, of the credentials used to logon at each
location. If, for example, a user logged on with a smart card at the first location, and
attempted to logon with the same smart card at the second location, the trust system
would query the system where the first logon occurred to ensure the smart card had been
128

removed. If not, this would obviously be a suspicious event prompting a logon_denied
for the second logon attempt.
Logging off from either the first or second location, deletes one of the
simultaneous entries from the ACM. Then, logging off from the other location, doesn’t
delete the last entry, but returns ACCN and logon IP values to zero.
3.9

Access Control Matrix (ACM) - Access Operations Security
3.9.1

Distributed Access Control Matrices.

The systems themselves (also referred to as nodes within this thesis) are
authorized to only send certain message types to and receive only certain message types
from specific other systems, and only on specific interfaces that match their routing
tables. All of these restraints are enforced by the ACM. The primary network-level ACM
is hosted on the network-level trust system (NTS). Table 14 depicts an example portion
of an ACM.
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Table 14. Network Trust System ACM Excerpt
ID
(username
or
systemMAC)
rhadams
jsboone
mdjefferso
hrlincoln
jrsmith
dktruman
smwashingt
master_station
_MAC
IED-239_
MAC

Role

Access
Level

Logon
ACCN

Trust
Level

Effective
ACCN

Logon IP

SCADA_
operator
management
office_
worker
vendor_
engineer
SCADA_
engineer
SCADA_
engineer
SCADA_
administrator
my_SCADA
_ master
IED

Standard

3

-0

3

Standard
Standard

0
2

-0
-0

0
2

3

3

-0

3

Standard

4

-1

3

3

0

2

0

2001:DC98:5634:2110:
BD1C:BA89:7325:3931
Not Logged on.
2001:A344:4DD1:F76F:
D2CB:3B09:5629:2005
2001:DC98:5634:2110:
BD1C:BA89:7325:3921
2001:DC98:5634:2110:
BD1C:BA89:7325:3923
Not Logged on.

Standard

4

-0

4

Standard

4

-0

4

Standard

4

-0

4

2001:DC98:5634:2110:
BD1C:BA89:7325:3901
2001:DC98:5634:2110:
BD1C:BA89:7325:3200
2001:DC98:5634:2110:
BD1C:BA89:7325:0239

Each node (IED, RTU, PLC, data concentrator, SCADA master control station,
etc.) that has the necessary hard drive storage and processing capacity available could
maintain a local software ACM hosted on the node itself (in the form of a nodal trust
system), or in the case of legacy systems, have a network device installed in front of the
node to host the trust system software and protect one or more nodes behind it as
depicted in Figure 11. An example nodal ACM is depicted in Table 15.

Table 15. Example Nodal Access Control Matrix
ID

Name

jhadams
John H. Adams
hrlincoln
Harry R. Lincoln
dktruman
Daniel K. Truman
smwashingt
Sally M. Washington
MPL_SCADA_
MPL SCADA
master _station master control station
_MAC
(primary)

Role
SCADA_operator
vendor_engineer
SCADA_engineer
SCADA_engineer
SCADA_master_
station
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Access
Level
Standard
3
3
Standard
Standard

Logon
ACCN
3
4
3
4

Trust
Level
-0
-0
-1
-0
-0

Effective
ACCN
3
3
2
4

In this case, the node does not allow access to everyone that is able to logon to the
network and instead maintains entries for specific individuals (usernames) and systems
(IP addresses) authorized to logon through the node’s terminal interfaces or to access the
node’s data or code via the SCADA network.
For the purposes of this thesis, it is assumed that local (i.e. nodal) ACMs at each
node send an update to the network-level ACM on the SCADA network trust system
each time the node approves an update to its local ACM. A node would only need to
approve an update to its own ACM if connectivity to the network-level trust system and
logon server were lost and the nodal trust system needed to act independently. In this
case, if a user attempted to logon directly to the node (for instance at a laptop or terminal
connected to a remote substation IED interface or substation controller), the node would
have to use its current ACM version to verify the username and password. A successful
logon results in adding a logon and effective ACCN to the local ACM to maintain the state
of logged on users. The node will also send a logon_request message to the logon server
and ACM_update to the network-level trust system as soon as connectivity is restored,
in order to update the network-level ACM.
In normal circumstances, the network-level ACM always sends an update message
to each of the appropriate local nodal ACMs whenever it approves a change to its own
network-level ACM based on a network-level logon and verifies the nodal ACMs match
the network-level ACM.
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3.9.2

Standard Access Levels.

The SCADA network-level ACM has entries for all individuals authorized access
to the SCADA network. A nodal ACM maintains entries for all individuals authorized to
access the node and all systems authorized to communicate with it. Most access levels
here are categorized as Standard, in which case the trust system will refer to its own
Standard Access Levels Table (SALT). Table 16 shows an example of a few SALT
entries. Using the Standard Access Levels Table, the trust system performs a lookup of
the user’s (or system’s) authorized access operations based on their role and ACCN.

Table 16. Example Standard Access Levels Table
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Note from Table 16, which has been extracted from an overall Standard Access
Level Table, that an operator with the highest access level (ACCN=4) is granted read (i.e.
r) and execute (i.e. x) privileges (i.e. user access operations) for operational SCADA
code and logs, but not the ability to change (i.e. write) them.
The operator can also read operational data (e.g. SCADA status values) and
emergency data (e.g. operational alerts) and execute SCADA code (e.g. sending OPEN
and CLOSE commands to breakers). The operator can only read, not modify, network
data (e.g. congestion statistics, server health, links up or down, etc.). Table 17 depicts
data types that might be available on various systems in the network.

Table 17. Example Data Types Found on Utility Intranet Systems
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Only data elements that are readable to the operator would be visible when the
operator explorers the network and system directories, folders, and files. For example,
suppose that the complete SCADA network file structure for the company is depicted in
Appendix E.
Because there is a data element assigned to each saved directory, folder, and file,
when logged onto the company’s segment of the Utility Intranet, the file structure the
operator sees might look like that depicted in Appendix F.
In this fashion, the SCADA operator is only allowed to see the files for which the
SCADA_operator role is granted access to read (i.e. has the need to know) and for which
the proper logon credentials were provided.
When logged onto the separate office network from an office computer, the
operator (or any other user) is granted access to the office LAN and shared drives. Readonly access is granted to network data, the company intranet, and the external website.
Note also that an IT network administrator has a very different set of authorized
data elements and access operations as shown in Table 18.

Table 18. Example IT Network Administrator Standard Access Levels
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With an effective ACCN of 4, the network administrator can read and append logs
but only has read access to security data (i.e. security alerts, packets blocked by the trust
system or firewall, etc.). Network administrators also have full read, write and execute
privileges for network data and code, allowing them to modify configurations for IT
components (routers, switches, servers, etc.) and write scripts as necessary to improve
network performance; however, they do not have access to operational data or code, as a
SCADA operator or SCADA engineer does. Only a security analyst can modify security
code (such as firewall and trust system rules). Also in the example, the IT network
administrator was given read, write, and execute privileges for the internal intranet and
external website code to backup the webmaster and assist in responding to cyber attacks
to the company’s web-accessible resources.
While this is only a theoretical example, data categorization and user access levels
could be tailored to provide more or less restriction to the various user access roles
depending on company and utility needs.
3.9.3

Manually-Entered Access Levels.

Manually-entered access level entries in the ACM assign a specific maximum
effective ACCN to an individual. The manual entry allows the security administrator (or
trust system) to assign a specific ACCN, different from the Standard Access Level, to an
individual user. For instance, suppose new operators undergo a one month on-the-job
training regimen and evaluation before being allowed to work unsupervised. During this
time, the company may assign a permanent maximum access level of 3 to the username,
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allowing the new operator, with no further trust level restrictions, to only read but not
modify operational and emergency data until fully qualified in their position.
Suppose a particular vendor supports its products by providing in-house troubleshooting assistance to the company. For this reason the vendor’s engineers are permitted
to logon (on-site or remotely) to the utility company’s SCADA nodes that were
purchased from the vendor in order to analyze performance and install system updates.
The last two times a particularly grumpy engineer named Harry Lincoln loggedon remotely for routine updates, he did not request that the system be taken offline or
inform the control center that his troubleshooting could kick off test alerts that might be
mistaken for real events. In addition, when he finished, he updated (appended) the logs
with the problem and fix action in a less than professional manner. After explaining the
company’s expectations and operational impact the first time, and seeing the same
behavior again, the utility company security administrator manually entered an access
level of 3 (Table 19) so that the next time the vendor engineer logged on remotely he
would only have read access to operational data and code. In this way, modifications
would only be allowed when he was supervised on-site with access temporarily elevated
to a full Standard Access Level (i.e. maximum effective ACCN of 4). Later, when it is
deemed that the individual has been performing satisfactorily, the Standard Access Levels
could be permanently restored for this engineer.
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Table 19. Example Nodal Access Control Matrix Entries.
ID

Name

Role

hrlincoln
dktruman
smwashingt

Harry R. Lincoln
Daniel K. Truman
Sally M. Washington

vendor_engineer
SCADA_engineer
SCADA_administrator

Access
Level
3
3
Standard

Logon
ACCN
4
4

Trust Effective
Level ACCN
-0
-0

3
4

Suppose a particular disgruntled employee, Daniel Truman, has given notice that
he is quitting and Friday will be his last day. His role is SCADA_engineer, so he
normally has access to documentation of network configurations, SCADA code and
production statistics, as well as other sensitive operational information.
Based on an open display of anger yesterday, the utility company decides to
manually enter an access level of 3 which allows him to read SCADA data and code as
he passes continuity on to another engineer over the next few days, but prevents him from
copying or modifying any sensitive data or code that might be sold to give another utility
company a competitive advantage, used destructively against the company’s SCADA
network, or taken out of the company to start his own enterprise.
In this way, the utility company regains control of its own network while
maintaining a degree of flexibility in a dynamic environment.
In addition, specific access can be configured in the trust system ACMs if an
employee’s actions are suspicious. For example, an employee or vendor with a
SCADA_engineer role, normally able to see and use operational data and operational
code, can be restricted from access to operational code based on two times when they
have not followed the company policy of developing and testing code on a development
system before porting it to the operational system.
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3.9.4

Access Level Elevation.

If John Smith had forgotten his smart card or was somehow unable to provide
biometric credentials, he would only be granted a logon ACCN of 1 with a correct
password and username combination, which would authorize him basic_user_access. If
John Smith as SCADA_engineer needed to perform root-level functions, he would have
to provide the proper credentials or he might be elevated to a higher access level as a
result of being vouched for by another member of the company with at least the level of
access John Smith wants to attain. Note also that all users authorized root level access
must be authenticated by at least two credentials (for ACCN = 3 or higher) to gain this
access.
One purpose of the elevation function is to enforce security control, based on
visual identification, while offering multiple logon options in emergency situations. This
prevents a single forgotten or mistyped credential from resulting in an account lockout at
a critical moment. It also provides a secure alternative to leaving accounts un-protected
(without passwords) to prevent lockouts.
The goal of the network logon method is to provide a one-time logon, with access
to all the systems and data a user needs and only at the appropriate, or necessary, level.
It does not, however, conform in a straightforward manner to the IT security principle of
Least Common Privilege but could be modified to enforce it more strictly. Making the
logon process faster, to prevent logon delays with the associated credential checks and
ACCN calculation can be critical to responding to real-time emergencies, but optimizing
calculations and search routines is left to follow-on research.
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Note that an effective ACCN of either 1or 2 equates to basic_user_access for all
roles unless vouched for and escalated by a user with the same role that has been
authenticated at the higher privilege requested. It is recommended that a user whose
access has been elevated by such an elevation_request not be allowed to then elevate
another user.
This concept embodies two-credential integrity, where one credential can be a
person that can visually vouch for the one requesting elevation. Note the
recommendation of visual confirmation vice phone calls. Company security policy
would have to deal with or disallow the potential phone call dilemma where an attacker
uses social engineering techniques to pretend to be or copy/record the true voice of a
legitimate user and replay it over the phone stating “I forgot my <credentials>, can you
vouch for me?” to try to gain higher-level access after compromising a password and
logging on at a lower access level.
When a password is incorrectly entered, the trust system would also execute an
algorithm to determine how close the entered password is to the X previous passwords,
represented by a percentage. Off-by-one might render a 95% depending on the overall
password length. A “close” password might indicate a legitimate user that mistyped the
password. Other characteristics such as trying the password again or changing the case
of one or two letters in the next attempt might indicate a legitimate user that has forgotten
the exact password. In the same way, monitoring the entries could also indicate a
dictionary attack when each attempt is completely different and does not come close to
matching any previous passwords, especially if a single character changes in alphabetical
or numerical order. In this manner a potential legitimate user might be afforded five
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logon attempts before locking out the password, whereas a dictionary attack might be
detected in as few as two attempts.
Combining known password attack signatures from a network IDS with the trust
system algorithm would provide an even more intelligent analysis. Analyzing host- and
network-based IDS alerts with trust system security alerts would provide a significantly
improved picture of attack attempts from outside the network, successful bypassing of the
firewall, continuation of the attack once inside the company’s outer security defenses,
and data returned to the attacker.
3.9.5

Message Sanitization.

When a particular recipient (system or user) is authorized, per the ACM, to
receive a particular message type, but only allowed to receive a subset of the data
elements contained in the message, the trust system can sanitize the message before
forwarding it to the intended recipient. In this way the code of the system sending the
message does not have to be changed to send different messages to different destination
users or systems. This is especially usefully in cases where legacy systems and systems
of different protocols are in use in the same company’s SCADA network or in the
destination network. The trust system in each network provides sanitization and can
bridge communications between dissimilar networks with a protocol gateway capability
as described in Section 3.12.1. The trust system can maintain a list of multi-cast
addresses for particular message types and situations to implement multicast on behalf of
sending nodes that do not have this capability, and sanitized multicast to recipients that
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can benefit from the message information (e.g. a status update) but who are restricted
from receiving some sensitive parts of the data in the message.
As an example of the sanitization process, suppose a status update from a node to
the SCADA master control station contains the following data elements: OD, ED, ND.
Also suppose that status messages are also to be relayed to neighboring company
control centers so they have a clearer picture of adjacent voltage drops or rises that may
affect their contracts or require an adjustment on their part to maintain balance in the
power grid. Now suppose that under normal conditions, there is no need for a neighbor
company that is a competitor to know if a single bus is undergoing maintenance. The
trust system can be configured to filter out certain data elements (in this case network
data, ND) from messages to another company. All that the node has to know is to send
duplicates of the regular status reports it has been designed to send to its SCADA master
control station and other recipients. The trust system checks the access level (i.e. role
and effective-ACCN) of each recipient IP address (and username logged on at that IP),
each data element type of each label in the message, and the caveat of the data element
types, against its ACM. By doing so, it ensures unnecessary or company-sensitive data
elements are removed from the message before sending it to an IP address or user that is
not authorized the need-to-know, or in which there is less than full trust.
Sanitization prevents unauthorized information leakage of company-sensitive
information and is ideal for an environment with legacy systems or continually evolving
requirements. Simple changes to the trust system sanitization rules and ACM can
accommodate routing and sanitization changes quickly.
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In the same manner, even e-mail attachments could be checked for files not
authorized for the intended recipient.
For the purposes of demonstration in the simulations for this thesis, sanitization
was implemented by replacing each to-be-sanitized character with a space character, to
effectively blank-out the original information, in the sanitized output message. A realworld implementation would not allow recipients to have any indication that information
was even missing.
3.9.6

Access Violation Attempts.

If a user or system attempts an access operation (i.e. an operation_request
message is received), the data type of the data for which access is requested and the
access operation on that data type is checked against the ACM for the individual (or
system’s) current role and effective ACCN. If the requestor is not authorized to access
that particular data type, or is authorized access to the data type but not authorized to
perform on that data type the operation requested, the attempt will be denied by the trust
system and initiate a suspicious event. An operation_denied warning message will be
sent to the screen of the source IP address. Figure 12 depicts a sample denial warning.

Figure 12. Warning to Requestor’s Screen for Denied Operation Message
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3.9.7 ACM Scorekeeper.
Similar to the FWR-SK and FOR-SK, the ACM scorekeeper (ACM-SK) keeps
track of failed logon, simultaneous logon, and elevation attempts. It also updates failed
access operation attempts. When the ACM has completed all ACM checks, if any check
has failed in the scorekeepers, all three scorekeepers are forwarded to the Suspicious
Event Handler (SEH) module.
3.9.8

Supplemental Access Control Policies and Procedures.

Another threat to critical infrastructure might come from a state-sponsored or
terrorist source. If online attempts to gain access are sufficiently thwarted, the only
network access method may be kidnapping or armed assault. If a company employee
were held at gunpoint and forced to logon remotely to the network at escalated privilege,
company security policies might require a beeper or cell phone message to a specific
beeper number and beeper ID or cell phone number and phone ID to which the requestor
must confirm the access attempt, deny, or confirm but send distress with GPS location.
The problem here would be the possibility of stealing beeper and cell phone numbers for
administrators from the company’s phone bills at the phone company or through a
compromised online account.
Despite all these efforts, the greatest threat is often from the inside. Policy
(security and termination) plays an important role in ensuring that network access is
discontinued as soon as an employee is no longer to be employed by the company. In the
event of a disgruntled employee or corporate espionage, before the situation is realized
and a decision is made to separate the individual, all actions by that individual are logged
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by username and timestamp. Later, these records can assist the company in holding the
individual accountable for any damage or malicious intent.
3.9.9

Maintaining a Secure State.

Before a change to the ACM is authorized and implemented, the trust system
should auto-check the proposed ACM policy change to ensure both a proper domination
relationship and a secure state are maintained using such methods as the *-property and
Simple Security Principles for mandatory and discretionary access control [30]. These
methods have not been simulated for this thesis.
3.10

Suspicious Event Handler (SEH) Module.
3.10.1 Alert Counter.
After the trust system evaluates a message according to its firewall, format, and

ACM rules, if any parameter failed, the firewall rules, format, and ACM scorekeepers are
forwarded to the trust system Suspicious Event Handler (SEH) component. The SEH
uses the failed parameters to determine when to generate a security alert and of what
type. Some types of suspicious events (SE) will create an immediate security alert.
Others will start an alert counter.
The alert counter is set in order to continue to monitor suspicious events that the
SEH cannot yet determine to be a security issue (e.g. a failed logon that might be a
legitimate user that has forgotten or mistyped a password). The SEH increments the alert
counter for each occurrence until the configured threshold for that type of alert is
reached. Once the counter threshold has been reached, the SEH generates a
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security_alert message. It may also lower the trust level of a particular message type,
protocol, interface, username, system, or any combination of these parameters as a result.
A lowered trust level may lower the effective_ACCN in the ACM and may also require a
blocking (i.e. deny) action in the trust system firewall rules.
As an example, suppose the alert counter threshold is set to 3 with a duration of
60 seconds for bad data packets detected, as shown in Appendix C. The alert counter for
the suspicious event is initially 0. When the first bad data packet is received, the alert
counter is incremented to 1. After the second bad data packet, the alert counter equals 2.
If three packets are received from the same source in a 60 second period, with data values
that do not conform to the expected range, a security alert is generated and further
messages on that interface from that source are blocked by updating the firewall rules.
3.10.2 Tracking Suspicious Events by Suspicious Event ID.
When a suspicious event notification is received by the SEH (i.e. when the SEH is
forwarded scorekeepers containing failed parameters) it initiates a new suspicious event
ID (SEID), characterized by its SEID number, which is the date-timestamp that the event
was first detected (i.e. when the first packet was received by the trust system), and two
or three parameters known as trackers taken from the scorekeepers. The SEID is an
object containing all of the scorekeepers, the SEID number, and the trackers. Table 20
summarizes the tracker values assigned for different suspicious event types, indicated in
the scorekeepers.
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Table 20. Trackers for Possible Trust System Suspicious Events
Suspicious Event (SE)
Type
Logon SE
Access Control SE

Firewall Rules SE

Message Format SE

Trackers
Tracker1: username
Tracker2: source_IP
Tracker1: username
Tracker2: source_IP
Tracker3: <object_of_operation>
Tracker1: source_IP
Tracker2: destination_IP
Tracker3: <failed_label>
Tracker1: source_IP
Tracker2: destination_IP
Tracker3: <message_type>

The purpose of the trackers is to be a reference point for correlating similar
packets that may be part of a larger event. Each time the SEH receives a suspicious
event, before creating a new SEID, it compares the trackers for the incoming
scorekeepers to the trackers of currently open SEIDs. If there are no matches, it checks
recently closed SEIDs as well. If any of the trackers match, the SEH will determine if the
new activity is part of a previous SEID and, if so, update a currently open SEID or reopen a closed, related SEID.
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3.10.3 Blocking.
When a blocking action is required, the firewall rules allow the trust system to
deny packets based on any combination of message type, protocol, interface, username,
or system IP address. If the traffic was previously allowed by a whitelist rule in the
firewall rules, the Deny column is simply changed from false to true. If the necessary
granularity for the blocking rule does not already exist, a new rule is added for the
activity experienced and the Deny column is set to true.
3.10.4 Trust Assignment and Authorization.
By recognizing bad or malicious packets from a particular source, especially if it
occurs more than once, the trust system can begin to lower its trust in further packets
from that source and even switch to another more trusted source as its primary, trusted
input for particular data elements, alerts, or status updates.
Lowering the trust level for users or systems lowers their effective ACCN,
restricting some of their access to critical data and restricting their privileges (i.e.
operations on the data to which they still have access).
3.11

Outgoing Message Handling
3.11.1 Re-encryption.
If a message passes all trust system checks and is to be forwarded on to the

original destination, after any required sanitization takes place, the trust system
reassembles the payload in the original order and must re-encrypt it before forwarding it
on to its intended destination.
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Messages created by the trust system (i.e. queries, control messages, alerts,
warnings, logon_approved/denied, operation_denied, etc.). An exception is made in the
case where original message was un-encrypted and it is believed that the source may not
be encrypting properly. In this case, UDP messages will simply be blocked and ignored
and TCP messages will result in a RST/ACK to close the connection. A
query_encryption message may also follow, to the closest trust system to the source IP,
requesting an investigation and confirmation of the encryption problem and actions taken
to prevent further unencrypted traffic from the source.
3.11.2 Addressing and Routing.
For a trust system to be able to perform format and ACM checks, it must be able
to decrypt packet payloads to inspect the data inside.
This is simpler if the encryption is accomplished solely by trust systems. If the
encryption is performed by a nodal trust agent on the source or a gateway-mode trust
router along the path, that trust system will know the next trust system down the line,
closest to the destination (i.e. a trust router or trust agent on the destination system),
and be able to encrypt the packet with its own private key and the public key of the
down-range trust system, then apply an IP header with its IP address as a source and the
down range trust system’s IP address as the destination, before forwarding it on. The
down-range trust system will strip the IP header, decrypt and inspect the contents. If it
is a trust router, and the packet passes all checks, it will apply another IP header with its
IP address as the source and forward the unencrypted packet to the destination system. If
the down-range trust system is a nodal trust agent on the destination system, the agent
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will decrypt the packet, complete its checks, and if the packet passes, deliver the
unencrypted original packet to the operating system.
If the source operating system applies IPsec encryption to its packets, this requires
the source to encrypt the packet payload with the public key of the next trust system
along the path and with its own private key, in order for the trust system to be capable of
decrypting and inspecting its contents. Then that intermediate trust system, after
inspecting the packet, will repackage the original packet (with its original IP header),
encrypt the packet with its private key and the public key of the next trust system closest
to the destination, and add a second IP header to route it to that trust system.
The other option is for the sender operating system to encrypt the packet with
IPsec and when the packet is received at the destination, the trust system there performs
decryption on behalf of the operating system, checks it, and passes it up to the next layer
in the OSI stack if it passes all checks. Although this requires fewer trust system checks
and reduces end-to-end delay, the time to stop a bad packet is the greatest, only occurring
at the destination.
3.12

Other Required or Augmenting Capabilities Not Simulated
3.12.1 Protocol Gateway.
Legacy RTUs, PLCs, and IEDs were developed with proprietary protocols and

prior standards such as MODBUS, DNP3, Fieldbus, etc. This may require specific
protocol gateway plug-ins to translate input delivered in various protocols to a common
format.
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3.12.2 Summary and Full Reporting Modes.
To eliminate network traffic over bandwidth-constrained communication lines, a
message from the trust system could toggle between full reporting (when all seems
normal or there is good bandwidth and un-necessarily delayed traffic flow) or summary
reporting (in the event of high congestion or when the node is involved in an emergency
situation). If necessary, based on bandwidth congestion or lines down, the trust system
could send a squelch message to less important nodes to send minimal update info and
not overwhelm the line. Integrating security alerts with network management alerts
would provide a more intelligent view of the impact of an attack in progress to bandwidth
usage, although the trust system has an inherent bandwidth calculation algorithm used to
determine TCP and UDP connection capacity.
3.12.3 Key Management.
There is the potential for packets to be sniffed and the key cracked, enabling an
attacker to spoof messages to and from nodes internal to the utility company or from
outside utility entities. Changing keys often can help to prevent this. Especially when a
compromise is detected or a suspicious event that might have resulted in a key
compromise is suspected, the key should be automatically changed. For this reason, it is
recommended to have a key change and distribution process, initiated at random times at
least once per week, potentially once per day, and if congestion is not a problem, per
message via a reliable means (i.e. TCP).
If an emergency is initiated in the middle of a key update, some nodes will have
changed over to the new key and some may be in transition or not have received the
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update yet. Both the old and new key would need to remain valid until a response is
received from all recipient nodes that the new key has been updated.
3.12.4 Node Discovery.
All nodes on the network are required to logon on to the network logon server in
the same way that a user must, in order to participate on the network. A system provides
its own unique credentials, such as IP address, MAC address, a unique node ID or node
name, and IPsec authentication. When the logon server evaluates the node’s
logon_request message, it forwards a logon_evaluated message to the trust system,
which then identifies if there is any security reason to mistrust or deny the logon and
reports back to the logon server with a logon_approved or logon_denied message. The
trust system also calculates an ACCN (equal to 4 if there is no reason to mistrust the
system) and updates its ACM to show the node_name and IP address as logged on to the
network. Whenever information is received indicating the node has gone down or is
disconnected for an extended period of time (e.g. expected messages are not received and
a subsequent ping or status check with the nodal trust system receives no response), the
logon entry is deleted, and the logon server is sent a logon_denied message, requiring the
node to logon once more to join the network when it comes back online. This realization
would also prompt a maintenance_alert message.
3.12.5 Alert Correlation.
Very often network security, network management, and the operators impacted
the most by configuration changes are physically separated, hindering timely
communications between these parties. Ideally, all would be co-located in the same
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control center room. Whether this is the case or not, correlating network management
system (NMS) and security alerts can facilitate a network management and security
synthesis that, together, provide instant awareness of the impact of security
configurations and cyber attacks on network performance and operations and the impact
of network outages on operator capabilities and network security posture.
By gathering all alerts from SCADA, EMS, network management, and network
security platforms, an alert correlator can convert them to similar formats to display to a
company, CA, or RC control room. The alerts could be easily filtered to show only a
subset of the total alerts (i.e. just the operational alerts, only emergencies, only network
security alerts, or any combination or subset). In this way, a control room could be
properly staffed with operators, engineers, network security analysts, and network
management experts that can operate in real-time off the same sheet of music and
understand the complete impact of outages and emergencies on availability, performance,
security, and safety of the entire network.
The trust system should include or work in conjunction with a network security
correlation tool that would evaluate network security alerts from other security
mechanisms (i.e. network and host-based intrusion detection systems and firewalls) in the
network and initiate (or recommend to a human analyst) corrective or mitigating actions
based on a simulation or estimation of network and utility service impact of such actions
(whether automated or human-in-the-loop). In fact, if malformed packets, bad or
corrupted data, or DoS indicators were detected, the cause could be a system (i.e.
software or hardware) malfunction or malicious attack, so evaluation of alerts from both
security and engineering/maintenance perspectives is essential, further justifying the
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integration of alerts from a network security, capable of informing and interacting with
the trust system, with an overall alert correlator which is fed network security, network
management, and operational alarms.
3.13

Assumptions for Development of Experiments
3.13.1 Protocols and Standards.
For the purposes of this paper and its experiments, an IPV6, TCP- and UDP-

compliant structure was used for messages. UDP was the protocol-of-choice for nonreal-time updates and trust system queries, to alleviate network congestion. TCP was
used for emergency traffic and real-time or near real-time traffic that either required
reliability or would be implemented as TCP by its manufacturer. For example, it can be
assumed that network logon operations would be designed as standard TCP/IP traffic by
an IT vendor. Furthermore, it was assumed that in an emergency situation a logon should
be a high priority event (warranting reliability and confirmation) to ensure engineers and
operators gain fastest access to the network to implement response actions. For
simplicity, even in non-emergency situations, logons are deemed high priority.
Previous work by Birman, et al., demonstrated the feasibility of UDP messages
for sending breaker trip messages between peer nodes on a SCADA network, within just
a few seconds, when there is no network delay. Delivery times were only a few seconds
longer in the face of network congestion or communication links. It is, however,
necessary for some emergency situations to be resolved in fractions of a second, often in
100ms or less. Hard real-time notifications might even need to be made in 4ms or less.
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For such messages to be received, processed, and reacted to, these UDP techniques do
not provide the necessary reliability and transit time guarantees.
In an attempt to resolve the more real-time requirements, the SCADA network
was simulated as capable of UDP messaging for non-emergency traffic, and dedicated
TCP bandwidth for emergency traffic. For example, normal status updates are sent as
UDP datagram packets. Walled-off TCP bandwidth is reserved for emergency
commands, including neighbor trip attempts and emergency status updates. Criteria for
emergency handling would be defined in the trust system specification and would
typically be indicated by protocol (TCP) and message type. A dangerous security event
might also warrant the trust system sending an emergency alert notification. The trust
system implements a prioritization of each packet in its incoming and outgoing queues to
ensure that only the highest priority packets are checked first and sent first. Less
important data that is moved to the back of the line, so to speak, would be checked
against a staleness factor for the message type and queue. It would only continue through
the trust system process to be checked and forwarded if the time delay from waiting in
the queue for higher priority packets to be processed did not make the data stale or
obsolete, in which case it would be discarded because a more current update has already
arrived.
3.13.2 Encryption Delay.
For this thesis, IPsec encryption is assumed for all messages between nodes on the
SCADA network in order to assess its impact. The SCADA network nodes modeled for
this thesis only communicate over a single encrypted port (port 500 for IPsec) for
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inbound and outbound messages. Nested application-level encryption would add
additional overhead and require the trust system to update and cache application specific
keys, but would greatly increase the security of transmissions. Only IPsec was simulated
for the purposes of this research effort but application-layer encryption would be useful
to investigate in follow-on research.
3.13.3 Network Message Formats.
Various packets can be expected to traverse the Utility Intranet. Commands from
HMIs to SCADA master control stations, commands and polls from SCADA master
control stations to substations (i.e. data concentrator, RTUs, PLCs, and IEDs), file
transfers for IED configuration and PLC programming, and status updates and alerts from
substation power systems, network management systems, and network security systems
(e.g. firewalls and intrusion detection systems). Even low-priority corporate e-mail and
file sharing has been allowed to traverse some utility networks.
Packet sizes for messages vary depending on purpose, payload, and protocol. For
the purposes of the simulations and experiments for this thesis, example message types
selected for the model network are defined in Table 21. The format for each message
type is illustrated in Figure 13.
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Table 21. Message Types Defined for Simulations
Type
1
2

Message
get_status
status

3
4-6

set
intertrip,
neighbor_trip,
backup_trip

7

logon_request

8

logon_evaluated

9

logon_denied

10

logon_approved

11

security_alert

12

ACM_update

13

suspicious_event
_log
query_packet

14
15
16

query_ACM
query_
simultaneous_
logon

17
18

query_response
elevation_request

19

elevation_approved

20

elevation_denied

Description
Request for power status from a node.
Contains power status. Response to a get_status or sent by a node to
inform others of its status.
Command to set breaker status as open or closed.
Command to trip (i.e. open) a breaker.

Generated by a workstation, terminal, or node when a user attempts to
logon to the network. Sent to the logon server along with credentials
supplied by the user. Also sent by a node reconnecting to the network.
Generated by the logon server after receiving a logon_request. Specifies
logon server’s analysis of the user’s credentials (which were authenticated
and which failed).
Response to logon_ request and logon_evaluated messages. Relays the
verdict that the logon is disapproved. Includes the ACCN (0 because
access is denied) and any ACM or trust level changes regarding that
username. May also inform the node’s ACM to locally deny any further
attempts if the network trust system’s SEH detected a dictionary attack
and believed the logon attempts to be malicious.
Response to logon_ request and logon_evaluated messages with the
verdict that the logon is approved. Includes the user’s ACCN and any
ACM or trust level changes regarding that username.
Warning of suspicious event that violated the security policy. Includes
actions taken by the trust system and a link to further detail.
Identifies most current ACM settings. Sent from network trust system to
nodal trust systems (and vice versa) to promulgate ACM changes.
Historical log entry record (or update) of a suspicious event. Contains perpacket detail, trust system evaluation, and trust system response.
Query by the trust system to find out if the source IP actually sent a
packet believed to be spoofed.
Query by the trust system to find out if a system has the latest ACM.
To prevent malicious logon. Sent by the trust system whenever a
currently logged-on username attempts to logon-from a second IP address.
Creates an alert to the screen at the IP address where the initial logon
occurred, prompting for an APPROVE/DENY response from the user.
Response to a query from the trust system.
Occurs infrequently when a user, who is authorized to perform duties at a
higher level, but on this occasion does not have enough of the credentials
present to authenticate at the higher level to perform a duty they are
required to perform. The request is sent by the user, after a successful
logon at a lower than desired access level, to another user currently logged
on with the same role but higher effective ACCN, requesting they vouch
for their authorization and approve the trust system granting a higher
effective ACCN than they provided credentials for. Typically only an
emergency measure.
Sent by the network trust system to the node that originated an
elevation_request with the verdict that the elevation is approved. Includes
the user’s new effective ACCN.
Sent by the network trust system to the node that originated an
elevation_request with the verdict that the elevation is denied.
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Figure 13. Format for Scenario Message Types

3.13.4 Background Traffic.
Besides operational traffic, other company network traffic, including office
automation (e.g. e-mail, web, etc.) and network management traffic (i.e. SNMP, etc.),
might be present simultaneously on the same external communications links between
organizations (even between internal offices). Here again, exact network loading and
bandwidth consumption will be company-specific. The capability to inject large volumes
of random background traffic into the scenarios was a limitation of the simulator and
would be a good follow-on test of the robustness of the trust system.
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IV. Analysis and Results
4.1

Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to present the calculations and simulation results for

trust system interception, evaluation, and response to real-time and non-real-time traffic
expected in a Utility Intranet that includes substation automation, wide-area notifications,
and malicious actions by a determined and intelligent foe. The primary results are delay
estimates of the time required for trust system checks, encryption mechanisms, end-toend delivery per packet, and scenario resolution, to include attack mitigation. The second
goal of this chapter is to estimate the potential applications for these security technologies
and honestly evaluate limitations in defensive capabilities and real-time response.
4.2

Investigative Questions Answered
This chapter indicates that IPsec encryption can be used carefully in a SCADA

environment to provide security and that a trust system, properly configured and
maintained, will either prevent, quickly detect and mitigate, or provide sufficient
evidence after-the fact to determine where and how malicious activity occurred in the
network. It supports the hypothesis that TCP and UDP can be used with bandwidth
guarantees to meet real-time delivery requirements. This chapter also shows that the
automated actions of the trust system can provide comprehensive, all-in-one, layered
security, reducing the need for a large team of security analysts while giving those few
security analysts required the exact tools they need to answer difficult questions
regarding intrusion footprints.
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The following sections of this chapter explain the measurements, foundational
calculations, simulation scenarios, and resulting delays determined in bringing to life and
supporting the trust system concept.
4.3

Scenario Files
4.3.1

Input Files.

A text file comprised of the firewall rules was read in by the trust system
main.cpp program prior to processing a scenario packet. The number of rules in this file
was kept to a minimum, including only the rules that applied for the scenarios. This
required the least firewall rules check delay, allowing the trust system simulation to
avoid the low level of accuracy (i.e. 10ms increments) of the Microsoft Windows®
system clock and reasonably substitute the average trust system check delay values
measured for each message type and transport protocol.
An input scenario text file was created to specify IP packet details for each
scenario to be read into the trust system. Specifically, each component (i.e. label) of
each packet’s headers and data were specified as variables and assigned the appropriate
value for that scenario. An actual IP packet would be received as a sequence of digital
bits (i.e. ones and zeros) for which the trust system would need to strip off the
appropriate number of bits for each component in turn and assign it to the appropriate
variable to be evaluated. However, for simplicity of generating and reading the
scenarios, the components (i.e. labels) in each packet in the input file were represented
from the start as a mix of integers, floating point variables, or doubles for numerical
values and as hexadecimal or ASCII values for string or character equivalents.
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Some of the more complex scenarios required multiple interactions between
network servers, SCADA nodes, and the trust system. In some cases, the trust system
was required to send and receive multiple packets to and from other systems in the
network. This was required either to query for additional information needed to improve
the accuracy of its decisions, block unauthorized activity, respond to logon server
evaluations of logon credentials, or send updates such as changes to ACMs, access
control lists, firewall rules, and assigned ACCN values, each of which defined
improvements to the overall network security posture.
To account for the end-to-end delay that would be experienced by these packets
as they traversed the network, their message type (indicating message size in bits) and the
source and destination IP addresses (indicating total distance to travel) were read into the
simulator and used to calculate their impact on received time of the next message and the
overall scenario’s completion time. It was assumed that as soon as the trust system
completed its processing of one packet, it was immediately ready to read in and begin
processing the next packet, calling this the received plus queue time at the trust system.
Packet sent time was then determined by subtracting the calculated transmit and
propagation delay on the link from source to trust system and estimated queuing delay in
the trust system input queue from this received plus queue time. Any delays for sending
packets due to human response time (i.e. in typing a password or reading an elevation
request before responding) could easily be tacked onto the total transit time to account for
delays at the source before the packet was sent.
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4.3.2 Output File.
The output file entry generated for each scenario demonstrated an alert for
suspicious activity, a log of the results of each of the trust system the checks (i.e. the
passed or failed parameters), a log of actions taken by the trust system in response,
documentation of the time to complete each check, and the total time to complete all
trust system functions for a packet.
It was assumed that the trust system was able to provide small network security
alerts (i.e. with only minimal, summary information), either directly to the screen of a
network security analyst or to an alert correlation system, on the network, where
combined security and network management alerts could be evaluated for further action
required or dismissal of false positives (i.e. verifiably legitimate events the trust system
algorithms categorized as suspicious). This was simulated by the trust system code
writing the text of these entries to the output file under headings for each scenario and
each packet in the scenario. A more detailed log of the parameters that passed or failed
the trust system checks and the values of those failed parameters were posted to the
same output file to simulate logs sent to an archive for historical purposes. The same
detailed data would, then, be available for analysts to request if they needed further detail
in their evaluation of a security alert, without automatically overwhelming their screens
with potentially unnecessary excess data. And easy way to implement this is a link in the
summary alert allowing the analyst to then open and drill down into the related, more
detailed historical record available on a separate data store. Event and packet statistics
(such as estimated bandwidth available on the link, response times, etc.) could also be
calculated and posted to log entries.
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4.4

Delay Measurements and Calculations Approach
To simulate the operational feasibility of a network, two factors are of paramount

importance: delay and congestion. Both are contingent upon the bandwidth available
throughout the network, propagation characteristics, store-and-forward operations (i.e.
queuing delay) by individual devices within the network, the presence or absence of
redundant paths and systems, system or connectivity failures, and the time required for
trust system checks.
4.4.1

Trust System Delay.

The trust system is able to measure statistics on delay for each received packet
and each trust system check, to include the time to complete a firewall rules check,
format check, logon check, access control check, and sanitization. Summing these values
gives the total time to complete all trust system checks necessary before forwarding the
packet on to its destination (i.e. if it is a good packet) or throwing away a bad packet.
It was discovered, however, that the Microsoft Windows XP® system clock
updates in 10ms increments, which did not provide the microsecond granularity
necessary for the small execution times of these individual functions. To estimate overall
trust system check times, time trials for the various message types were conducted 650,
000 times, for both TCP and UDP, to determine the minimum, maximum, and average
delay for each message type. For each trial, two different firewall rules files were used,
the first with the matching rule at the top of the list, so that it would be found
immediately, and the second with the matching rule at the bottom of a list of 2000
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firewall rules, giving the slowest times for rule matches. These results are depicted in
Appendix D.
It was hypothesized that dividing the firewall rules times by the number of rules
in the firewall (i.e. 2000) would provide the cost per rule, which could then be
extrapolated to estimate delays for smaller and larger rules lists. It was also thought that
dividing the format check times by the number of packet elements checked would
provide an accurate cost per value, however the trust system format checks
implementation was sufficiently different for each label, that the results varied greatly
and were not easily extrapolated to estimate the required time for messages with greater
or fewer data values. It was, therefore, necessary to run time trials for each message type
and average the results.
The measurements were conducted using a PC with Intel® Pentium® 3.00GHz
CPU and 3.50GB RAM, running the Microsoft Windows XP Professional® operating
system with Service Pack 2. Each message type ran through complete trust system
checks 50,000 times and the results were average for each trial. Each trial was repeated
15 times for a total of 650,000 samples taken per message type.
Minimum, average, and maximum values were recorded. These results, using
both UDP and TCP versions per message type, are depicted in Appendix D.
4.4.2

Network Transit Delay.

Processing delay is the measure of the time required to examine a packet’s header
and determine where to route the packet. Processing delay would also include the time
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required to check for bit errors in the packet that occurred in transmitting the packet’s bits
from the source node to the router, trust system, and destination node [31].
The total processing delay within the trust system from the time the first check
begins on a packet to the time it is ready to be forwarded on to its destination is
designated as dproc(TrustSystem). This value is derived from actual measurements of
execution time of the code’s checks.
Queuing delay, dqueue, is the time while a packet sits in the output queue to be
transmitted onto the link by the source node and each router or trust system along the way
[31].
dqueue(node) = 3(sizequeue)sizepacket)/(rateincoming_link)

(1)

where:
sizequeue = queue size of router, node, trust system (B)
sizepacket = packet length including headers (bits)
rateincoming_link = incoming link rate (bps)
It would also include the time waiting in the input queue to be processed, which
depends on the priority it is assigned and the quantity and size of higher priority packets
that are processed ahead of it. In the case of the trust system, dqueue has been divided
into two parts: an incoming queuing delay, which is the time a packet waits in the
incoming queue before processing of the packet begins by the trust system, and an
outgoing queue delay which is the time the same packet waits to be transmitted onto the
link by the trust system.
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Transmission delay, dtrans, is the amount of time required to push (i.e. transmit) all
of the packet’s bits onto the communications link at the source and each router or trust
system along the way [31].
dtrans = lengthpacket / rateoutgoing_link

(2)

where:
sizepacket = packet length including headers (bits)
rateoutgoing_link = rate of the link (bits/sec)
The rateoutgoing_link can vary due to link congestion and dynamic bandwidth assignment
algorithms.
Propagation delay, dprop, is the total time required for the packet to propagate from
the outgoing interface of one node in the link to the incoming interface of the next node,
for each node along the path traveled by the packet. If distancelink(i

-> i+1)

is the link

distance (in meters) between a network device or system, node(i), that is about to transmit
a packet onto the link, and the next device or system, node(i+1), poised to receive the
packet and, if speedprop(i -> i+1) is the propagation speed of the signal across that link (in
m/s), then the propagation delay (in milliseconds) across a series of n links, dprop(end-to-end),
is given by Equation 3 [31].

n ⎛ ..........
..........
.......
distance
link(i ->
i+1)⎞
⎟(1000)
dprop(end-to-end) = ∑ ⎜⎜
speedprop(i->i+1) ⎟⎠
i=1 ⎝

(3)

For simulation experiments, the fiber cabling between each node within a company’s
network was assumed to be of the same capacity, therefore, distance(source->destination), the
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distance between the source and the destination nodes, could be used to approximate the
n

total end-to-end link sum,

∑

distancelink(i -> i+1), so that Equation (3) reduces to

i=1

Equation (4) for LAN communications within a single company.

⎛ distancelink(source ->destination)
dprop(end-to-end) = ⎜
_ _ _ _prop(constant)
________
⎝ _ _ _ _speed

⎞
⎟(1000)
⎠

(4)

Higher speed links were used for most inter-organization (i.e. company to company or
company to CA) communications, requiring use of Equation (3) for their propagation
delay.
The propagation speed is dependant upon the physical medium of the link. For
these experiments, all internal company links were assumed to provide a total 100Mbps.
The distances between fixed nodes were maintained in the trust system’s firewall rules
with their traffic rules and were used to calculate available throughput and the legitimacy
of receive times for incoming packets, especially when certain packets were expected
only at regular intervals. Values were adjusted within reasonable boundaries, for
calculated current congestion values.
Device processing delays are specific to each uniquely manufactured device in the
network and can be expected to continue to decrease over the next several years as better
and faster network technologies are developed. In this simulation, reasonable delay
estimates were used for network components such as routers, switches, and fiber optic
cabling as depicted in Table 22. For the speed of light in fiber, a value of 2.0 x108 meters
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per second was assumed. Processing delay for routers and switches was assumed to be
approximately the same. A minimum value of 0.09 milliseconds and a maximum value
of 2 milliseconds were used. Constant queue size for all nodes was estimated to be a
medium range of 300B. The greater the queue size, the greater the overall processing
delay per packet.

Table 22. Network Device Delay Figures for End-to-End Calculations
Device
source
router

switch

trust system

fiber optic cable
destination
total:

Delay Type
dtrans
dproc(router)
dqueue(router)
dtrans
dproc(switch)
dqueue(switch)
dtrans
ddecryption
dproc(TrustSystem)
dqueue(TrustSystemIncoming)
dqueue(TrustSystemOutgoing)
dpacket-reassembly
dencryption
dtrans
dprop(link)
dqueue(destination)
dproc(destination)
dend-to-end

Delay Estimate (ms)
lengthpacket / rateoutgoing_link
min=.09ms, max=2ms
3(queue_size)(message_size)/(rateincoming_link)
lengthpacket / rateoutgoing_link
min=.09ms, max=2ms
3(queue_size)(message_size)/(rateincoming_link)
lengthpacket / rateoutgoing_link
3(queue_size)(message_size)/(rateincoming_link)
message type-specific, use Appendix D
3(queue_size)(message_size)/(rateincoming_link)
3(queue_size)(message_size)/(rateincoming_link)
d(TrustSystem-FWR)
message type- and processor-specific, use
Appendix E
lengthpacket / rateoutgoing_link
distancelink/(2.0*108 m/s)*1000
min=.09ms, max=2ms
sum of the above values

End-to-end delay, dend-to-end, is the one-way latency of a packet from source to
destination and was calculated using Equation (5) for the sum of all of the values in Table
22.
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dend-to-end = dtrans(source) + (dproc(switch) + 2*dqueue(switch) + dtrans(switch))(quantityswitches)

(5)

+ (dproc(router) + 2*dqueue(router) + dtrans(router))(quantityrouters) + (dproc(TrustSystem)
+ dqueue(TrustSystemIncoming) + dqueue(TrustSystemOutgoing) + dtrans(TrustSystem))(quantityTrustSystems)
+ dtrans(source) + dprop(link) + dqueue(destination) + dproc(destination)

4.4.3

Encryption Delay.

All packets in the SCADA network simulated were assumed to be encrypted and
authenticated for greater data security. The trust system simulation code does not
actually perform any encryption or decryption, so, to estimate IPsec encryption delay, the
research of Niedermayer, Klenk, and Carle [32] was used as the basis for extrapolating
values for each message type. Their work indicated much better performance of IPsec as
compared to SSSL. Of the multiple IPsec Authentication Header (AH) and
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) variations that they measured, the best, worst, and
mid-range performers were selected for use in this thesis. The results of their
measurements demonstrated minimal difference between the performance of AH-only,
ESP-only, and AH plus ESP; therefore, the obvious solution, for maximum security was
to use both AH and ESP.
128-bit Encryption Standard (AES-128) with SHA-1 authentication was the
fastest performer with average security. Unfortunately, SHA-1 has been cracked and a
128-bit key is not nearly as secure as a 192- or 256-bit key. Triple (3DES) with the
stronger SHA-256 authentication was the worst performer, according to their
measurements, creating a huge encryption time delay that also proved problematic with
meeting real-time requirements for the scenarios. 192-bit Blowfish with SHA-256
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performed in the middle range overall and appeared to be the best fit for both better
security and lower delay. Plotting the rise and run for their results, within the range of
message sizes used for this thesis’ experiments, yielded the slope and general equations
for extrapolating IPsec encryption delay with both AH and ESP (for maximum security)
listed in Table 23.

Table 23. IPsec Encryption and Authentication Delay Equations
Encryption/
IPsec
Authentication Mode
Scheme
AES-128/
trans
SHA-1
AES-128/
SHA-1
Blowfish-192/
SHA-2(256)
Blowfish-192/
SHA-2(256)
3DES/
SHA-2(256)
Blowfish-192/
SHA-2(256)

tunnel
trans
tunnel

Encryption Delay (ms)

dAES-128/SHA-1(transport) = 1000((10.253)(sizepayload)+19337.5)/speedCPU
sizepayload = size of message payload to be encrypted (bits)
speedCPU = processor speed in the encrypting node (Hz)
dAES-128/SHA-1(tunnel) = 1000((10.52)(sizepayload)+19698)/speedCPU
dBlowfish-192/SHA-2(transport) = ( 1.17)(1.146) dAES-128/SHA-1(transport)
= (1.3408) dAES-128/SHA-1(transport)
dBlowfish-192/SHA-2(tunnel) = (1.3408) dAES-128/SHA-1(tunnel)

trans
tunnel

d3DES/SHA-2(transport) = (2.75)(1.17) dAES-128/SHA-1(transport)
= (3.2175)dAES-128/SHA-1(transport)
d3DES/SHA-2(tunnel) = (3.2175)dAES-128/SHA-1(tunnel)

#

(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)

Appendix E lists the results of these calculations for each message type traversing
the simulated network.
4.4.4

Concurrency.

Although the trust system C++ code for this simulation did not implement
concurrent processes, a realistic implementation would use pipelining to increase the
speed of execution. Separate measurements of completion time for each check (i.e.
firewall rules, format, and ACM with sanitization) on each packet traversing the path of
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the trust system allow calculation of best case performance with concurrent processing
of more than one packet at a time.
4.5

Scenarios Approach and Simulation Network
The escalating scenarios in Chapter 4 simulate IP packet traffic of various sizes

and various message types between SCADA nodes and network servers that is
intercepted and analyzed by the trust system. The reaction of the trust system to each
message, by accurately allowing legitimate traffic, blocking malformed packets and
unauthorized traffic due to user errors or malicious attempts, or sanitizing information in
messages that the receiver is not authorized read, demonstrated the successful execution
of the trust system concept and supporting computer code. Delay measurements were
calculated based on maximum response times measured for the trust system and average
and high-end ranges for each network component (i.e. routers, switches, and cabling)
along the way. The total time for each scenario was also calculated. These delay figures
indicate the impact of trust system operations on control system time constraints.
Figure 14, illustrates a simple, two-company slice of an interconnected Utility
Intranet, illustrating the various SCADA and IT systems simulated in the experiments for
this thesis.
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Figure 14. Typical Network Diagram

The simple, yet realistic scenarios to demonstrate the concepts proposed in this
thesis are based upon a fictitious electric utility company, Middletown Power and Light
(MPL), and its personnel, a nearby utility company with some poor security habits, and
their area control (or operations) center. The scenarios are not intended to represent any
particular real-life company or employee. Figure 15 depicts the same network as Figure
14, yet replacing the standard firewalls with more comprehensive, strategically placed
trust systems in the network for a minimal trust system implementation. The diagram
shows the components and the distances used in calculations. To illustrate applicability
to highly remote communications, the two company control (or operations) centers are
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100km apart from each other and 30km away from the nearest substations that they
control. The CA Operations Center is approximately 300km away from each company.
Of course, the ideal trust system implementation would implement all router/switch
combinations as trust routers and include trust agents on nearly all nodes in the
network.

Figure 15. Scenarios Network Diagram (Minimal Trust System Implementation)
4.6

Baseline Simulation Scenarios
4.6.1

Overview.

The purpose of the baseline scenarios was to demonstrate trust system
functionality in a benign environment with properly formatted traffic sent by legitimate
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users or systems. They indicate the delay induced by the trust system in a network
without background or malicious traffic and estimate the associated impact on the types
of day-to-day traffic expected on a Utility Intranet.
4.6.2

Scenario 1 - Legitimate Status Update.

A legitimate UDP status update packet, Packet 1-1, was transmitted within MPL’s
SCADA network from IED-239 (in Substation A) to MPL’s SCADA master control
station. The input parameters defined for Packet 1-1 (as received at the MPL network
trust system) are depicted in Figure 16. Note that IPv6 tunnel mode and trust system
gateway (i.e. router) mode have been employed. Specifically, the IED-239 nodal trust
system encrypts the message from IED-239 using its private key and the network trust
system’s public key then adds an IP routing header to send it to the trust system gateway
closest to the destination, trust_router2, which happens to be hosting the network trust
system. Ellipses throughout the rest of the examples indicate omissions, for brevity.
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MESSAGE UDP
//begin IPv6 outer header for tunnel mode
IP2_traffic_class
3290
IP2_flow_label
4E28C
IP2_source_address
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4239
//nodal_TS@MPL_IED-239
IP2_destination_address
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4050
//network_TS@MPL_trust_router2
//end IPv6 outer header for tunnel mode
//begin AH header
…
//end AH header
//begin ESP header
…
//end ESP header
//begin IPv6 inner header for tunnel mode
IP1_traffic_class
C450
IP1_flow_label
13B87
IP1_payload_length
101
IP1_source_address
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:0239
//MPL_IED-239
IP1_destination_address
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:3200
//MPL_SCADA_master_station
//end IPv6 inner header for tunnel mode
//begin UDP header
…
UDP_source_port
500
UDP_destination_port
500
UDP_length
26
…
//end UDP header
//begin message data
message_type
status
time_message_created
12:00:00.0000-20Jun07
busNumber
1006
busName
HUNTLEY_
CAname
CA1
companyName
_MPL
nominalVoltageKV
+0220.000
busVoltPu
+0000.984
VoltKV
+0137.581
busAngleDeg
+0013.790
loadMW
+0017.610
loadMvar
+0320.740
gen_MW
-0236.740
genMvar
+0234.020
switchedShuntsMvar
+0200.000
actGshuntMW
+0009.110
actBshuntMvar
-0006.760
month_AMR_collect_start
0:00:00.0001-01Jun07
customers
20
month_AMR__total_usage
479,015.996
daily_ave_AMR_usage
24,563.731
AMR_usage_kWh_today
13,404.326
//end message data
//begin ESP trailer
…
//end ESP trailer
//begin ESP ICV
…
//end ESP ICV

Figure 16. Packet 1-1 (UDP Status, IED-239 to MPL Master Station)
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The trust system simulator code, at the time of this writing, did not implement
multicast or a carbon-copy list, however this capability was simulated by sending the
exact same message, with the same originating timestamp, to each of the other (external)
destination IP addresses allowed to receive the message. In this case, the same status
message was forwarded to both the CA1 control center and a neighboring competitor
company (adjacent company 1) control center. In a network without a trust system
agent loaded on IED-239, the network-level trust system (NTS) could create and send
duplicates of the message to the CA and neighbor destinations based on its list of carboncopy recipients and on behalf of the IED, which could not multicast the message.
According to the trust system firewall rules, both external destinations (i.e.
outside the MPL SCADA network) were authorized to receive a status message, but the
adjacent competitor company was not allowed to receive all of the same MPL status data
that would be given to a fully-trusted organization, like the CA control center. Instead,
the adjacent company was only granted access to the minimal amount of performance
parameters required for it to recognize or respond to emergency situations occurring
within MPL’s span of control. Although firewall rules and format checks all passed, the
ACM identified data elements in the message, specifically financial rate and customer
usage data (i.e. data type FN) which the competitor was not authorized to read. As a
result, the trust system sanitized the status message, as depicted in the packet detail of
Packet 1-2, Figure 17. The trust system demonstrated sanitization of the message that
would be forwarded to the adjacent company by replacing each character of the financial
data elements with an X.
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MESSAGE UDP
//begin IPv6 outer header for tunnel mode
IP2_traffic_class
F065
IP2_flow_label
C13AA
IP2_source_address
2392001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4050
//network_TS@MPL_trust_router2
IP2_destination_address
2001:DC99:31AC:9AAD:FC29:6C1A:80EA:4057
//network_TS@adjacent1_trust_router7
//end IPv6 outer header for tunnel mode
//begin AH header
…
//end AH header
//begin ESP header
…
//end ESP header
//begin IPv6 inner header for tunnel mode
IP1_traffic_class
530E
IP1_flow_label
8B7A0
IP1_payload_length
101
IP1_source_address
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:0239
//MPL_IED-239
IP2_destination_address
2001:DC99:31AC:9AAD:FC29:6C1A:80EA:3200
//adjacent_company1_master_station
//end IPv6 inner header for tunnel mode
//begin UDP header
…
UDP_source_port
500
UDP_destination_port
500
UDP_length
26
…
//end UDP header
//begin message data
message_type
status
time_message_created
12:00:00.0000-20Jun07
busNumber
1006
busName
HUNTLEY_
CAname
CA1
companyName
_MPL
nominalVoltageKV
+0220.000
busVoltPu
+0000.984
VoltKV
+0137.581
busAngleDeg
+0013.790
loadMW
+0017.610
loadMvar
+0320.740
gen_MW
-0236.740
genMvar
+0234.020
switchedShuntsMvar
+0200.000
actGshuntMW
+0009.110
actBshuntMvar
-0006.760
month_AMR_collect_start
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
customers
XX
month_AMR__total_usage
XXXXXXXXXXX
daily_ave_AMR_usage
XXXXXXXXXX
AMR_usage_kWh_today
XXXXXXXXXX
//end message data
//begin ESP trailer
…
//end ESP trailer
//begin ESP ICV
…
//end ESP ICV

Figure 17. Packet 1-2 (Sanitized Status, IED-239 to Adjacent Master Station)
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In comparison, Packet 1-3 (Figure 18) was sent to the company’s CA control
center, which was authorized to receive financial data because of its responsibility for
regulating electrical power costs, usage, and generation, was unsanitized and had
identical data as Packet 1-1, sent to the MPL operations center.
MESSAGE UDP
//begin IPv6 tunnel mode outer header
IP2_traffic_class
DA2F
IP2_flow_label
1CC43
IP2_source_address
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4239
//nodal_TS@MPL_IED-239
IP2_destination_address
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4050
//network_TS@MPL_trust_router2
//end IPv6 tunnel mode outer header
//begin AH header
…
//end AH header
//begin ESP header
…
//end ESP header
//begin IPv6 tunnel mode inner header
IP1_traffic_class
95C0
IP1_flow_label
B9602
IP1_payload_length
101
IP1_source_address
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:0239
//MPL_IED-239
IP1_destination_address
2001:DC99:31AC:9AAD:FC29:6C1A:80EA:3200
//CA1_master_station
//begin UDP header
…
UDP_source_port
500
UDP_destination_port
500
…
UDP_length
26
//end UDP header
//begin message data
messageType
status
time_message_created
12:00:00.0000-20Jun07
busNumber
1006
busName
HUNTLEY_
CAname
CA1
companyName
_MPL
nominalVoltageKV
+0220.000
busVoltPu
+0000.984
VoltKV
+0137.581
busAngleDeg
+0013.790
loadMW
+0017.610
loadMvar
+0320.740
gen_MW
-0236.740
genMvar
+0234.020
switchedShuntsMvar
+0200.000
actGshuntMW
+0009.110
actBshuntMvar
-0006.760
month_AMR_collect_start
24:00:00.0001-01Jun07
customers
20
month_AMR__total_usage
479,015.996
daily_ave_AMR_usage
24,563.731
AMR_usage_kWh_today
13,404.326
//end message data
//begin ESP trailer
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…
//end ESP trailer
//begin ESP ICV
…
//end ESP ICV

Figure 18. Packet 1-3 (Unsanitized Status Update, IED-239 to CA1 Control Center)

No suspicious event or security alert was warranted; therefore, the sanitized
message was forwarded on to the adjacent company and the original message was
forwarded to the MPL master control station and CA1 control center. The packet details
were logged to the historical database.
Table 24 summarizes the end-to-end delay totals for each of the three packets to
reach their destinations, comparing IPsec mode options using Blowfish-192/SHA-2(256),
maximum measured trust system values for a status message, and trust system
processor speeds ranging from 3GHz to 12GHz. Internal to the MPL network, the IED
was able to deliver a status update within 1.62ms, well within the normal 2sec time
constraint and sufficient for an emergency notification. External communication was also
possible in less than 4.3ms over distances as great as 300km. The greatest delay
dependency resides in the routers along the path. Routers with large queue size and high
processing delay were simulated in conjunction with tunnel mode IPsec to provide an
idea of worst case delivery with non-real-time routers. Results indicated fractions of a
second transit time, though not hard real-time. Routers (or trust routers) that will handle
real-time traffic must be optimized for minimal processing delays.
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Table 24. Scenario 1 Delay Summary

4.6.3 Scenario 2 - Legitimate Area Summary and Emergency Trip.
A legitimate UDP area_summary message, Packet 2-1, was received from MPL’s
CA1 control center. These messages summarize power status for the hundreds,
thousands, or tens of thousands of buses within the control area that would be of interest
to a particular company. The summary indicated rising load requirements in nearby
towns managed by other electrical utility companies in the same control area. Typical
packet size is around 2.4MB and was simulated by sending 9600 status packets, similar
to the example above, each approximately 250B in size; however in reality, maximum
packet fragment sizes might be as large as 1500B.
The calculated transit time, from send to receive, for a single status packet would
have been a minimum of 4.25ms in IPsec tunnel mode with a 3GHz trust system
processor (as determined from Scenario 1). For 2.4MB, the estimated receive time would
be approximately 9600 times that delay, equivalent to 40.8sec for MPL to receive and
process the complete update from its area operations center. At the high end of the delay
spectrum, with large router/switch processing delays (dproc = 2ms) and larger queues
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(1500B), delivery of one UDP status packet would have taken an estimated 37.88ms,
requiring 363.652sec = 6min 3.7sec to receive and process the entire 2.4MB equivalent.
However, only a few seconds after receiving the first bit of the 2.4MB
area_status message, a legitimate TCP emergency trip message, Packet 2-4, was also
received by MPL from the CA1 control center. The parameters defined for Packet 2-4, as
received at the network trust system, are depicted in Figure 19.

MESSAGE TCP
//begin IPv6 tunnel mode outer header
…
IP2_source_address
2001:6B03:105E:A993:28CA:E7BB:A4B3:4050
//network_TS@MPL_trust_router3
IP2_destination_address
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4050
//network_TS@MPL_trust_router2
…
//begin IPv6 tunnel mode outer header
//begin AH header
…
//end AH header
//begin ESP header
…
//end ESP header
//begin IPv6 tunnel mode inner header
…
IP1_source_address
2001:6B03:105E:A993:28CA:E7BB:A4B3:3200
//CA1_master_station
IP1_destination_address
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:0239
//MPL_IED-239
…
//end IPv6 tunnel mode inner header
//begin TCP header
TCP_source_port
500
TCP_destination_port
500
…
TCP_control_flags
111000 //URG, ACK, PSH, RST, SYN, FIN
…
//end TCP header
//begin message data
message_type
breaker_trip
time_message_created
13:00:00.0000-20Jun07
status
OPEN
//end message data
//begin ESP trailer
…
//end ESP trailer
//begin ESP ICV
…
//end ESP ICV

Figure 19. Packet 2-4 (TCP Emergency Trip Message from CA1 to IED-239)
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Because the packet was an emergency packet, indicated by the message type
(trip), TCP protocol (emergency TCP bandwidth is reserved for extremely time-critical
communications), and URG control flag being set, it was moved to the front of the trust
system input queue, and allowed to interrupt the evaluation of the non-emergency UDP
area_status summary packet. The trust system processed the emergency trip message
before completing all of the status messages, simulating the capability of the trust
system to break evaluation of a single UDP 2.4MB area summary packet to devote all of
its efforts to handling the emergency event. Concurrent processes with sufficient
memory and processing speed could allow simultaneous processing by the trust system
with little impact to real-time response to the emergency. The emergency packet passed
all trust system checks, warranting no suspicious event or security alert.
The source (i.e. CA1) was a trusted, neutral third party that MPL had given
permission to initiate emergency actions on its systems, when warranted, so the packet
was forwarded directly to the intended destination, IED-239. A copy of the same packet
was also sent to the SCADA master station for awareness in the MPL operations center.
The MPL SCADA master station would, in turn, issue its own trip command in response
and the node would respond to whichever message it received first and discard the
second.
After tripping its breaker, IED-239 replied in response with a multicast TCP
emergency status packet to the MPL master control station and the CA control center
indicating the now open breaker, as depicted in Figure 20.
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MESSAGE TCP
//begin IPv6 tunnel mode outer header
…
IP2_source_address
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4239
//nodal_TS@MPL_IED-239
IP2_destination_address
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4050
//network_TS@MPL_trust_router2
…
//end IPv6 tunnel mode outer header
//begin IPv6 tunnel mode inner header
…
IP1_source_address
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:0239
//MPL_IED-239
IP1_destination_address
2001:6B03:105E:A993:28CA:E7BB:A4B3:3200
//CA1_master_station
//end IPv6 tunnel mode inner header
//begin TCP header
TCP_source_port
500
TCP_destination_port
500
…
TCP_control_flags
111000 //URG, ACK, PSH, RST, SYN, FIN
…
//end TCP header
//begin message data
message_type
status
time_msg_created
13:00:00.0218-20Jun07
breaker
1003
status
open
//end message data
//begin ESP trailer
…
//end ESP trailer
//begin ESP ICV
…
//end ESP ICV

Figure 20. Packet 2-2 (TCP Trip Response from IED-239 to MPL Master and CA)

The delay calculation results are summarized in Appendix F. The emergency trip
alone took an estimated 22-205 ms (regular TCP, tunnel mode IPsec) to execute using
regular TCP control protocol, avoiding the blackout events occurring in nearby cities
from spreading or affecting customers supplied by MPL. Using an abbreviated TCP
protocol (by eliminating an ACK from three-way handshakes and graceful closes and by
only ACKing with data, whenever possible) would reduce the response time nearly 40%.
The packet detail was also logged to the MPL log server and historical database.
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After the trust system handled and forwarded IED-239’s trip response status
packet, it immediately returned to completing its checks on the rest of the UDP
area_summary update packet (i.e. the rest of the 9600 packets simulating a single 2.4MB
packet). The total time calculated for the trust system to evaluate this message was
between 40.82sec (dproc(router/switch)= 0.9, 300B queue sizes) and 6min, 3.9sec
(dproc(router/switch) = 2.0, 1500B queue sizes), from start to finish, including the delay in
evaluating the emergency trip and response messages. Of course, the trip action may
have stabilized the overall area power status, rendering this message’s data stale and not
worth continuing to process.
The robustness of the trust system code created for these simulations was
demonstrated in its handling of over 9600 packets while re-prioritizing its actions to
handle an emergency.
4.6.4

Scenario 3 - Successful Root Logon by a Legitimate User.

A logon_request, Packet 3-4, was sent from SCADA_admin_workstation1 by
user Sally Washington, a SCADA administrator with username smwashingt. Returning
after a 2-week vacation, she had forgotten and mistyped her password as depicted in
Figure 21.
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MESSAGE TCP
//begin IPv6 tunnel mode outer header
…
IP2_source_address
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4051
//nodal_TS@MPL_SCADA_workstation1
IP2_destination_address
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4050
//network_TS@MPL_trust_router2
//end IPv6 tunnel mode outer header
//begin AH header
…
//end AH header
//begin ESP header
…
//end ESP header
//begin IPv6 tunnel mode inner header
…
IP1_source_address
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:3901
//MPL_SCADA_admin_workstation1
IP1_destination_address
2001:A344:4DD1:F76F:D2CB:3B09:5629:1000
//MPL_logon_server
//end IPv6 tunnel mode inner header
…
//begin message data
message_type
logon_request
time_message_created
08:00:00.000-21Jun07
username
smwashingt
number_of_credentials
4
credential_1_type
PASS
credential_1
!#V8k12g4x
credential_2_type
CARD
credential_2
1D43EF3409193A389BB067867D3A80C3249B8
credential_3_type
PIN
credential_3
10465891
credential_4_type
FING
credential_4
ÿØÿà JFIF dd1i=&ÿÛ„OXÖS+x°rGŽe-Ô&9 |6C‡ùw?]
± ÊÍ/‘ L Ëîë´F±O K³XüÞGÇr qBÒåj Õ©•ã É5²ÇY
u “™Òß`é°³ÆUªTj¤Ö¼ö ˜Úµ®Ê‰p®Êaµºm$<'×Lhø Ìbx
ÿØÿà JFIF
d d 1i =&ÿÛ „ OXÖS+x°rGŽe-Ô
&9 |6C‡ùw?]± ÊÍ/‘ L Ëîë´F±O K³XüÞGÇr qBÒåj Õ
©•ã É5²ÇY au “™Òß`é°³ÆUªTj¤Ö¼ö ˜Úµ®Ê‰p®Êaµºm
$<'×L hø Ìb_x$ ½\-|h¡• ò™žä ø Æÿ œ7ÖÆJ†^©gÇ²
Ç\·åiIû]z 8Û×X{rÈåŠ¶ÜsJÄnÙQ0•æ>³é¬½5ä6ÆÊT3×·
"³™‰)™ §ût§ÄWµ]`cø·i éë3·M 7™í3ÙÓéÿ9Õ'6¸ X¢“
9“Ü§ºÈú G¤h #ˆÀˆþ ´Gö@¾¿u_ë /Œû¤ÿ‚6)Ž'í‚þ ý
º¯ ^É3-"f å1 ¾ÑþÏM9rèlÕ d‰3îo<¿5-¥t×#ô vÚ “+
D”¬)Í¡ŸÓÔþœŽ²§üEÃ)þ9úÆ…ÌÉ¡™ VaÜ 4Õ§W¨w¦ˆOÇ
!ô†–ÓøjÅºÇeÕd5¬æìþ›ˆµ-],eEC-/„IFÑËSnÚ¼f )kŠÄ
ê9J êìÜû4ZûÕœÒõä[Dï:Û §di[/ŽÜ‡ äû×°ëšµR§‘m§1
$_ÌX³^šNB†n ¬ˆZ<bMuû |Œ»eËÆ³Õ½«¯’ ƒí9 ÷ ¢"w
$›y ß“Q¬Ùæñ<¿vk -dŸqµý»ô…è|p mN(|³Å~+‡ Ê ¬œ
× gq ‘@ûþ®¾E÷rËã ®@ñÇñr”YF¢òøÄrž`ÆD¡ë’ŸÌ ¬
•ü: Ö2pßñ Sm›Üî²¦Rœ+y /aI {Y7 F'Èkåà\]©Œ
¬ èm<ù!FÞ…-¤3§-®šø/'®ã
wöÉo Ü·)çîúm¯"I, ´
\]š¿^KnÍ–í3¼A–ÿ Û¬y/žÖ±€²`oÚaGP(˜õôÚtó°+7U´á
ŽqÐ8qãìŒOM"ÉÕ¯Êa›òPIO¾vë#øi ±
â# -òôˆéýÿ
Ÿ×G¶ÿ ÏG¤íõ rartG-S Ë‰{wßùaõÔ
Žá$¿Ì{~
//end message data
//begin ESP trailer
…
//end ESP trailer
//begin ESP ICV
…
//end ESP ICV

Figure 21. Packet 3-4 (First Failed Logon Attempt, Wrong Password).
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The password entered, !#V8k12g4X, did not match the stored password of
!#V8k12g$X; therefore, the logon attempt was denied. The trust system recognized the
similarity to the correct password and increased the threshold from three tries to five, to
provide her more opportunities to log on.
Sally tried a second time. The second logon attempt (Figure 22) was denied
because the last character was a lowercase letter x instead of the expected uppercase X.

MESSAGE TCP
…
//begin message data
message_type
time_message_created
username
number_of_credentials
credential_1_type
credential_1
credential_2_type
credential_2
credential_3_type
credential_3
credential_4_type
…
//end message data
…

logon_request
08:00:15.000-21Jun07
smwashingt
4
PASS
!#V8k12g$x
CARD
1D43EF3409193A389BB067867D3A80C3249B8
PIN
10465891
FING

Figure 22. Packet 3-15 (Second Failed Logon Attempt, Wrong Case)
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The third logon attempt was denied because of a typo, an @ sign instead of a 2, as
illustrated in Figure 23.
MESSAGE TCP
…
//begin message data
message_type
time_message_created
username
number_of_credentials
credential_1_type
credential_1
credential_2_type
credential_2
credential_3_type
credential_3
credential_4_type
…
//end message data
…

logon_request
08:00:28.000-21Jun07
smwashingt
4
PASS
!#V8k1@g$x
CARD
1D43EF3409193A389BB067867D3A80C3249B8
PIN
1046589
FING

Figure 23. Packet 3-23 (Third Failed Logon Attempt, Typo)

The fourth logon attempt (Packet 3-31) supplied the proper password. Since all of
the credentials supplied were correct, the logon server, sent the evaluated credentials to
the in a logon_evaluated packet, depicted in Figure 24.
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MESSAGE TCP
//begin IPv6 header
…
IP1_source_address
IP1_destination_address
//end IPv6 header
//begin AH header
…
//end AH header
//begin ESP header
…
//end ESP header
//begin TCP header
…
//end TCP header
//begin message data
message_type
time_message_created
username
number_of_credentials
credential_1_type
credential_1_pass
credential_2_type
credential_2_pass
credential_3_type
credential_3_pass
credential_4_type
credential_4_pass
//end message data
//begin ESP trailer
…
//end ESP trailer
//begin ESP ICV
…
//end ESP ICV

2001:A344:4DD1:F76F:D2CB:3B09:5629:1000
//MPL_logon_server
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:3901
//MPL_SCADA_admin_workstation1

logon_evaluated
…
smwashingt
4
PASS
YES
CARD
YES
CPIN
YES
FING
YES

Figure 24. Packet 3-33 (Logon Credentials Evaluated by the Logon Server)

The logon was successful, so no security alert was generated. The trust system
assigned an effective ACCN of 4 to username smwashingt in its ACM, granting Sally rootlevel privileges in a logon_approved message, as depicted in Figure 25.
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MESSAGE TCP
…
//begin IPv6 header
IP1_source_address
IP1_destination_address
…
//end IPv6 header
…
//begin message data
message_type
time_created
username
effective_ACCN
//end message data
…

2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4050
//network_TS@MPL_trust_router2
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4239
//nodal_TS@MPL_IED-239

logon_approved
…
smwashingt
4

Figure 25. Packet 3-37 (Successful Logon by SCADA Administrator)

The trust system then generated a historical log entry for the historical archive.
Appendix G lists the calculated end-to-end delay measurements for Scenario 3.
4.7

Malicious Activity Scenarios
4.7.1

Scenario 4 – Unencrypted Remote Logon Attempts.

Before the trust system and other security mechanisms were installed on the
MPL SCADA network, an attacker, intent upon disrupting MPL’s operations, first
accessed an adjacent utility company’s network through an unsecured rogue office
connection to the Internet. Unknown to Sally Washington, the attacker then sent a
spoofed e-mail to Sally’s co-worker at MPL with a Valentine’s Day card attachment
using a compromised e-mail account and source IP address from the adjacent utility
company. Because the source IP address and SMTP were allowed and e-mail
attachments were not being scanned by the firewall or by antivirus software on the e-mail
server or workstations at that time, the e-mail easily traversed the MPL firewall and was
loaded to the MPL e-mail server. When the co-worker was logged onto shared
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SCADA_admin_workstation_1 and opened the e-mail a malicious Trojan horse program
was loaded onto the computer’s hard drive. The malicious code could sniff and record
keystrokes from the attached keyboard and from the Ethernet switch connecting the
company control center workstations to the SCADA network. The installed malicious
code, using a non-disabled FTP service on the workstation, forwarded the results each
evening to the compromised computer in the adjacent company to which the attacker had
remote administrator access. The sniffer captured keystrokes, including the username
and local hashed password caches as workers logged on throughout the day, and reported
them back to the compromised system for the attacker to extract.
Soon after this undetected incident, MPL management, concerned about
improving the security of its operations after increasing reports of network intrusion
attempts, had a trial trust system installed at a strategic location within its network and
revised its security policies.
While scanning the Internet, the attacker came across MPL’s external website
which listed the names of company managers and technical support. Sally Washington
was listed as the point of contact for SCADA technical matters with her e-mail address,
smwashingt@middletownpl.com. The attacker then guessed, correctly, that Sally’s
network username might be the same, or at least similar, to the beginning of her e-mail
address.
The next evening, the attacker attempted to logon remotely to the compromised
MPL SCADA_admin_workstation1, with Sally’s username, in an attempt to gain
SCADA administrator privileges.
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The first attempt was a remote logon from the compromised computer in MPL’s
neighboring company office using a common password, password12. The three packets
crafted by the attacker were SYN (Packet 4-1) and ACK (Packet 4-3) control messages
used in initiating and completing a three-way TCP handshake and the actual
logon_request message (Packet 4-4), depicted in Figure 26.

MESSAGE TCP
//begin IPv6 outer header for tunnel mode
…
IP2_source_address
2001:DC99:31AC:9AAD:FC29:6C1A:80EA:4057
//network_TS@adjacent_trust_router7
IP2_destination_address
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4050
//network_TS@MPL_trust_router2
…
//end IPv6 outer header
…
//begin IPv6 inner header
…
IP1_source_address
2001:DC99:31AC:9AAD:FC29:6C1A:80EA:5231
//adjacent1_office_workstation
IP1_destination_address
2001:A344:4DD1:F76F:D2CB:3B09:5629:1000
//MPL_logon_server
…
//end IPv6 inner header
…
//begin message data
message_type
logon_request
time_message_created
19:00:00.0000-30Jun07
username
smwashingt
number_of_credentials
1
credential_1_type
PASS
credential_1
password12
//end message data
…

Figure 26. Packet 4-4 (Remote Logon Attempt, Wrong Password and Unencrypted)

The attempt was detected by the MPL trust system firewall rules encryption
check and blocked closest to the MPL WAN boundary because packets are required to be
encrypted with the proper key. In this first attempt, the attacker was not even able to
establish a connection with the logon server (the initial SYN packet was rejected)
because the traffic was not encrypted.
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In the second attempt, only packet 4-4 was sent, without establishing a
connection, and was again rejected because it was not encrypted.
Each time a non-encrypted packet was received and rejected, the MPL trust
system queried the adjacent company’s trust system regarding whether the source IP
address was properly encrypting its traffic (possibly needing to turn on encryption or
update to the current key). The parameters defined for the query_encryption message are
illustrated in Figure 27. The adjacent company’s trust system would then query it’s own
nodes to determine the answer. If the result was that the source had the current key and
was encrypting its traffic (which was the case), the adjacent company trust system (on
its own, or prompted by the MPL trust system) would then query to determine if the
source had actually sent the packet the MPL trust system claimed to have received.

MESSAGE UDP
//begin IPv6 header
…
IP1_source_address
IP1_destination_address
…
//end IPv6 header
…
//begin message data
message_type
time_message_created
key_ID
//end message data
…

2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4050
//network_TS@MPL_trust_router2
2001:DC99:31AC:9AAD:FC29:6C1A:80EA:4057
//network_TS@adjacent1_trust_router7

query_encryption
…
22:19:43.215-29Jun07

Figure 27. UDP Encryption Check for Unencrypted Packet Source IP
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The query_response, depicted in Figure 28, indicated that encryption was in effect
at the node and the key was current.
MESSAGE UDP
//begin IPv6 header
…
IP1_source_address
IP1_destination_address
…
//end IPv6 tunnel mode inner header
…
//begin message data
message_type
time_message_created
encryption_on?
key_current?
//end message data

2001:DC99:31AC:9AAD:FC29:6C1A:80EA:3201
//nodal_TS@adjacent1_SCADA_master_station
2001:DC99:31AC:9AAD:FC29:6C1A:80EA:4057
//network_TS@adjacent1_trust_router7

query_response
…
yes
yes

Figure 28. UDP Response to Encryption Query

Next the adjacent company trust system queried the node to see if it had actually
sent the packet. The parameters defined for a query_packet message, are depicted in
Figure 29.

MESSAGE UDP
//begin IPv6 header
…
IP1_source_address
IP1_destination_address
…
//end IPv6 header
…
//begin UDP header
…
destination_port
protocol
…
//end UDP header
//begin message data
message_type
time_message_created
rcvd_queryPacket_type
queryPacket_dest_IP
queryPacket_dest_port
queryPacket_protocol
//end message data
…

2001:DC99:31AC:9AAD:FC29:6C1A:80EA:4057
//network_TS@adjacent1_trust_router7
2001:DC99:31AC:9AAD:FC29:6C1A:80EA:3201
//nodal_TS@adjacent1_SCADA_master_station

500
UDP

query_packet
…
control
2001:A344:4DD1:F76F:D2CB:3B09:5629:1000
500
UDP

Figure 29. Query to Verify the Source IP Actually Sent the Status Request
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In a third attempt the source IP address was spoofed to look like an MPL address.
The query_response from the system in the adjacent company’s network that the attacker
had pretended to be, indicated that it had not sent the packet, as depicted in Figure 30.

MESSAGE UDP
…
//begin message data
message_type
time_message_created
query_type
query_time
response_1
//end message data
…

query_response
…
query_packet
…
no

Figure 30. UDP Response Identifying Source Did Not Send the Packet

In this case the source IP address in the attacker-generated packet was spoofed, so
the trust agent of the system at that IP address responded to its network trust system
that it had not sent the packet. Note that it is also possible in a network where logging of
all transactions occurs to a historical database, for the network-level trust system to
simply query this database without having to create unnecessary traffic to be processed
by individual nodes and their trust agents. Now trust systems in both companies
realized that malicious activity was occurring and began the process of tracking down the
originating node for the traffic in order to block it closest to the source.
No trust level change was required because the real node was performing properly
and existing trust system rules would block unencrypted traffic. Obviously, security
responses that lower the trust level for any IP address or user could be leveraged by the
attacker as a DoS against the adjacent company, by sending further spoofed packets to
lower the trust level for a legitimate IP address or user. In this manner, it might be
193

expected that the trust system would eventually block all traffic, even legitimate packets,
from the adjacent company IP address.
As an aside, note that this is where the advantage of multiple, collaborative trustenabled routers can be brought to bear in increasing the intelligence of the overall trust
system. The trust system realized that the actual system in the adjacent company
configured with the source IP address it was seeing in the spoofed packets, was not
actually creating and sending the spoofed packets it was seeing and correlated these
events with the first attempts using the adjacent company’s IP addresses.
The next step would be to track down the source of the spoofed packets. By
sending a track_source packet out the interface from which the spoofed packets were
being received, the MPL and adjacent company trust system’s would query other trust
systems (i.e. trust routers, systems, and agents) it was aware of down-the-line, to
determine which other trust systems had also seen the packet and on which interface (i.e.
link or links) it had arrived. The track_source would also inform them to block (i.e.
update specific firewall rules to not allow the unauthorized traffic to a particular
granularity) and initiate their own track_source for any further traffic of this type.
As the next trust system down the line received the track_source packet, it would
check to see if that packet had crossed its path. Recognizing the packet and incoming
interface, it would then send a track_source on that link to the next trust system or
systems, which would in turn check to see if they had processed the same packet and, if
so, track the source. Eventually, a trust system would respond back to the previous trust
system that queried it. In the best case, it would state it had found the originating source,
blocked the traffic, and alerted to the activity. In the worst case, it would indicate it had
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no more reachable trust systems to query or those it could query all responded
negatively and the trail had run cold. Even in this case, the updated firewall rules would
block further similar activity at the level closest to the source and a better picture of the
incoming avenue of attack could be determined. The event detail was logged to the
historical database.

In addition to the log entry, a suspicious event was initiated, generating a security
alert to the screen of security analysts and network administrators as depicted in Figure
31. Further event detail could be accessed and drilled into from the analyst GUI to the
security database and historical databases.

SECURITY ALERT:
SEID-13:30:34.1756-30Jun07
INFRACTION/S

1) Encryption error—unencrypted connection attempt.
2) Attempted logon from external IP not allowed for
username smwashingt, role MPL_SCADA_administrator.
3) Malicious packet—packet-listed source_IP encryption
current and did not send packet.

ACTION/S

Denied by MPL Firewall Rules.
Queried adjacent1 trust system.
Tracked source to 2001:DC99:31AC:9AAD:FC29:6C1A:80EA:5231.
//adjacent1_office_workstation
Adjacent trust system generated alert.

PACKET DETAIL
type
time_message_created
source_address
source_port
dest_address
dest_port
protocol

control (SYN)
…
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:3905
//MPL_SCADA_admin_workstation1
9593
2001:A344:4DD1:F76F:D2CB:3B09:5629:1000
//MPL_logon_server
TCP

Figure 31. Security Alert (Failed Remote Logon Event)
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4.7.2 Scenario 5 - Encrypted Remote Logon Attempts with Compromised Key.
Realizing this would not be as easy as he thought, the attacker began capturing
and analyzing network traffic outgoing from and incoming to the adjacent utility
company’s network. He recognized the communications between the two companies
were all encrypted, so the only way he would be able to read packet data or connect to the
MPL network would be to crack the encryption or get inside the network itself. The
traffic captures previously reported by the installed sniffer on MPL
SCADA_admin_workstation1 had also showed encrypted port 500 interactions between
systems on MPL’s network, indicating the use of IPsec. He began work to crack the key.
After considerable time he was able to crack the private encryption key for
external communications and recognize the signature of key update packets. He also
optimized the algorithms for encryption cracking so that shortly after a key change, the
new key could be cracked in a matter of minutes. As he sniffed, decrypted, and studied
traffic between the two companies, the attacker began to learn typical utility message
types, node names, addresses, and common status values of MPL’s equipment. After
even more work he was able to crack the private key needed to spoof and encrypt packets
that would be interpreted as either coming from the MPL or adjacent company networks.
Shortly after MPL had installed trust systems and conducted a complete security
policy review, just prior to the attacker’s latest attempts, the company had locked down
unnecessary FTP services on its systems and denied external FTP connections. All
systems were scanned to remove viruses and rootkits, including the attacker’s Trojan. As
a result, the attacker could no longer receive reports from the now deleted program that
had been installed on MPL’s SCADA_admin_workstation1.
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Fortunately for the attacker, he still had the keystroke captures and encrypted
password cache from an earlier time when Sally had logged on to the MPL network. He
was able to run a cracking program against the hashed password and keystroke dumps he
had captured when the Trojan was still active. After a few minutes, he was able to
extract the decrypted password and waited for the opportunity to try again.
In the attacker’s fourth attempt, the same packets were sent, this time properly
encrypted. The encryption check passed but the firewall rules module noted a rules
mismatch in its scorekeeper, because logon attempts from an external IP address (i.e.
outside of the MPL network), indicated by the incoming interface and the source IP
address in the packet, were not allowed by the MPL security policy. The activity was
blocked at the MPL trust system and the adjacent company trust system was notified to
update its firewall rules to block further logon attempts from its network into the MPL
network. The firewall_rules_update request might have initiated an alert to the screen of
the adjacent company’s network security analysts to either approve or deny the requested
rules change, in this manner providing a human-in-the loop review, instead of completely
automated inter-company security configuration changes.
Finally, in a fifth attempt, the spoofed source IP was changed to reflect a
legitimate MPL address from which user smwashingt might realistically attempt to logon
internally to the MPL logon server. In this case, the packet was not received on the
proper internal interface for that IP address (i.e. received on an external interface when
MPL logon traffic should have been all internal) and was again rejected by the MPL
trust system firewall rules at trust_router3.
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Consider if trust router3 had not been there. The network trust system at
trust_router2, receiving TCP control packets and a logon_request from an MPL corporate
office IP address, might have been tempted to assume the activity to be legitimate (by its
IP address and interface) and allowed the packets into the network, routing them to the
logon server.
A quick trust system comparison of the actual traversal time of the packet (from
send to receive timestamps) to the estimated travel time for a packet from the corporate
office to reach the trust_router2 (based on distance and last congestion measurement)
would have indicated the packet likely originated a much further distance away and
would have been watched as suspicious.
Without the attacker being able to insert himself in the middle of the
conversations, the logon server responses were routed to the source IP listed in the
packets, an MPL node, which would have dropped them because it was not expecting
them (i.e. it had no active connection with the logon server and had not sent a
logon_request). A trust agent at that node would have recognized this activity as
suspicious and alerted the network trust system.
Even if the attacker had gained physical or virtual access to MPL switches or
links, and could perform a man-in-the middle attack, he needed the correct credentials for
the logon to be approved.
What he did not know yet was that even with the correct username and password,
he would not be granted a high enough ACCN to gain root-level access. Had MPL’s
security policy allowed Sally to simply logon with a separate root account password for
higher level privileges, the attacker’s captures and password cracking program would
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have provided the tools necessary to steal her password and gain root access. In contrast,
with the trust system’s credential credibility based access control, the quantity and
credibility of logon credentials is used in determining a user’s access level. The attacker
had no easy way to spoof Sally’s biometric or smart card credentials and could not use
these to gain root-level access.
4.7.3

Scenario 6 – False Status Update.

Having failed at a logon attempt, with the intent to still exhibit remote control of
the MPL network, the attacker turned his attention to studying SCADA protocol
documentation gleaned from numerous technical papers and vendor websites on the
Internet. From his review, and after sniffing and cracking MPL’s inter-company traffic,
the attacker recognized the communications protocols for MPL’s SCADA updates and
other operational messages.
The attacker crafted a false status message, Figure 32, to test his newly found
expertise and attempt to direct emergency actions on the MPL SCADA network. He
spoofed the adjacent company’s master control station IP address and sent the message
using TCP with the emergency flag set.
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MESSAGE TCP
//begin IPv6 outer header for tunnel mode
IP2_traffic_class
11A0
IP2_flow_label
124C7
IP2_source_address
2001:DC99:31AC:9AAD:FC29:6C1A:80EA:4057
//network_TS@adjacent1_trust_router7
IP2_destination_address
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4050
//network_TS@MPL_trust_router2
//end IPv6 outer header for tunnel mode
…
//begin IPv6 inner header for tunnel mode
IP1_traffic_class
32EF
IP1_flow_label
AA89C
IP1_payload_length
101
IP1_source_address
2001:DC99:31AC:9AAD:FC29:6C1A:80EA:3200
//adjacent1_SCADA_master_station
IP1_destination_address
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:3200
//MPL_SCADA_master_station
//end IPv6 inner header for tunnel mode
//begin TCP header
…
TCP_source_port
500
TCP_destination_port
500
…
//end TCP header
//begin message data
message_type
status
time_message_created
09:00:00.0000-1Jul07
busNumber
3378
busName
PARKVIEW
CAname
CA1
companyName
C
nominalVoltageKV
+0211.000
busVoltPu
+0001.084
VoltKV
+0137.581
busAngleDeg
+0013.790
loadMW
+0017.610
loadMvar
+0320.740
gen_MW
-0236.740
genMvar
+0234.020
switchedShuntsMvar
+0200.000
actGshuntMW
+0009.110
actBshuntMvar
-0006.760
//end message data
…

Figure 32. Packet 6-1 (Status Message with Spoofed Adjacent Source IP)

The packet looked legitimate and passed all trust system checks except the time
check. Status updates from that company were normally forwarded every 4 secs. This
one was early. For reliability, the input was matched to the last status from the company,
which indicated a tremendous jump in values. Input from CA1 was also expected. The
last area_status from CA1 indicated no such emergency conditions. The final straw was
an actual status from the adjacent company, on-time, indicating no emergency situation.
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The MPL trust system then queried the adjacent company’s trust system to
verify its master station had sent the first emergency status message. It replied negatively
and together they began tracking and blocking the source.
The attacker could see this interaction and, though not successful in causing the
reaction he’d hoped, now he had the means to initiate connections to the MPL network,
but had to re-crack the key after each daily key update. The trust systems were also
blocking his activity now from the compromised adjacent company workstation.
4.7.4

Scenario 7 - Work Schedule Mismatch.

The next evening, the attacker traveled to a nearby remote, unattended substation
owned by MPL. MPL had purchased security cameras and motion detectors to monitor
for break-ins to the substation yard but had not yet installed them. The attacker was able
to climb the fence into the substation with his laptop and found an unlocked door through
which he could access one of the company’s IEDs and the data concentrator. MPL was
still in the process of implementing its security policy and the SCADA administrators
were currently disabling all dial-up connections and logons previously allowed through
terminal ports on substation equipment. In this manner, vendor representatives or MPL
administrators were now required to either physically log on to a computer within the
MPL network or be granted access (i.e. after a terminal port was re-activated) by an
administrator from the operations center, to allow a direct computer connection to IEDs
and other SCADA nodes.
After attempting the first terminal port, which had been disabled by the SCADA
administrator, the attacker found another port that had not been disabled. He was able to
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connect his laptop to the IED but found he was not allowed to logon directly to the
system, instead the IED nodal trust agent displayed a banner explaining that he was
required to first logon to the network to gain access to the data and code on the IED. An
IED trust agent was capable of forwarding logon_requests, on behalf of a connected
user, to the network logon server for authentication and accountability of actions. The
attacker’s first attempt failed because MPL was now using a different key for internal
communications than it used for external communications between MPL and other utility
organizations; however, it was using the same authentication and encryption protocols
and mode.
The attacker was prepared, and had the encryption cracking program loaded on
his laptop. After a few minutes of effort in cracking the internal encryption key, the
attacker crafted connection requests and a logon_request message, Packet 7-4, displayed
in Figure 33. He then encrypted it, and forwarded it to the MPL network logon server in
an attempt to logon with Sally’s username and password. He did not have any other
credentials he could supply.
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MESSAGE TCP
/begin IPv6 tunnel mode outer header
…
IP2_source_address
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4239
//nodal_TS@MPL_IED-239
IP2_destination_address
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4050
//network_TS@MPL_trust_router2
…
//end IPv6 tunnel mode outer header
//begin AH header
…
//end AH header
//begin ESP header
…
//end ESP header
//begin IPv6 tunnel mode inner header
…
IP1_source_address
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:3908
//attacker_laptop_with_spoofed_MPL_IP_and_MAC
IP1_destination_address
2001:A344:4DD1:F76F:D2CB:3B09:5629:1000
//MPL_logon_server
…
//end IPv6 tunnel mode inner header
…
//begin message data
message_type
logon_request
time_message_created
20:00:00.000-2Jul07
username
smwashingt
number_of_credentials
4
credential_1_type
PASS
credential_1
!#V8k12g4x
//end message data
//begin ESP trailer
…
//end ESP trailer
//begin ESP trailer
…
//end ESP trailer

Figure 33. Packet 7-4 (After Hours Logon Request from Substation IED)

The logon server validated the two credentials and notified the trust system. The trust
system checked the logon time against Sally’s work schedule, depicted in Table 25, and
identified that she was not scheduled to work during that shift. As a result, a suspicious
event was initiated and a security alert generated, as depicted in Figure 34.

Table 25. Trust System Work Schedule File Entry.
Username
smwashingt

Date
2Jul07

Start
08:00

203

Stop
18:00

(+/-)
00:35

SECURITY ALERT:
SEID-20:00:03.0207-2Jul07
INFRACTION/S
ACTION/s
PACKET DETAIL
type
time_message_created
source_address
source_port
dest_address
dest_port
protocol

Logon not authorized—work schedule mismatch.
Denied by NTS ACM.
logon_request
20:00:00.0000-2Jul07
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:0239
500(ISAKMP)
2001:A344:4DD1:F76F:D2CB:3B09:5629:1000
500(ISAKMP)
TCP

SUSPICIOUS EVENT LOG:
------------SEID-20:00:03.0207-2Jul07(NETWORK TRUST SYSTEM)------------UPDATE-20:00:03.5341-2Jul07 (All times in seconds)
tracker/s
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:0239
smwashingt
message_type
logon_request
_____________________________________________________________________
ACTIONS
Logon denied by ACM
_____________________________________________________________________
TIME CHECK
sent
…
received
…
incoming delay
…
[PASSED]
_____________________________________________________________________
FIREWALL RULES CHECK
rule_matched
…
source_IP
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:0239
[PASSED]
dest_IP
2001:A344:4DD1:F76F:D2CB:3B09:5629:1000
[PASSED]
destPort
500
[PASSED]
_____________________________________________________________________
CHECKSUM CHECK
checksum
010111010101111
[PASSED]
___________________________________________________________________
FORMAT CHECK
message_type
logon_request
[PASSED]
time_message_created
20:00:00.000-2Jul07
[PASSED]
username
smwashingt
[PASSED]
number_of_credentials
4
[PASSED]
credential_1_type
PASS
[PASSED]
credential_1
**********
[PASSED]
_____________________________________________________________________
LOGON CREDENTIALS CHECK
time_logon_attempted
20:00:00.000-2Jul07
username
smwashingt
[PASSED]
password
**********
[PASSED]
logon_ACCN
2
_____________________________________________________________________
ACM CHECK
work_schedule_day
2Jul07
[PASSED]
work_schedule_time
07:25-18:35
[FAILED]
trust level
-0
[PASSED]
effective_ACCN_assigned
0
_____________________________________________________________________
SANITIZATION
Not required.

Figure 34. Work Schedule Mismatch Warning and Denied Logon
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During the day, a message would have been sent to a logged on network
administrator, requesting approval or denial of the logon; however, with no logged on
administrators (or if a timely response was not received), the logon was denied by the
trust system with an effective ACCN of 0 assigned. The attacker would have to try
again when Sally was scheduled to work.
The security alert and log results would be sufficient to indicate malicious
activity, especially if Sally were questioned the next day to verify if she had tried to
logon to the substation IED after hours. Recognizing the malicious attempt would
prompt the network administrator to require an immediate password change for her
account before allowing her to logon again, further complicating the attacker’s attempt to
use Sally’s account. However, let’s assume that the event was not caught or reacted to
quickly enough.
The attacker left the substation in a fury and stormed through the empty parking
lot toward his car. Noting something on the ground, he picked it up, and squinted reading
the small print of the card, depicted in Figure 5.

Figure 35. Front and Back, Respectively, of Administrator Smart Card

205

4.7.5 Scenario 8 - Malicious Simultaneous Logon.
The next morning the attacker attempted access from the substation once again.
Sally was working that day and the attacker’s logon occurred after Sally had already
logged onto the network from SCADA_admin_workstation1 with the correct password
and fingerprint scan. With these credentials, the trust system had assigned her an
effective ACCN of 4, root-level access, as a SCADA_administrator. For some
unknown reason, she hadn’t been able to find her smart card that morning and assumed
she may have accidentally left it at work or dropped it during her trip to the substation the
afternoon before.
That morning the attacker again supplied the correct username and password
credentials, which were validated by the logon server as depicted in Figure 36.

MESSAGE TCP
//begin IPv6 header
…
IP1_source_address
IP1_destination_address
…
//end IPv6 header
//begin AH header
…
//end AH header
//begin ESP header
…
//end ESP header
//begin message data
message_type
time_message_created
username
number_of_credentials
credential_1_type
credential_1_pass
//end message data
//begin ESP trailer
…
//end ESP trailer
//begin ESP ICV
…
//end ESP ICV

2001:A344:4DD1:F76F:D2CB:3B09:5629:1000
//MPL_logon_server
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:0239
//MPL_IED-239

logon_evaluated
08:45:00.000-3Jul07
smwashingt
1
PASS
YES

Figure 36. Packet 8-4 (Credentials Evaluation for Second IED Logon Attempt)
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In addition, the trust system recognized a previous and still active logon by the
same username at another IP address, SCADA_admin_workstation1. The simultaneous
logon attempt prompted the initiation of a suspicious event and a query_simultaneous_
logon message (Figure 37) forwarded to SCADA_admin_workstation1, where the same
username had logged on previously.

MESSAGE UDP
//begin IPv6 header
…
IP1_source_address
IP1_destination_address
//end IPv6 header
//begin AH header
…
//end AH header
//begin ESP header
…
//end ESP header
//begin UDP header
…
destination_port
protocol
…
//end UDP header
//begin message data
message_type
time_message_created
username
logon_IP
on_behalf_of
effective_ACCN_assigned
//end message data
//begin ESP trailer
…
//end ESP trailer
//begin ESP ICV
…
//end ESP ICV

2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:3210
//network_TS@MPL_trust_router2
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4051
//nodal_TS@MPL_SCADA_Workstation1

500
UDP

query_simultaneous_logon
…
smwashingt
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:0239
//MPL_IED-239
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:3908
//attacker_laptop_with spoofed_MPL_IP_and_MAC
2

Figure 37. Simultaneous Logon Query Message to First Logged-on User
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The alert illustrated in Figure 38 was displayed on the screen of SCADA_admin_
workstation1.

Figure 38. Simultaneous Logon Alert Displayed at SCADA_admin_workstation1

At that instant, Sally was away from her desk and did not see the message. When
no response was received within the trust system’s time-to-wait threshold (set to 15
seconds), the simultaneous logon was allowed and a logon_approved message was sent
to the source IP address from which the attacker’s request was initiated.
However, with only username and password supplied, the trust system assigned
an effective ACCN of 2 to this second logon attempt by username smwashingt, granting
only basic user access and not the SCADA administrator role the attacker desired.
The IED-239 trust agent updated its nodal ACM with the approved username and
effective ACCN, then granted access to the attacker. The attacker was thrilled when his
logon was approved but soon found he was only granted full access to office automation
tools and e-mail and read-only access to web pages, as a basic user, but no administrative
rights. Furthermore, as he perused directories he could view network common drives, but
he was prevented from viewing any of the node’s operational data and code files or any
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other SCADA network systems or tools, the folders of which were all denied read access
(including viewing their existence) due to his low effective ACCN.
Even if the attacker had attempted to use the smart card before Sally notified the
network administrator she had lost hers (and the network administrator disabled smart
card logon credentials until it was found or replaced), without the PIN, the attacker could
only be assigned a logon ACCN of 3 with the correct username, password, and card,
which, according to the MPL trust system ACM of Table 14, would allow him read-only
access to operational and emergency data and code and execute access to tools, but not
the ability to modify, copy, or delete either data type. Although this limited administrator
privilege is primarily to allow a legitimate non-elevated employee to perform basic
administrator/operator functions quickly in emergency situations, it does not allow full
administrative privileges which would be much more devastating in the hands of an
attacker.
Denied his desired administrative privilege on the SCADA network, the attacker
quickly perused the MPL intranet pages and discovered the name of another MPL
SCADA administrator. He sent an elevation request (i.e. a query_elevation message)
with the parameters depicted in Figure 39.
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MESSAGE UDP
//begin IPv6 tunnel mode outer header
…
IP2_source_address
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4239
//nodal_TS@MPL_IED-239
IP2_destination_address
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4050
//network_TS@MPL_trust_router2
…
//end IPv6 tunnel mode outer header
//begin AH header
…
//end AH header
//begin ESP header
…
//end ESP header
//begin IPv6 tunnel mode inner header
…
IP1_source_address
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:0239
//MPL_IED-239
IP1_destination_address
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:3905
//MPL_SCADA_admin_workstation5
//end IPv6 tunnel mode inner header
//begin UDP header
…
destination_port
protocol
…
//end UDP header
//begin message data
message_type
time_message_created
username
effective_ACCN_assigned
requested_ACCN
note
//end message data
//begin ESP trailer
…
//end ESP trailer
//begin ESP ICV
…
//end ESP ICV

500
UDP

query_elevation
…
smwashingt
2
4
I forgot my card today. Thanks.

Figure 39. Elevation Request Message from the Attacker to a SCADA Administrator

When the second SCADA administrator received the elevation_request message
on his desktop, he had not visually identified Sally. Since she was in a different building
but he could recognize her voice, he called her desk to make sure it was really her
attempting to elevate her privileges without supplying all of the required credentials.
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When the phone rang, Sally was just returning and picked up the call. She
confirmed she had not initiated the request. The second SCADA administrator promptly
denied the elevation request as depicted in Figure 40.
MESSAGE UDP
…
//begin message data
message_type
time_message_created
query_type
query_time
response1
//end message data
…

query_response
…
query_elevation
…
no

Figure 40. Message Denying Attacker’s Elevation Request

The trust system initiated a suspicious event and continued monitoring for any
more related suspicious activity. Meanwhile, Sally noticed the simultaneous logon
message still displayed on her screen. She immediately selected DENY, which sent the
message shown in Figure 410 to the trust system.

MESSAGE UDP
…
//begin message data
message_type
time_message_created
query_type
query_time
response1
//end message data
…

query_response
…
query_sim_logon
…
no

Figure 41. Denial of Simultaneous Logon by the True User

The trust system notified the logon server to logoff the second logon by
username smwashingt, disconnecting the attacker and updating the network-level trust
system ACM and that of IED-239 not to allow further logon attempts by that username

211

from that source IP address. A security alert, Figure 42, was then generated by the trust
system.

SECURITY ALERT-…
SEID
ACSE
INFRACTION

ACTION

PACKET DETAIL
type
source_address
source_port
dest_address
dest_port
protocol
sim_logon_IP
on_behalf_of

…
Simultaneous logon denied.
Username smwashingt at SCADA_admin_workstation1 denied
simultaneous logon at IED-239.
Simultaneous logon active for … sec.
Second logon disconnected by network_TS@trust_router2.
Automated simultaneous logon by smwashingt denied in ACM
until reinstated.
query_response
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:3901
//MPL_SCADA_admin_workstation1
500(ISAKMP)
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4050
500(ISAKMP)
UDP
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:0239
//MPL_IED-239
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:3908
//attacker_laptop_with spoofed_MPL_IP_and_MAC

Figure 42. Security Alert for Malicious Simultaneous Logon

Failing at all attempts over the last few days, the attacker abandoned his plot to
disrupt MPL’s operations and turned his attention to easier targets in other companies
that had not implemented such comprehensive rings of defense.
4.7.6 Scenario 9 - Disgruntled Employees.
Installation of IEDs, high-speed fiber optic links, and the trust system’s
additional security measures had increased MPL’s efficiency and security, reducing the
need for as many SCADA administrators. As a result, two employees with poor
performance records (who were only kept around because of their close-held knowledge
about the legacy systems) were notified in advance that they would be let go. This was to
be their last day. Angry, they had been plotting together, over the last week, to steal
company-sensitive financial and network configuration data they could sell for profit.
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They also planned to sabotage the SCADA network with false data, hoping to cause a
local blackout that might cost MPL hundreds of thousands of dollars in revenue this
month. The individuals were aware that the company security policy required their
accounts to be immediately disabled the very afternoon of their last day, just after leaving
the building. As administrators, still in possession of a smart card and able to provide
biometric credentials in addition to a PIN, on their final day they were still authorized to
logon with full root-level privileges.
One individual, an IT_network_administrator, attempted to steal a particularly
negative quarterly financial forecast and overdue maintenance records, which if made
public, might hurt the company’s reputation and potential value of company stocks. He
also planned to download network diagrams, password files, and configuration settings
that would be valuable to US or international hackers seeking to exploit utility networks.
He searched the common drives and found the quarterly report data which was
viewable to his role. He then attempted to copy it to a thumbdrive, whereby his
workstation sent the packet shown in Figure 43, a copy request message, to the common
drive server hosting the file.
MESSAGE TCP
…
//begin message data
message_type
time_message_created
username
operation_type
file
//end message data
…

operation_request
…
bearnold
copy
L:\Finance\QuarterlyReports\Jul-Sep\FinancialForecast.ppt

Figure 43. Insider’s Request to Copy File FinancialForecast.ppt
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The trust system, checked the administrator’s role and effective ACCN against
the ACM and found he was authorized to read but not copy this data. In addition, as an
IT network administrator, he did not have permissions to change the trust system ACM
settings, as a security administrator role would have had. Figure 44 illustrates the denial
message displayed to the disgruntled employee’s screen.

Figure 44. Denial Message for Copy Attempt

Next he found the folders containing network diagrams and the logon server’s
password cache. He did have authority, by his role, to copy these and was able to
download them to his thumbdrive using the requests depicted in Figures 45 and 46.
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MESSAGE TCP
…
//begin message data
message_type
time_message_created
username
operation_type
from_file
from_file_data_type
from_file_caveat
//end message data
MESSAGE TCP
…
//begin message data
message_type
time_message_created
username
operation_type
from_file
to_file

operation_request
…
bearnold
copy
L:\IT\Diagrams\LAN_Diagram(current).vsd
//common drive
ND
//network data
company-sensitive

operation_request
…
bearnold
paste
L:\IT\Diagrams\LAN_Diagram(current).vsd
//common drive
F:\Copy of LAN_Diagram(current).vsd
//removable drive

//end message data

Figure 45. Insider’s Copy and Paste of the Network Diagram File
MESSAGE TCP
…
//begin message data
message_type
time_message_ceated
username
operation_type
from_file
from_file_data_type
from_file_caveat
//end message data

MESSAGE TCP
…
//begin message data
message_type
time_message_created
username
operation_type
from_file
from_file_data_type
from_file_caveat
to_file

operation_request
…
bearnold
copy
C:/etc/passwd\MPLpw.txt
ND
//network data
restricted-release

operation_request
…
bearnold
paste
C:\etc\passwd\MPLpw.txt
//logon server password file
ND
restricted-release
F:\Copy of C:\etc\passwd\MPLpw.txt
//removable drive

//end message data

Figure 46. Insider’s Copy and Paste of the Password File
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However, all actions were logged to the historical database for which he did not
have permissions to modify. Next he attempted to e-mail them to his home e-mail
account, sending the Packet depicted in Figure 47.
MESSAGE TCP
…
//begin message data
message_type
time_message_created
username
To
Cc
Bcc
Text

number_of_attachments
attachment_1
attachment_1_dataType
attachment_2_caveat
attachment_2
attachment_2_dataType
attachment_2_caveat
e-mail_dataTypes
e-mail_caveat
//end message data
…

e-mail
…
bearnold
hackersblog@yoohoo.com
ihatemycompany@snotmail.com
jwboothe@homenetwork.net
m@dH@k3r, I got the initial $5000 check, so
here’s the LAN diagram and password file for
MPL as promised! I expect 50% of the highest
bid when this gets posted on your site.
-benedict
2
F:\Copy of LAN_Diagram(current).vsd
//copied network diagram
ND
company-sensitive
F:\Copy of C:\etc\passwd\MPLpw.txt
//copied password file
ND
restricted-release
ND
restricted-release

Figure 47. Disgruntled Employee’s First E-mail Attempt

The trust system inspected the message and found the attachments. When it
checked the data type against usernames associated with the sender and receiver e-mail
accounts it determined that these files contained company-sensitive data not authorized
for release outside the company network, so the e-mail was blocked. The log entry and
security alert pictures in Figure 48 were generated.
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SECURITY ALERT-…
SEID
ACSE

…
Release-restricted data not authorized to leave
company network.
User bearnold attempted to e-mail releaserestricted, ND attachment to unauthorized
recipient/s.
Attachment stripped from e-mail by ACM.

INFRACTION

ACTION
PACKET DETAIL
type
source_address
source_port
dest_address1
dest_address2
dest_address3
dest_port
protocol
number_of_attachments
attachment_1
attachment_1_dataType
attachment_2_caveat
attachment_2
attachment_2_dataType
attachment_2_caveat
e-mail_dataTypes
overall_e-mail_caveat

e-mail
2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:3901
//MPL_network_admin_workstation1
500(ISAKMP)
hackersblog@yoohoo.com
ihatemycompany@snotmail.com
jwboothe@homenetwork.net
500(ISAKMP)
TCP
2
F:\Copy of LAN_Diagram(current).vsd
ND
company-sensitive
F:\Copy of C:\etc\passwd\MPLpw.txt
ND
restricted-release
ND
restricted-release

Figure 48. Security Alert and Log Entry for Blocked E-mail

The administrator then changed the names of the files, re-attached them, and
attempted to resend them as shown in Figures 49 and 50.

MESSAGE TCP
…
//begin message data
message type
time_message_created
username
operation_type
attribute
from
to
data type
caveat
//end message data
…

operation_request
…
bearnold
modify
filename
F:\Copy of LAN_Diagram(current).vsd
//copy of network diagram (original name)
F:\picture.vsd
//new name of file
ND
company-sensitive
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MESSAGE TCP
…
//begin message data
message type
time_message_created
username
operation_type
attribute
from
to
data_type
caveat

operation_request
…
bearnold
modify
filename
F:\Copy of C:\etc\passwd\MPLpw.txt
//copy of password file (original name)
F:\moneymaker.txt
//new name of file
ND
//same file, so data_type remains (un-editable)
restricted-release
//same file, so data type remains (un-editable)

//end message data
…

Figure 49. File Name Changes on Files Copied to Thumbdrive

MESSAGE TCP
…
//begin message data
message_type
time_message_created
username
To
Cc
Bcc
text

e-mail
…
bearnold
ihatemycompany@snotmail.com
hackersblog@yoohoo.com
jwboothe@homenetwork.net
m@dH@k3r, I got the initial $5000 check, so here’s the LAN
diagram and password file for Company A as promised! I
expect 50% of the highest bid when this gets posted on
your site. -benedict
number_of_attachments 2
attachment_1
F:\picture.vsd
//copied network diagram
attachment_1_dataType ND
attachment_2_caveat
company-sensitive
attachment_2
F:\moneymaker.txt
//copied password file
attachment_2_dataType ND
attachment_2_caveat
restricted-release

Figure 50. Insider’s Second Outgoing E-mail Attempt with File Names Changed

At this time the trust system was only configured to prevent inadvertent
disclosures, however, simply changing the filename of a copy of an existing file, that had
already been assigned a data type, did not change the file’s assigned data type. Again the
e-mail was blocked. The administrator then removed his thumb drive. A workstationlevel trust agent might have generated a message to the administrator’s screen asking if
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he meant to download company-sensitive data or generating a security_alert. In such a
case, even clicking yes and proceeding with the theft or modifying the contents slightly
and renaming, the file download would still be logged to the historical database.
In this case the trust system, updated the suspicious event, generated a new
security_alert with the second failed attempt details, and lowered the trust level for the
username. An analyst seeing the security_ alert event might have immediately
recognized the potential harm and stopped the theft right away. Let’s assume this did not
happen immediately, but all actions were recorded and viewable after-the-fact.
The second disgruntled employee, a SCADA administrator, was authorized to
successfully download current SCADA configuration files. Had he been assigned any
other role, he would not have had these privileges. In this case, the trust system was not
configured to alert for copy actions on sensitive-data by an employee on his last day,
which would have alerted security analysts of suspicious activity, however, his actions
were also logged by the historical database.
The next morning, reviews of the previous day’s logs indicated the activity by the
administrators and they were greeted by law enforcement at their residences.
4.8

Chapter Summary
Chapter 4 has demonstrated trust system functionality and security enhancement

in the face of various benign and malicious scenarios. In each case, the trust system and
encryption simulations performed within acceptable time threshold requirements
indicating the potential for general implementation of the trust system on near real-time
utility communication architectures and carefully application to some real-time utility
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networks. Congestion was assumed to be prevented through bandwidth management but
was not simulated. A successful implementation will require bandwidth and QoS
guarantees, which will add additional overhead and delay to the scenarios.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1

Chapter Overview
This chapter summarizes the research findings and applicability of employing

collaborative, situationally-aware trust agents to manage security mechanisms such as
IPsec encryption, format inspection, and trust-based access control over time-constrained
Utility Intranet communications, both in local and wide-area interactions. It concludes by
recommending areas for follow-on research.
5.2

Conclusions of Research
This thesis indicates that the implementation of the proposed trust system

inspections add minimal overhead to communications and can reasonably be applied to
near real-time requirements. These mechanisms were shown to perform well in the face
of determined attacks. It also shows that a mix of UDP and TCP traffic can deliver
notifications that meet the majority of expected utility SCADA and wide-area protection
systems. In ideal, uncongested cases, they can even meet hard real-time response
thresholds, but must be augmented by strict bandwidth guarantees and maintain the state
of on-going events to prevent the negative effects of TCP congestion control and UDP
unreliable delivery on critical communications. While the implications of the proposed
trust system hold great promise for the electric power grid and other utilities, they are
certainly even more appropriate for many other networks that can afford less-strict
delivery requirements.
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5.3

Significance of Research
In a very difficult and not well understood area of communications, where

security solutions are still in their infancy, this research is a step forward in defining a
unique, defense-in-depth capability for an industry that has been slow to understand and
accept their increasing vulnerability to digital avenues of disruption. The community has
been even slower to learn new concepts and embrace the greater priority and corporatededication required to keep operations running smoothly and prevent potential
catastrophic consequences from network attacks in the coming years.
This research is important in debunking the myth that security mechanisms cannot
be applied to SCADA systems, yet it does reveal the added complexity of such
endeavors, where mistakes are unforgiving and can cripple industrial processes and risk
human life. Nevertheless, the old paradigm of ignoring network security in order to keep
process control and emergency reaction simple must be left behind and will require a
great degree of corporate and utility community investment in technologies, unique
network administration skillsets, network planning, testing, and routine training programs
(covering topics such as network technologies, attacker capabilities, and security
essentials) to continuously assess and refine the security posture of utility organizations.
This research also points to the increased safety that can result across the grid
through the secure sharing of information, facilitated by the trust system.
5.4

Recommendations for Action
It is the opinion of this author, that immediate action should be taken to develop

an ideal security architecture for the national power grid and that a national level agency
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should gather and manage detailed system and infrastructure requirements at levels
higher than individual companies, enforcing both reliability and security standards at the
same high level for all manufacturers. A national utility communications simulator
should be constructed to thoroughly test new configurations and industry patches before
deploying them to the national power grid.
An incentive must also be provided for developers of power equipment to gain the
appropriate network security expertise and for utilities to incorporate security into their
architectures. One way is to enforce a certification program for utilities that ranks them
according to their performance, efficiency, security posture, incident response and
prevention, innovation, and environmental impact. This program would serve to increase
healthy competition in the areas that will benefit the country in its security, energy
independence, and health for new generations. A certification program should also give
consumers a choice in their providers, increasing the incentive for companies to
transform their operations.
5.5

Recommendations for Future Research
Follow-on research is required in four main areas.

First, IP-based security

mechanisms are highly dependent on bandwidth and QoS guarantees, which will also add
additional negotiations and processing not accounted for in this thesis. A study and
incorporation of bandwidth management capabilities like Multi-Protocol Layer Switching
(MPLS) into this scheme is required.
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Second, additional testing with encryption schemes at IP network, and application
layers is needed to define which combination of software, hardware, and protocol-level
encryption and key distribution schemes are most appropriate.
Third, a more detailed integration of IEC61850 protocol message formats is
needed to accurately test exact time delays of future implementations over electric utility
communications networks.
Finally, the trust system simulator code should be optimized and integrated into a
robust network simulator such as Network Simulator 2 (NS/2) or OPNET, with more
robust scenarios of power events and network penetration attempts incorporated into
trust system scenarios. As a starting point, Hopkinson, et al., have already designed a
simulation engine known as Electric Power and Communication synCHronizing
Simulator (EPOCHS) that integrates NS/2 with a power system simulator.
An initial goal of the simulator development for this paper was to provide a
generic tool into which the specific communication parameters of each individual system
or network device could be entered and modified, depending on the actual or proposed
topology of a company’s network. The simulator code provided generic constantparameter place-holders for each device and medium (i.e. quantity of devices, link length
and signal speed in medium, message size, parameters for propagation and transmission
delay calculations, router queue size and processing delays) which could be modified in
the future to accurately reflect vendor-provided performance statistics of that company’s
network as newer technologies become available. The implementation for these
calculations was rudimentary (generic formulas and delay summation). Greater
performance granularity could be achieved with a network simulator such as OPNet or
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NS/2, which can simulate real-world performance of specific vendor routers and other
network devices and introduce varying background traffic loads.
Realistic scenarios could easily be implemented using the actual New York Power
Pool (NYPP) bus data that has been incorporated into EPOCHS files. A cascading
blackout scenario, similar to what occurred in the Northeast US in 2003, could be
recreated to show that the trust system is able to prevent the cascade and to measure the
time required for breakers to trip with the security mechanisms in place, a mix of TCP
and UDP trip messages, link drops, and varying background traffic loads. Also measured
should be the time required to notify and receive responses from control areas, regional
coordinators, and regional control centers.
To provide a sample of realistic data, the NYPP file could be used to simulate
multiple, interconnected SCADA networks. Specifically the busses and loads might be
arbitrarily divided into eight different zones (A-H) of roughly the same size, as depicted
in Figure 51. Each area, in this case would represent a different utility company and two
or three utility companies would comprise a single control area (CA) with a reliability
coordinator and ISO, for a total of three CAs. Although, the actual NYPP is organized
under a single ISO, the NYPP is unique in this regard. This selection is realistic since
most other states of comparable size are comprised of multiple ISOs overseeing one, two,
or three utility companies.
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Figure 51. New York Power Pool Subdivided Into Utility Companies

These eight subdivisions (i.e. A,B,C,D,E,F,G, and H) would represent eight
separate electric utility companies with responsibilities for generation, transmission, and
distribution. Each company has Utility Intranet connections to others in its vicinity.
These data connection edges could be modeled to parallel the actual point-to-point flows
of electric power that currently exist between power system nodes (generation plants,
substations, etc). The eight companies might comprise three different control areas,
where, for example, CA1 is comprised of three companies (A,B,C), CA2 is comprised of
three more companies (D,E,F), and the final control area, CA3, is comprised of only two
companies (G,H).
Generators, step-down transformers, and other power system entities would be
replaced in the Intranet communication model with communication nodes representing
either an IED/switch/router combination in a substation (or generation facility) or, at the
supervisory level, either the EMS/SCADA master station and its switch and router, the

226

company control center facility, the area control and engineering centers, or the reliability
coordination offices.
5.6

Summary
A variant of the trust system concept will enhance security and safety within the

US Utility Intranet by the unique traffic authorization, packet inspection, access control,
encryption, collaboration, and information sharing it enables.
The trust system can provide these capabilities (or a subset thereof) within the
strict time constraints of many SCADA and protection communications and is flexibly
configurable and modular, making it customizable and financially advantageous to any
corporation’s specific needs and budget.
It is this author’s opinion that a comprehensive, collaborative, and intelligencegathering approach like the trust system concept, will be the wave of the future in
automated network security implementations.
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Appendix A: Proposed Electric Utility Organizational Structure
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Appendix B: Information Sharing Possible Between Enclaves in the Utility Intranet
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Appendix C: Trust System Functions and Output
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Appendix D: Example File Structure for a Company’s Operational Network
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Appendix E: Operator’s Network Views on Operations LAN vs. Office LAN
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Appendix F: Measured Trust System Check Delay per Message Type
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Appendix G: Calculated Encryption/Authentication Delay per Message Type
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Appendix H: Scenario 2 Delay Results
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Appendix I: Scenario 3 Delay Results
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